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his is Old Dominion University’s fourth State of the Commonwealth 
Report. While it represents the work of many people connected in 
various ways to the university, the report does not constitute an official 
viewpoint of Old Dominion, its president, John R. Broderick, the Board of 
Visitors, the Strome College of Business or the generous donors who support 
the activities of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy. 
The report maintains the goal of stimulating thought and discussion that 
ultimately will make Virginia an even better place to live. The recent 
improvements in the Commonwealth’s economic performance present an 
opportunity to make wise investments to sustain the long-term economic 
health of Virginia.
The 2018 report is divided into six parts:
Virginia Breezes Along, but Are There Storm Clouds on the Horizon?
After an anemic recovery from the Great Recession and sequestration, 
Virginia’s economy picked up the pace in 2018 and is likely to improve in 
2019. We should not, however, grow complacent. There are storm clouds on 
the horizon. The challenge now is to enact wise policies to foster and sustain 
economic growth while preparing for the next eventual downturn. 
Moving Forward: Growth Improves for Virginia’s Metropolitan Areas
2017 was the first year since 2006 that each of Virginia’s metropolitan areas 
exhibited positive economic growth from the preceding year. The uneven 
economic performance of Virginia’s metros cannot easily be attributed to one 
specific factor. The challenge is how to stimulate development in all areas of 
the Commonwealth.
The Promise and Peril of Medicaid Expansion for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia
Virginia will expand Medicaid, a health insurance program for low-income 
adults and children, on Jan. 1, 2019. Medicaid expansion will reduce the 
number of uninsured, allow Medicaid recipients to work more and offer health 
care providers a measure of relief with regard to uncompensated care costs. 
The future costs of expansion, however, remain uncertain.
A Commonwealth Coming Together or Growing Apart?
We shed light on the diversities of circumstances and outcomes that exist in 
today’s Virginia. The distributions of income and wealth in the Commonwealth 
provide important information about the extent to which Virginians share an 
economic destiny.
Much Ado About Nothing? Virginia’s “Kings Dominion Law”
In 1986, Virginia passed into law a requirement that public schools cannot 
open until after Labor Day unless they met specific conditions for a waiver. In 
2017, over 50 percent of Virginia elementary, middle and high school students 
attended schools that opened prior to Labor Day. We ask whether there is 
evidence to support the commonly offered arguments for and against the 
Virginia “Kings Dominion law.”
Sin Taxes and Alcohol Consumption in Virginia
How does the Commonwealth tax alcohol? We look at the taxation of beer, 
wine and distilled spirits and the role of Virginia’s Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Authority. We investigate whether levying taxes on alcohol is an appropriate 
method of raising revenue.
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ALONG, BUT ARE 
THERE STORM CLOUDS 
ON THE HORIZON?
After climbing a great hill, one only finds 
that there are many more hills to climb. I 
have taken a moment here to rest, to steal 
a view of the glorious vista that surrounds 
me, to look back on the distance I have come. 
But I can only rest for a moment, for with 
freedom comes responsibilities, and I dare 




or six consecutive years since the 
end of the Great Recession, real 
(after-inflation) economic growth in 
Virginia lagged that of the United States. 
The twin hammers of the recession and 
federal budget sequestration fell heavily on 
the Commonwealth. Job creation lagged 
neighboring states, Virginians left in greater 
numbers in search of superior economic 
opportunities and perceptions of the business 
climate fell precipitously. Naysayers argued 
that Virginia’s time had passed and that 
the Commonwealth was no longer open for 
business. We could only look wistfully on the 
fortunes of Georgia, North Carolina and Texas 
and wonder how it all went wrong.
While some pessimism was warranted, Virginia 
finally appears to have turned the proverbial 
economic corner and has been accelerating 
in 2018. Federal government spending, which 
is responsible for more than 30 percent of 
the Virginia economy, is rising. Job creation 
continues to improve, tourism continues to 
grow and the housing sector is showing robust 
price growth. 
State government revenue collections rose 
during the 2017-18 fiscal year (FY) and 
through the second quarter of FY 2019. The 
Commonwealth wisely added to its “rainy day” 
fund to bolster its bond rating and increase its 
ability to weather inevitable future economic 
storms. 
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Virginia is poised for continued growth into 2019. The unemployment 
rate is nearing 3 percent and the labor force continues to expand. The 
Port of Virginia is expected to eclipse last year’s record for cargo traffic, 
although it must contend with increasing competition from other ports. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) base budget grew considerably in FY 
2018 and again in FY 2019, creating new demands for labor, especially in 
Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia. Efforts to improve the business 
climate have borne fruit, with a top-five ranking by CNBC in 2018. 
Virginia is, in fact, open for business.
Opportunities, however, are not without challenges. Economic growth 
continues to be unevenly distributed across the Commonwealth. Medicaid 
expansion, which will improve health outcomes of new enrollees and 
lower uncompensated care costs to health care providers, will constitute 
a net economic benefit to Virginia’s budget. On the other hand, Medicaid 
expansion may also increase the long-term financial risks associated with 
the Commonwealth’s budget because of the possible unreliability of federal 
funding to support the expansion.
Though Virginia continues to be an attractive destination for international 
migrants, it recently has struggled to retain its residents. The opioid crisis 
continues to plague the Commonwealth and the nation. Further, our labor 
force participation rate remains low when compared to the period prior 
to the Great Recession – about one-third of working-age residents are no 
longer actively participating in the labor force. 
Virginia, for better or worse, is impacted more by the vagaries of the 
federal government than many of its neighbors. The continuing trade 
conflict with China will adversely impact the operations of the Port of 
Virginia and all those who use the Port, including Virginia farmers. 
The federal government’s decision to increase spending and cut taxes is 
fueling growth in the short run but has also added to the federal debt. We 
must recognize that the current fiscal habits of the federal government are 
unsustainable and that, at some point, a retrenchment of spending and 
taxes must come. When this occurs, Virginia’s economic dependence on 
the federal government will once again prove problematic.
1 The compound average growth rate can be determined by the following: CAGR = ((Final Period/Initial Period)^(1/number of periods))-1.
After an anemic recovery from the Great Recession and sequestration, 
Virginia’s economy picked up the pace in 2018 and is likely to continue 
to improve more rapidly in 2019. Many standard economic indicators 
are not only pointing in the right direction, but also are at or near 
record levels. We should not, however, grow complacent. There are 
storm clouds on the horizon. The challenge now is to continue to enact 
wise policies to foster and sustain economic growth while preparing 
for the next eventual downturn. No tree grows to the sky, and every 
business cycle comes to an end.
Reconciling the prospects for growth in the short term with the 
uncertainty of the long term is a primary task we undertake in this 
chapter. We will examine these sometimes puzzling pieces of data and 
provide a more focused picture of the state of the Commonwealth and 
what policies will likely work best for Virginia in the years ahead. 
Growth Picks Up In 2018
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the headline measure of economic 
performance in the United States and the Commonwealth. It places a 
dollar value on all the goods and services we produce. While no measure of 
economic activity is perfect, and GDP does not count nonmarket activities 
such as barter, misses portions of the “gig economy” and does not place 
a value on household production, it remains the most commonly used 
benchmark of the value of overall economic activity. We should note that 
the GDP data on the state level arrive with some lag. The data for the 
second quarter of 2018 did not arrive until November 2018 and, as always, 
these numbers are subject to revision. 
Table 1 presents annual GDP for Virginia in nominal and real (inflation-
adjusted) dollars. We focus on real GDP, as it removes the influence of 
price inflation from our discussion. We can compute a compound average 
growth rate (CAGR) to obtain an annual average rate of growth from 
2006 to 2007.1 Virginia’s real GDP grew at an annual average rate 
of only 0.7 percent between 2006 and 2017. Even if we only focus on 
5the last five years, the average annual GDP growth rate was a mere 
0.9 percent from 2013 to 2017. To say that the economic performance 
of the Commonwealth was underwhelming in the early years of this 
decade might be an understatement.
TABLE 1
VIRGINIA’S REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES, 2006-2017
Year Nominal GDP Real GDP Real GDP Growth
2006 $379,180 $405,682 2.4%
2007 $392,553 $408,148 0.6%
2008 $398,817 $407,227 -0.2%
2009 $407,302 $407,302 0.0%
2010 $420,862 $416,903 2.4%
2011 $429,174 $419,724 0.7%
2012 $441,144 $422,269 0.6%
2013 $449,235 $422,275 0.0%
2014 $459,242 $422,957 0.2%
2015 $479,669 $430,768 1.8%
2016 $491,221 $432,862 0.5%
2017 $508,662 $441,494 2.0%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018
Graph 1 compares the Commonwealth’s economic performance with that 
of the United States from 2010 to 2017. The conclusion is clear: Real GDP 
growth for the U.S. was higher than that for Virginia, on average, in each 
year this decade. However, Virginia’s economic performance did improve 
in 2017, with the Commonwealth’s real growth rate approaching that of 
the U.S. Let’s look at the data.
Graph 2 presents the annualized percentage change in quarterly real 
GDP from the first quarter of 2014 through the second quarter of 2018 
for Virginia. The Commonwealth’s economy vacillated between growth 
and contraction from the first quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2017. 
Since the second quarter of 2017, however, Virginia has grown for five 
consecutive quarters and appears to be poised to grow well into 2019.
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GRAPH 1
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES: 
GROWTH OF REAL GDP, 2010-2017




VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES: 
ACTUAL AND FORECASTED GROWTH OF REAL GDP, 2010-2017 
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7GRAPH 2
VIRGINIA: ANNUALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN QUARTERLY REAL GDP, 
1ST QUARTER 2014 TO 2ND QUARTER 2018
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Comparing the quarterly economic performance of the United States and 
Virginia from the first quarter of 2016 to the second quarter of 2018 yields 
some interesting insights. Table 2 illustrates that 2016 was a mixture of 
quarterly economic growth and contraction. Even though the Virginia 
economy contracted in the first quarter of 2017, what followed is not only 
several straight quarters of growth, but, more importantly, growth at 
a rate nearing that or equal to the United States. This is a remarkable 
change from the first six years of the decade where Virginia’s overall 
economic performance has lagged that of the nation. 
Drawing back, there now appears to be sufficient data for us 
to conclude that the Virginia economy has pulled itself out of 
the doldrums of the Great Recession and sequestration. The 
Commonwealth economy is not only growing, it is accelerating ahead.
Graph 3 presents data for the first half of 2018 as well as our forecasts for 
the second half of 2018 and 2019 for the United States and Virginia. U.S. 
economic growth surged in the second quarter of 2018, largely due to the 
impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and the Bipartisan Budget 
Agreement of 2018. Second quarter 2018 growth also surged in Virginia 
due, in part, to increases in defense spending. However, after the second 
quarter of 2018, we expect that national economic growth will taper. We 
forecast that the U.S. and Virginia economies will grow at similar rates 
(subject to our usual caveats on economic shocks) through 2019. 
That the Virginia economy is expected to perform as well as the U.S. 
economy is a significant change from earlier in this decade. Given the large 
increases in defense spending through September 2019, plus improved 
expectations due to the announcement of Amazon’s HQ2 in Northern 
Virginia, we expect Virginia’s growth will likely outperform the United 
States in 2019.
TABLE 2
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES:  
ANNUALIZED CHANGE IN QUARTERLY REAL GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT, 2016 Q1-2018 Q2
Year United States Virginia
2016 Q1 1.5% -4.1%
2016 Q2 2.3% 3.0%
2016 Q3 1.9% 1.7%
2016 Q4 1.8% 3.9%
2017 Q1 1.8% -0.7%
2017 Q2 3.0% 2.4%
2017 Q3 2.8% 2.8%
2017 Q4 2.3% 1.3%
2018 Q1 2.2% 2.1%
2018 Q2 4.2% 4.2%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018 and Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy. Real GDP 
is measured in millions of chained 2012 dollars, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. The data represent the 
annualized change in quarterly real GDP from the previous quarter. 
9GRAPH 3
ACTUAL AND FORECASTED ANNUALIZED QUARTERLY REAL GDP GROWTH: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2018 Q1 TO 2019 Q4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. U.S. third quarter 2018 real GDP is the second estimate, while Virginia second quarter 2018 is the advance 
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Federal Spending Rises, 
But Will It Last?
One of the main drivers of Virginia’s economic engine is federal 
government spending. Not only has Virginia consistently ranked among 
the top five states in terms of federal spending as a percentage of state 
GDP, but also it ranked first in terms of federal spending per capita in FY 
2015.2 About 30 percent of economic activity in the Commonwealth can be 
attributed to the activities of the federal government.
While income transfers to individuals are a part of the overall activity of 
the federal government in Virginia, these programs are largely driven by 
law. Social Security payments, for example, may be influenced by decisions 
about cost-of-living adjustments, but these payments are largely outside 
the purview of the annual budgeting process. Discretionary spending, 
on the other hand, is typically drafted, debated, passed by Congress and 
signed into law on an annual basis.3
An award is defined as money the federal government has promised to 
pay a recipient. Funding may be awarded to a company, organization, 
government or individual. An obligation is a binding agreement between 
the federal government and the recipient of the award to spend an award 
now or in the future.
Table 3 illustrates how awards from the federal government flow into the 
Commonwealth. Federal contract awards are typically the largest category, 
followed by direct payment awards to individuals. Total federal awards per 
capita in FY 2018 were approximately $12,000 in Virginia, slightly more 
than the $11,360 per capita in Maryland and significantly higher than the 
$6,800 in awards per capita in North Carolina.
2  “Federal Spending in the States (2017),” The Council of State Government. http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/2017_CFFR_Report_3.pdf.
3  We recognize there are multiyear appropriations (shipbuilding, for example), but the majority of discretionary appropriations are for a specific fiscal year.
TABLE 3
NOMINAL FEDERAL AWARDS IN VIRGINIA: 
BILLIONS OF NOMINAL DOLLARS, FISCAL YEARS 2016-2018*
Year FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018
Contracts $50.6 $52.9 $51.7
Direct Payments $28.3 $32.8 $35.5




Loans 0.001 $0.5 $1.2
Total $88.3 $99.2 $102.0
Source: USAspending.com. Data are current as of Dec. 2, 2018, and are subject to revision. We caution 
that the FY 2018 data are likely to be revised, as the fiscal year concluded on Sept. 30, 2018. An award is 
a promise by the federal government to pay a recipient and an obligation is a binding agreement for the 
federal government to pay part or all of an award.
Graph 4 illustrates total federal awards, DOD awards and non-DOD 
awards made to individuals or organizations in Virginia from FY 2008 
to FY 2018. Between FY 2008 and FY 2011, DOD awards stagnated and 
then actually declined between FY 2011 and FY 2015. Federal budget 
sequestration and the subsequent caps on discretionary spending clearly 
negatively affected DOD awards in Virginia. However, because non-DOD 
award increases were greater than DOD award decreases from FY 2009 to 
FY 2011, total federal spending increased in Virginia. 
From FY 2012 through FY 2014, total federal awards declined and did not 
grow significantly in FY 2015 and FY 2016. It should be no surprise that 
the uptick in federal awards in FY 2017 and FY 2018 is closely aligned 
with increases in the Commonwealth’s economic performance. The ebbs 
and flows of total federal spending this decade in Virginia are clearly 
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Federal contract awards in Virginia totaled $51.7 billion in FY 2018 
and accounted for almost 51 percent of all federal awards in the 
Commonwealth. Virginia also ranked second in the nation in total federal 
contract awards in FY 2018, behind only California. Of the $51.7 billion of 
federal contract awards in Virginia in FY 2018, almost $30 billion came 
from the DOD. 
Graph 5 illustrates the evolution of nominal federal, DOD and non-DOD 
contracts in Virginia from FY 2008 to FY 2017. The impact of budget 
sequestration is clearly apparent, with the declines in DOD contracts from 
FY 2012 to FY 2015. The upswing in contracting activity in FY 2016 and 
FY 2017 is good news for those metropolitan areas in Virginia that have a 
large federal presence, especially Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia. 
As FY 2018 may not yet be closed out, we expect that contract awards for 
this year will increase over the coming months.
Recent increases in federal spending have been and will continue to be a 
boon to the Commonwealth’s economy. In the short term, increased federal 
spending will boost Virginia’s economic performance, but the question 
remains, for how long? Graph 6 displays the Congressional Budget 
Office’s projections of the federal deficit from FY 2018 through FY 2028. 
While the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced corporate and personal 
taxes and the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2018 increased federal 
discretionary spending, the consequence will be a rapid deterioration in 
the fiscal position of the federal government. Even the president’s Office 
of Management and Budget’s FY 2018 Mid-Session Review acknowledged 
that federal deficits will likely exceed $1 trillion in FY 2019.4 
4  Office of Management and Budget, 2018 Mid-Session Review, Table S-1 Budget Totals, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/19msr.pdf.
The rapid increases in the federal deficit and, therefore, gross federal 
debt, should be of concern. Deficits do matter, and the fiscal position of the 
federal government is clearly unsustainable over the long run. Whether 
it is the end of the current economic expansion or an unforeseen turn of 
events in financial markets, the federal government will have to, at some 
point, address its fiscal imbalance. In all likelihood, this turn of events 
will lead to reductions in federal spending and increases in federal taxes, 
neither of which will bode well for the Commonwealth.
Federal spending thus constitutes a blessing and a curse for Virginia. 
Increases in federal spending provide fuel for the Commonwealth’s 
economic engine, but budget sequestration illustrated that federal 
spending can also act as a brake on economic activity. With 
approximately 30 percent of economic activity in the Commonwealth 
tied to the federal government, much of the economic fate of Virginia 
is determined by politics in the District of Columbia. Our challenge is 
to leverage the strengths of federal spending, even while fostering a 
climate that promotes growth in the private sector.
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GRAPH 5
NOMINAL TOTAL FEDERAL CONTRACT AWARDS, DOD CONTRACT AWARDS AND NON-DOD CONTRACT AWARDS: 
BILLIONS OF NOMINAL DOLLARS, VIRGINIA, FY 2008 TO FY 2018
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GRAPH 6
PROJECTED FEDERAL DEFICITS: 
BILLIONS OF NOMINAL DOLLARS, FY 2018 TO FY 2028




































































Virginia Rising: Comparisons 
To Other States
The story is now familiar: The twin blows of the Great Recession and 
sequestration contributed significantly to the poor economic performance 
of the Commonwealth over the last decade. Table 4 illustrates that 
Virginia’s economic performance, as measured by growth in real GDP, fell 
from 19th in 2010 to a low of 45th in 2014. Virginia ranked 37th in 2016 
and improved to 19th in 2017. Virginia’s relative economic performance 
has not been something to cheer about this decade.
What should also be clear from Table 4 is that some states (Alaska, North 
Dakota) experienced natural resource booms and busts this decade. When 
oil and natural gas prices were high, these state economies expanded 
rapidly, only to contract when oil and natural gas prices fell. It takes no 
stretch of the imagination to note the fortunes of Virginia were similarly 
tied to the ebb and flow of federal government spending.
Table 5 presents the growth in quarterly real GDP from the first quarter 
of 2016 through the second quarter of 2018. The quarterly data show that 
Virginia’s economic performance was uneven relative to other states in 
2015 and into the first quarter of 2017. Starting with the second quarter 
of 2017, however, Virginia rose in the rankings, vaulting from 35th in 
the first quarter of 2017 to 14th in the second quarter of 2018. Virginia’s 
steady rise in the rankings lends credence to the argument that it has 
finally regained the economic ground lost earlier in the decade.
Of course, Virginia’s improvement in economic performance should not 
be entirely attributed to increases in federal government spending. While 
no measure of business climate is perfect, CNBC annually scores all 50 
states on more than 60 measures of competitiveness. A state’s rank may 
fluctuate year to year, and the trend illustrates the business climate in 
a state relative to other states. Table 6 shows that Virginia consistently 
ranked in the top three from 2007 to 2012 and then proceeded to decline 
in the business rankings through 2016. It appears, however, that efforts to 
improve the climate in Virginia are paying off as the downward trend has 
reversed, and the Commonwealth was fourth in the latest edition of the 
CNBC rankings.
TABLE 4















































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product by State. Annual percent change in Real 
GDP in parentheses. Data current as of Nov. 2018 and subject to revision. 
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TABLE 5
ANNUALIZED QUARTERLY REAL GDP GROWTH AND REAL GDP 



















































2018 Q2 14 (4.2%) Texas (6.0%)
New Mexico 
(2.7%)
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product by State. Annualized percent change 
from preceding period, estimates released November 14, 2018.
5  We recognize that the cost of doing business in Virginia may be biased upward due to the relatively high costs of doing business in Northern Virginia. Certainly, this index is not reflective of the lower costs of doing business in more 
rural areas of the Commonwealth.
TABLE 6






2007 1 Virginia Alaska
2008 2 Texas Alaska
2009 1 Virginia Alaska
2010 2 Texas Alaska
2011 1 Virginia Rhode Island
2012 3 Texas Rhode Island
2013 5 South Dakota Hawaii
2014 8 Georgia Rhode Island
2015 12 Minnesota Hawaii
2016 13 Utah Rhode Island
2017 7 Washington West Virginia
2018 4 Texas Alaska
Source: CNBC, “America’s Top States for Business, Various Years” 
Yet, the Commonwealth should not rest on its laurels. In Graph 7, 
we present the individual ranks for the top four states in the 2018 
CNBC rankings. Lower ranks reflect more desirable rankings. The 
Commonwealth performs relatively well in the workforce category, but is 
only among the top 20 states for economic performance, infrastructure, 
quality of life and technology. Virginia ranked 34th in the cost of doing 
business, illustrating that work still needs to be done to build upon the 
Commonwealth’s recent surge in growth.5
A consistent story emerges from the data. Virginia’s relative economic 
performance lagged in the first part of the decade. The recent 
recovery can be partially attributed to increases in federal spending 
and improvements in the business climate. If Virginia is to continue 
to improve its economic fortunes, then it must address its sometimes-
antiquated tax system, maintain its competitive advantage in workforce 
development and make wise investments in public infrastructure.
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GRAPH 7
CNBC BUSINESS RANKINGS BY CATEGORY: TOP FOUR STATES, 2018
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Sectoral Growth In Virginia
Economic activity in Virginia results from the efforts of individuals and 
businesses in a variety of sectors. We can assess the contributions of 
each sector to overall economic activity in the Commonwealth to discern 
how the economy is evolving over time. As illustrated in Table 7, the 
contribution of private industries to real GDP, for example, grew from 
80.3 percent in 2000 to 81.8 percent in 2017. Undoubtedly, private-sector 
6   We recognize that federal transfer payments to individuals (Social Security), federal payments for medical services (Medicare and Medicaid) and federal contracts to private businesses will increase the sectoral contributions of 
private businesses, even though the origination of this activity is the federal government.
contributions to real GDP are growing, suggesting that the Virginia 
economy is diversifying.6 
Table 7 also provides the sectoral contributions to real GDP for 2000, 
2010 and 2017. Two sectors – finance, insurance, real estate, rental and 
leasing, and professional business services – accounted for nearly 40 
percent of economic activity in the Commonwealth in 2017. Government 
and government enterprises accounted for another 18 percent of real GDP 
in 2017.
TABLE 7
SECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REAL GDP: VIRGINIA, 2000, 2010 AND 2017
Industry 2000 2010 2017
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
Mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction 0.7% 0.6% 0.5%
Utilities 2.1% 1.6% 1.4%
Construction 6.3% 3.7% 3.9%
Manufacturing 11.6% 9.9% 8.6%
Wholesale trade 4.5% 4.0% 4.3%
Retail trade 5.5% 5.1% 5.6%
Transportation and warehousing 2.6% 2.4% 2.4%
Information 4.1% 4.4% 3.8%
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing 16.7% 18.1% 18.9%
Professional and business services 13.7% 18.7% 19.9%
Educational services, health care and social assistance 5.6% 6.7% 7.1%
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food 
services
3.5% 3.0% 3.0%
Government and government enterprises 19.8% 19.0% 18.2%
Addendum: total private industries 80.3% 81.0% 81.8%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Annual GDP by State, 2018”
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From 1997 to 2016, government and government enterprises was the 
largest sector in terms of economic activity in Virginia. However, in 
2017, the professional and business services sector and the finance, 
insurance, real estate, rental and leasing sector eclipsed the government 
and government enterprises sector. The smaller share of the government 
and government enterprises sector was due less to a decline in overall 
economic activity and more to the faster rates of growth in the other two 
sectors.
Another way to analyze each industry sector’s contribution to real GDP is 
to examine its percentage of total employment. Table 8 provides the total 
employment of each sector and its share of total nonfarm employment 
in 2000, 2010 and 2017. These numbers echo the story told in the 
contributions to real GDP data. In 2000 and 2010, the government sector 
was the largest employer in the Commonwealth. By 2017, however, the 
professional and business services sector employment had a larger share of 
total nonfarm employment than the government sector.
TABLE 8
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA, 2000, 2010 AND 2017
Industry 2000 2010 2017
Forestry, fishing and related activities 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Utilities 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
Construction 6.4% 5.7% 5.5%
Manufacturing 8.3% 5.1% 4.8%
Wholesale trade 2.8% 2.5% 2.4%
Retail trade 11.0% 9.9% 9.6%
Transportation and warehousing 3.1% 2.8% 3.6%
Information 2.9% 1.9% 1.6%
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing 6.8% 8.3% 8.9%
Professional and business services 15.9% 17.9% 18.1%
Educational services, health care and social 
assistance
8.7% 11.1% 11.7%
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and 
food services
7.9% 8.5% 9.3%
Government and government enterprises 18.3% 18.4% 16.9%
Addendum: total nonfarm employment 4,337,959 4,689,327 5,151,514
Source: SA25N Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS Industry. Note that farm employment was 61,192 in 2000, 53,862 in 2010 and 48,859 in 2017.
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Table 9 sheds light on the growth of professional and business services. 
Within this sector, employment grew rapidly in the professional, scientific 
and technical services sub-sector from 2000 to 2010, though it grew at 
a slower pace from 2010 to 2017. Administrative and support services 
grew from 2000 to 2010 and increased at a faster pace from 2010 to 2017. 
Management of companies and enterprises, while growing absolutely over 
time, has fallen as a percentage of nonfarm employment. One might expect 
this category to grow slower than total nonfarm employment, as these jobs 
tend to be highly skilled and well compensated.
Let’s compare this to the government and government enterprises sector. 
Federal, state and local government employment were all higher in 2017 
than 2000; however, military employment declined dramatically over this 
period. Military employment fell from approximately 165,000 in 2000 to 
about 152,000 in 2010, to approximately 134,000 in 2017. The gains in 
federal, state and local employment offset these losses, but overall the 
sector grew slower over the period and thus fell as a percentage of total 
nonfarm employment.
The composition of the Virginia economy has been shifting slowly 
toward private-sector activity, in large part due to stagnant federal 
government spending. The gains in professional and business services 
and the finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing sector have 
helped diversify economic activity in the Commonwealth. The recent 
increases in federal spending, however temporary, will also help lift 
economic growth, but military and federal employment is a shrinking 
slice of the overall economic pie. In some respects, it appears that 
Virginia is improving its economic footing by becoming less dependent 
on federal government spending. Time will tell if the Commonwealth 
can take advantage of this opportunity to bolster the foundations of 
private-sector growth.
TABLE 9
SELECTED SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL 
NONFARM EMPLOYMENT: VIRGINIA, 2000, 2010 AND 2017
Industry 2000 2010 2017
Professional and business 
services
15.9% 17.9% 18.1%























































Addendum: total nonfarm 
employment
4,337,959 4,689,327 5,151,514
Source: SA25N Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS Industry
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Labor Markets Continue 
To Improve
With the increases in overall economic activity in 2017 and into 2018, it 
should be no surprise that labor market conditions have improved as well. 
Graph 8 illustrates the growth in the seasonally adjusted labor force and 
individual employment from January 2007 to August 2018 for Virginia. 
One can clearly see the impact of the Great Recession on the size of the 
labor force and individual employment. Following the trough of the Great 
Recession in 2010, the gap between the two series has narrowed, at times, 
for different reasons.
In the wake of sequestration, the civilian labor force declined into the 
fall of 2015. After that, more Virginians joined the labor force and the 
series has trended upward for the last three years. On the other hand, 
the individual employment series has continued to move upward since the 
trough of the recession. In 2018, individual employment grew at a more 
rapid rate than the labor force, continuing to narrow the gap between the 
two indicators of the overall health of the labor force.
There were approximately 4.36 million people in the Commonwealth’s 
civilian labor force in October 2018. This represented a 3.5 percent gain 
from the doldrums of October 2015 and 0.8 percent from October 2017. 
The good news is that people were finding jobs. Individual employment also 
rose during this period. Employment growth was 4.9 percent from October 
2015 to October 2018 and 1.5 percent from October 2017 to October 2018. 
Because gains in individual employment outpaced gains in the labor force, 
Virginia’s unemployment rate has fallen from a postrecession high of 7.5 
percent in February 2010 to a seasonally adjusted post-recession low of 2.9 
percent in October 2018 (Graph 9). Virginia’s unemployment rate has not 
been this low since 2007 and, given the prospects for continued economic 
growth, is likely to trend even lower into 2019. The challenge now is to 
find qualified individuals, given that Virginia’s unemployment rate is near 
what most economists would consider full employment.
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GRAPH 8
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED LABOR FORCE AND CIVILIAN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2005 TO OCTOBER 2018
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GRAPH 9
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2005 TO AUGUST 2018
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Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs)
As with individual employment, nonfarm payrolls (jobs) continued to 
expand in 2017 and into 2018. Graph 10 illustrates the number of jobs in 
the Commonwealth from January 2007 to October 2018. The good news 
is that nonfarm payrolls expanded by 1.8 percent from October 2017 to 
October 2018, reinforcing the narrative of an expanding Virginia economy.
In Graph 11, we compare the year-over-year change in jobs for Virginia 
and the United States. Virginia’s job growth was as strong (if not 
stronger) than the United States prior to the Great Recession, and the job 
losses in the Commonwealth were not as significant as in the nation. After 
the recession, however, job growth in the United States, for the most part, 
outpaced that of the Commonwealth. In 2018, it appears that job growth in 
Virginia has accelerated and is approaching that of the United States.
If labor markets are indeed tightening in the Commonwealth, then we 
would reasonably expect that earnings would increase and likely outpace 
inflation.7 We thus are interested in real average hourly earnings because 
real earnings control for the impact inflation has on our analysis. Graph 12 
presents real average hourly earnings for Virginia and the United States 
for the period January 2007 to October 2018.
An immediate observation is that real hourly earnings were higher 
in Virginia compared to the U.S. between January 2007 and October 
2018. Not only were real average hourly earnings higher in Virginia, but 
earnings also grew faster in Virginia than the U.S. this decade. Recently, 
real average hourly earnings grew by 0.7 percent in the Commonwealth 
from October 2017 to October 2018, slightly faster than the nation as a 
whole. Over the same period, real average hourly earnings increased by 0.5 
percent for the United States.
7  Average hourly earnings reflect not only changes in hourly and incentive wages rates, but also variable factors such as overtime and late-shift work. For further information, see https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/ces-20110307.pdf.
One possible constraint on the ability of the United States and 
Virginia to sustain the current economic expansion is labor markets 
that are near what most economists would consider to be full 
employment. Anecdotal reports suggest that employers are resorting 
to poaching employees instead of filling positions from the ranks of 
the unemployed. The rises in real average hourly earnings are another 
signal of the tightness of the Commonwealth’s labor markets. 
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GRAPH 10
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED NONFARM PAYROLLS: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2007 TO OCTOBER 2018
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GRAPH 11
YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE: 
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED NONFARM PAYROLLS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2007 TO OCTOBER 2018
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GRAPH 12
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED REAL AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS: 
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2007 TO OCTOBER 2018
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Labor Force Participation
The civilian labor force represents those individuals who are employed or 
who are seeking employment. Disaffected workers who have abandoned 
attempts to secure gainful employment are not included in the labor force, 
employment and unemployment data. Labor force participation, which is 
a percentage of the working-age (19 to 64) population that is employed 
or unemployed and seeking employment, typically falls during economic 
contractions and rises during economic expansions. Graph 13 presents 
labor force participation rates for the U.S. and Virginia.
One immediate observation is that labor force participation has declined 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession and has not recovered to 
prerecession levels in the ensuing economic expansion. The long-term 
decline in labor force participation rates represents an economic puzzle, 
with demographic change (baby-boomer retirements), dependence on 
government benefits structural employment (jobs exist, but workers are 
not qualified to fill them) and the opioid crisis all considered as potential 
contributing factors. Contrary to some arguments, part-time employment 
and “gig economy” employment does not appear to be a contributing 
factor. In any case, real earnings growth has not yet been enough to pull 
many disaffected workers back into the labor force.
One perspective is that the demand for labor has shifted over the previous 
decades in favor of highly skilled labor and will be likely to do so over 
the coming decade.8 While manufacturing’s share of GDP has remained 
relatively steady, manufacturing employment has fallen due to significant 
improvements in worker productivity. Fewer workers can produce more 
output, and this trend is likely to accelerate as automation accelerates 
in the manufacturing and service industries. Automation may have 
eliminated jobs within an industry in the past, but workers could retrain 
within the industry. Automation now appears to be eliminating entire 
industries, to the benefit of consumers and businesses but the detriment of 
the workers who now must learn new skills for different industries.
8  Eleanor Krause and Isabel Sawhill, 2017, “What we know and don’t know about declining labor force participation: A review,” The Brookings Institution.
9  https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/mortality-and-morbidity-in-the-21st-century.
Another perspective is that the supply of labor is no longer as responsive 
to increases in real earnings as it was in the past. Disaffected workers 
may have high reservation wages due to their ability to cobble together 
cash income with public benefits. These workers may also be in poorer 
health due to “diseases of despair” and are effectively unemployable in 
many industries due to substance abuse.9 A not-so-uncommon complaint 
by employers in manufacturing and transportation industries in Hampton 
Roads, for example, is that skilled workers are in short supply and many 
who apply for work are disqualified due to substance abuse.
Labor force participation rates also vary across the Commonwealth. 
Figure 1 displays the labor force participation rates by locality in 2017. 
Labor force participation rates are markedly lower in southwestern 
Virginia, with some counties observing participation rates below 50 
percent. The highest labor force participation rates are those above 70 
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FIGURE 1
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY LOCALITY, 2017






Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2017, 1-Year Estimates 
 





Table 10 lists the top five and bottom five localities in terms of labor force 
participation rates. The variation of rates across the state is the result of 
changing industry sectors’ contributions, discussed earlier in the chapter. 
The growth in business, finance and real estate sector contributions 
since 2007 reflects the high labor force participation rates in Northern 
Virginia, Richmond and Hampton Roads, while the decline in coal mining, 
manufacturing and construction has contributed to the low participation 
rates in southwestern Virginia. 
TABLE 10
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES 





Change in Labor Force 
Participation Rate, 
2011-2017
Arlington County 80.7% -4.6%
Alexandria 80.5% -2.8%
Loudoun County 80.2% -4.1%






Change in Labor Force 
Participation Rate, 
2011-2017
Buchanan County 36.1% -18.5%
Dickenson County 36.8% -15.1%
Lee County 42.7% -19.4%
Wise County 43.4% -22.5%
Tazewell County 46.1% -12.0%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2017, 1-Year Estimates
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Amazon Is Coming: What We 
Know, What Is Uncertain
On Nov. 13, 2018, Gov. Ralph Northam announced that Amazon had 
selected Virginia as one of the two sites for its second headquarters, 
commonly referred to as “HQ2.” HQ2 will be located in Arlington County 
and Alexandria, and Amazon is expected to create more than 25,000 jobs 
over the coming decade. The expectation is that the initial construction 
and site development will occur in Pentagon City and Crystal City. 
Northam noted, “This is a big win for Virginia – I’m proud Amazon 
recognizes the tremendous assets the Commonwealth has to offer and 
plans to deepen its roots here.” 
We recognize that the Commonwealth will provide incentives for Amazon 
to locate a portion of its HQ2 in Virginia (the other site being in New 
York). While proponents of the effort to attract Amazon have pointed 
to the likely creation of high-wage jobs, opponents have argued that 
public subsidies should not be used to the benefit of private corporations. 
Wisconsin, for example, has promised to provide Foxconn, which pledged 
to invest $10 billion in an LCD manufacturing plant, with an estimated 
$4 billion in subsidies for the promised benefit of 13,000 jobs. Recently, 
Foxconn announced that the number of expected jobs may actually be 
fewer than 4,000. The estimated subsidy per job has risen, some argue, to 
more than $300,000.10 
At first glance, the $550 million in workforce cash grants for 25,000 
jobs, infrastructure investments in Arlington County and Alexandria, 
and a $1 billion Virginia Tech innovation campus might draw similar (if 
not as costly) comparisons to the Foxconn package. However, we note 
that the Commonwealth has wisely included language to mitigate the 
risks associated with the Amazon HQ2 incentive package. In fact, the 
language suggests that Virginia may “claw back” incentives if Amazon 
underperforms its jobs creation targets, one of many significant differences 
from the Wisconsin-Foxconn incentive program.
10 https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2017/09/06/government-incentives-to-attract-jobs-are-terrible-deals-for-taxpayers/#41dd1b96eff6.
11 https://www.mwcog.org/documents/2018/09/12/regional-housing-memo-to-cog-board-cog-board-affordable-housing-housing.
12 Urban Institute, October 23, 2018. “What HQ2 could mean for the Washington region’s housing market, in 7 chats.” https://apps.urban.org/features/amazon-hq2-washington-housing-charts.
How, then, will Amazon’s HQ2 impact Virginia? First, it is unlikely 
that job creation will be limited solely to Amazon. At first, construction 
employment will rise as new buildings are constructed and existing 
buildings are renovated at the National Landing site. As construction 
employment tapers in the coming years, Amazon’s employment is likely 
to rise, and the average and median wages of these jobs are expected to 
be higher than the region’s average. It is reasonable to expect that for 
every job created by Amazon, at least 0.5 to 1.5 jobs will be indirectly 
created in the regional economy. Even a conservative estimate suggests 
that the location of HQ2 will lead to the overall creation of almost 
40,000 jobs, and a more optimistic estimate is well over 60,000 jobs. The 
difficulty in assessing how HQ2 will affect the Commonwealth lies not 
only in the number of jobs created, but also on the number of firms that 
decide to co-locate in Northern Virginia as part of an innovation cluster. 
As the number of indirect jobs created increases, the per-job-created 
incentive costs will decline, increasing the return on investment for the 
Commonwealth.
Undoubtedly, HQ2 will also present challenges for local governments. A 
recent report by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 
estimated that the region needs 235,000 more housing units by 2025 to 
keep pace with expected job growth,11 an estimate created prior to the HQ2 
announcement. In the relatively more urbanized cities and counties of the 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, average real household incomes have 
risen steadily since 2000.12 Why? Existing residents are moving up the 
income ladder and job creation is attracting new, higher-income residents 
to the area. Adding new jobs from Amazon and associated firms that are 
relatively high-income would likely continue the appreciation of housing 
prices. As lower- and middle-income individuals are “squeezed” out of 
residential housing and into rental housing, rents are likely to increase 
across the region. Residents clearly trade distance for housing cost, 
leading to some of the longest commuting times in the nation. We want 
to clearly state that this challenge would occur even if Amazon had not 
selected National Landing as its site for the Virginia portion of HQ2.
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Given these uncertainties, can we determine the economic impact of 
Amazon HQ2? To generate reasonable estimates of economic impact, we 
would not only need to assume the number of jobs created by Amazon 
but also the indirect jobs associated with the construction and operation 
of HQ2. It is likely that the total number of jobs (direct and indirect) 
will near, if not exceed, 40,000. The overall increase in economic activity 
associated with HQ2 is also expected to lead to firm creation and 
relocation. In other words, entrepreneurs will start new firms around 
HQ2 and other firms will relocate to be near HQ2. We argue that this 
is the most uncertain part of the estimates of the economic impact of 
HQ2 in Northern Virginia. If HQ2 leads to an innovation – information 
technology cluster due to entrepreneurial activity and firm relocation 
– then the Commonwealth’s incentives will almost certainly look paltry 
in comparison. We have observed this effect with other large technology 
firms and are optimistic that, given wise investments in higher education 
and public infrastructure, it is entirely possible it will occur. Quantifying 
the scope of this emerging cluster and the benefits for the Commonwealth, 
however, would require significant assumptions about how many and 
what types of firms are created and relocate to the Commonwealth. Even 
with these uncertainties, however, we are optimistic that Amazon will 
spur increased job creation, tax revenues and economic growth in the 
Commonwealth.
What should Virginia do in the interim? We continue to advocate for wise 
investments in public infrastructure, education, and a favorable business 
climate. Amazon’s decision may spur increased attention and funding, 
which would have positive spillovers in attracting other businesses to the 
Commonwealth. Virginia should focus on creating a climate that leads to 
improved investments in broadband infrastructure, so firms can locate in 
other areas of the state that are reasonably close to HQ2 but sufficiently 
far away that the cost of doing business is lower. Amazon’s HQ2 presents 
a unique opportunity for the Commonwealth to build its reputation as an 
innovative state that is a welcoming home for business.
Final Thoughts
For the first time this decade, Virginia is poised to grow robustly for two 
(if not more) consecutive years. Rising economic activity is reflected in 
increases in general fund tax collections, individual employment, jobs and, 
finally, real average hourly earnings. The Commonwealth’s fiscal situation 
has improved (in part due to windfalls from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s 
changes to the federal tax structure) and the reserve fund is appreciably 
higher than anytime this decade. One might survey the economic data 
and conclude that not only is Virginia back, but that it is back with a 
vengeance. 
The Book of Job contains a verse appropriate for the Commonwealth: “The 
Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away.” Increases in federal government 
spending have provided a short-term boost to economic growth in the 
United States and Virginia. A divided Congress, ongoing investigations and 
a decelerating international economy make the future less certain. The 
debt ceiling suspension expires on March 1, 2019, and the Budget Control 
Act’s discretionary spending caps return on Oct. 1, 2019. Those who 
stridently argued that sequestration would never happen because Congress 
would never act in such a harmful way should not assume that history will 
not repeat itself in 2019.
Virginia succeeded in attracting Amazon and even though there are 
substantial future costs involved, taken as a whole, this is a good 
development for the Commonwealth. Yet, Virginia must also be wary of 
giving away the store to attract new firms. Rather than expending public 
funds to subsidize the activities of private firms, it would be more prudent 
to improve the regulatory climate, reform the tax system and make wise 
investments in infrastructure, rural broadband and K-12 education. Now 
is not the time to rest on our laurels and proclaim that our policies are a 





It’s about how hard you can get hit and keep 
moving forward. How much you can take and 
keep moving forward. That’s how winning is 
done.
– Rocky Balboa, 2006
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T
he performance of Virginia 
metropolitan area economies is a 
tale often told with an eye toward 
the good times of the past and a wary eye 
to the future. The twin shocks of the Great 
Recession and federal budget sequestration fell 
unevenly across Virginia, and only now is there 
evidence of consistent growth across most of 
the Commonwealth’s metro areas.1 Finally, it 
seems, Virginia’s metros are picking themselves 
off the proverbial economic mat and moving 
forward.
2017 was the first year since 2006 that each 
of Virginia’s metropolitan areas exhibited 
positive economic growth from the preceding 
year. The Winchester metro area, while a 
relatively small part of the Commonwealth’s 
overall economic activity, has grown for nine 
consecutive years, followed by Richmond’s 
eight consecutive years of growth. Staunton, 
after contracting significantly following the 
Great Recession, has grown for the last five 
consecutive years. The Charlottesville and 
Washington, D.C.–Arlington–Alexandria 
(Washington, D.C.) metro areas have also 
grown the last four consecutive years. On the 
other hand, the Blacksburg, Harrisonburg, 
Lynchburg, Roanoke and Virginia Beach–
Norfolk–Newport News (Hampton Roads) 
regional economies have contracted each 
once in the last three years.
1   For the purposes of this chapter, a metropolitan area conforms 
to the Office of Management and Budget’s 2018 delineations of 
metropolitan statistical areas. We do not include the Kingsport-
Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA, MSA in our analysis due to a lack of data. 
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Table 1 presents real (inflation-adjusted) rates of growth for gross 
domestic product (GDP), a measure of economic activity. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) produces 
the national, state and metropolitan area estimates of GDP, which provide 
benchmarks for economic activity over time. These estimates, especially 
those for 2017, should be viewed with a dash of caution.
Why? The BEA released the “advance” estimates for metropolitan area 
GDP for 2017 in September 2018. The next revision to these estimates 
will be in September 2019, when the BEA releases the advance estimates 
for 2018. With such a lag, we advise the reader to examine the long-term 
trend and focus less on the estimate for a specific year, which could well 
change in the next revision.
If we examine the data from 2010 to 2017, a story of anemic growth 
emerges. While the United States grew, on average, by 2.1 percent over 
this period, Virginia’s average growth was only 0.8 percent.2 This is not 
surprising, given that no metropolitan area in Virginia exceeded 2 percent 
average growth, although Charlottesville, Richmond and Winchester 
came close at 1.9 percent. Several metro areas, including Harrisonburg, 
Lynchburg, Roanoke and Hampton Roads, did not appreciably grow at all 
from 2010 to 2017. Staunton’s economy contracted on average, but this was 
primarily due to the significant declines in economic activity in 2011 and 
2012. 
The uneven economic performance of Virginia’s metropolitan areas can 
not be readily attributed to one specific factor. Growth lagged in Hampton 
Roads due to federal budget sequestration and anemic private-sector 
job creation. Other metro areas have struggled to cope with long-term 
structural changes in the composition of the Commonwealth economy, 
including the decline in coal and other natural resources. The good news 
is that the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel no longer seems to 
be a freight train. 
2  We estimate the Compound Average Growth Rate (CAGR), which is the average annual growth rate between two periods.
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TABLE 1
REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: YEAR-ON-YEAR RATES OF GROWTH, 2010-2017












2010 1.2% 3.3% 3.6% 2.5% 1.7% -1.5% 3.0% 2.9% -1.6% 3.8% 2.4% 2.6%
2011 1.4% 1.0% -0.9% -1.8% 0.8% -1.0% -6.8% 1.9% 0.3% 1.5% 0.7% 1.6%
2012 7.6% 2.7% -0.9% -0.9% 2.8% 0.4% -7.6% 1.3% -0.8% 0.5% 0.6% 2.2%
2013 -1.0% -0.5% -0.4% 0.0% 1.3% -0.1% 1.7% 1.4% -0.6% -0.8% 0.0% 1.8%
2014 2.3% 3.7% -0.1% -0.2% 1.0% -0.3% 0.8% 0.9% -0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 2.5%
2015 1.3% 3.7% 2.9% -0.5% 3.7% 2.4% 2.0% 3.7% 2.6% 2.0% 1.8% 2.9%
2016 -0.7% 0.5% -0.1% 0.8% 1.1% -1.6% 0.0% 1.6% -1.3% 1.8% 0.5% 1.6%
2017 0.6% 2.3% 0.7% 2.4% 2.6% 0.0% 1.5% 2.7% 1.0% 2.1% 2.0% 2.2%
CAGR 1.6% 1.9% 0.1% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% -1.3% 1.9% 0.1% 1.1% 0.8% 2.1%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018. Base year for real GDP is 2009 for metropolitan areas and Virginia. Base year for real GDP for the United States is 2012. CAGR is the Compound Annual Growth Rate.
3   The Current Population Survey (CPS) covers households and asks whether an individual was employed or actively seeking employment. The Current Establishment Survey (CES) covers businesses and reports the number of jobs. 




Are more people working in Virginia’s metropolitan areas? There are 
two broad measures we can examine to answer this question: individual 
employment and nonfarm payrolls (jobs). Employment data capture 
responses by individuals to the question of whether they are employed, 
looking for work or have abandoned attempts at finding employment. 
Nonfarm payroll data measure the number of jobs there are in an 
economy. A person who has two jobs would appear once in the employment 
data but twice in the jobs data.3 Let’s look first at the individual 
employment data.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) asks people about their employment 
status. If an individual is employed or looking for work, then the BLS 
reports that he or she is in the labor force. Graph 1 illustrates labor force 
growth in 2016, 2017 and 2018, and compares January 2017 through 
October 2017 to January 2018 through October 2018. The average growth 
in the labor force across Virginia’s metro areas was 0.5 percent for 2016, 
1.3 percent for 2017 and 1.1 percent through October 2018. 
The labor force increased in 2018 in all the metropolitan areas, except for 
Blacksburg. Charlottesville’s average labor force from January to October 
2018 was 3.0 percent larger than for the same period in 2017. Winchester 
also grew robustly, experiencing a 2.5 percent increase in the labor force 
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year-to-date. Blacksburg, on the other hand, saw its average labor force 
contract by 0.4 percent year-to-date when compared to the same period in 
2017. It is not entirely clear why that occurred since this metro’s largest 
employer, Virginia Tech, was expanding. The three largest metropolitan 
areas (Hampton, Roads, Richmond and Washington, D.C.) have all 
observed slower rates of labor force growth in 2018. A possible explanation 
is that real wages have not yet risen sufficiently to improve labor force 
participation. Simply put, individuals who have remained outside the labor 
force may require higher wages to pull them back into actively searching 
for employment. 
Graph 2 reports individual employment by metropolitan area and 
reinforces the narrative that economic conditions are improving at the 
metro level in Virginia. Individual employment continues to grow in each 
of the Commonwealth’s metro areas, with seven metros growing faster 
from January 2018 to October 2018 than over the same period in 2017. 
This suggests that qualified employees are increasingly scarce and that 
employers will have to increase real wages to attract new employees.
Hampton Roads has slowed from 2 percent growth in 2017 to 1.2 percent 
growth year-to-date in 2018. Reported employment growth has also 
slowed year-to-date in Richmond. However, even with the slowdowns in 
year-to-date employment growth, Virginia’s metros employed more people 
in 2017 than in 2016. The same conclusion applies when we compare 2018 
year-to-date employment with 2017 year-to-date employment.
The unemployment rate rises and falls depending on the size of the labor 
force and the number of employed and unemployed in the labor force. 
Except for Blacksburg, where the labor force contracted, metropolitan 
area labor forces have grown in 2018 when compared to the same period in 
2017. Individual employment has grown for all metro areas and (excepting 
Blacksburg) at a faster rate than the labor force. In other words, a higher 
percentage of the labor force is employed, and thus unemployment rates 
have fallen as a result. Graph 3, which compares the unemployment 
rates in October 2017 and 2018, provides a bit of good news. While there 
is debate about what is the level of full employment, it should be clear 
from Graph 3 that most (if not all) of the Commonwealth’s metropolitan 
areas are near full employment. Growing the labor force is necessary for 
continued economic growth, else employment growth will slow because 
almost all qualified individuals are already employed. 
More people are working in Virginia’s metropolitan areas than at 
any other time in history. The upticks in labor force and individual 
employment are signals that a broader recovery may be underway 
among the metros, especially if we compare 2018 to previous years. 
Care must be taken, however, in that the Commonwealth’s performance 
is not evenly distributed across its metro areas. What may appear to 
be a story of robust gains in the labor force and individual employment 
at the state level may not apply to every metro area. 
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GRAPH 1
LABOR FORCE GROWTH: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 2016, 2017 AND 2018 YEAR-TO-DATE
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Non-seasonally adjusted data. Growth rates in 2016 and 2017 are calculated using the annual averages for 2015, 
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GRAPH 2
GROWTH IN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 2016, 2017 AND 2018 YEAR-TO-DATE
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Non-seasonally adjusted data. Growth rates in 2016 and 2017 are calculated using the annual averages for 2015, 

























































































VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, OCTOBER 2017 AND OCTOBER 2018
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Are There More Jobs In 
Virginia’s Metropolitan 
Areas?
Job creation in 2016 was lackluster for the most part. While 2017 provided 
some measure of good news, robust job growth was limited to a handful 
of metro areas. To date, each metro has created jobs in 2018, but, as with 
individual employment, job growth remains uneven.
The most accurate estimates of job growth come from the BLS Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The QCEW captures about 
98 percent of all wage and salary jobs in the United States, where jobs are 
defined as full- or part-time positions that are covered by state and federal 
unemployment insurance law. A drawback of the QCEW is that the data 
arrive with a significant lag, usually five to six months after the end of the 
quarter. 
Table 2 presents job growth for the metropolitan areas in Virginia for 2016 
and 2017. Also shown is the job growth rate for the first quarter of 2018 
compared to the same period in 2017. Job growth numbers in 2016 and 
2017 provide a mixed bag in that no clear story emerges from the data. 
Job growth accelerated in Charlottesville, Lynchburg and Hampton Roads 
but decelerated in Harrisonburg, Richmond, Winchester and Northern 
Virginia. Two metro areas, Roanoke and Staunton, lost jobs in 2017. 
The first quarter of 2018 presents a stronger picture of job growth. 
The number of jobs increased in each of Virginia’s metropolitan areas. 
Blacksburg’s job growth surged in the first quarter of 2018 after a 
relatively anemic performance in 2016 and 2017. This creates the 
somewhat puzzling observation that while the labor force contracted in 
Blacksburg, a higher percentage of individuals remaining in the labor force 
were gainfully employed. Job growth also accelerated in Hampton Roads 
and Winchester in the first quarter of 2018 and maintained the same pace 
in Harrisonburg. Job growth, however, slowed in the other metro areas, 
again illustrating the uneven nature of the continuing expansion in the 
Commonwealth.
TABLE 2




Blacksburg 0.1% 0.1% 1.6%
Charlottesville 1.4% 2.2% 1.8%
Harrisonburg 3.6% 1.2% 1.2%
Lynchburg 0.0% 0.7% 0.3%
Richmond 1.7% 1.3% 0.7%
Roanoke 0.8% -0.5% 0.3%
Staunton 1.5% -0.5% 0.8%
Hampton Roads 0.6% 1.1% 1.5%
Washington, D.C. 1.6% 1.2% 0.9%
Winchester 2.1% 2.0% 2.1%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2018. Metropolitan 
statistical areas.
While the QCEW presents the most accurate jobs data, it is, as previously 
noted, subject to considerable lag. We can examine the BLS’s Current 
Establishment Survey (CES), which uses a sample of employers to 
estimate job gains and losses in the United States. While the CES is more 
current than the QCEW, it may be less accurate and subject to significant 
revisions, as it relies on a sample of employers in contrast to the QCEW, 
which captures almost all employers in the country.
We present year-to-date job growth through October of 2017 and 2018 
in Graph 4. The CES data show job growth in each of Virginia’s metro 
areas. The data suggest that job growth has surged in Charlottesville and 
was stronger in 2018 than 2017 in the Blacksburg, Lynchburg, Roanoke, 
Staunton and Winchester metros. While job growth decelerated in 
Harrisonburg, Richmond and Hampton Roads, it remains positive. The 
slight decline in job growth in Washington, D.C., from 1.6 to 1.5 percent 
is not sufficiently significant to label it a slowdown. The good news is 




YEAR-TO-DATE AUGUST JOB GROWTH IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Non-seasonally adjusted data. Year-to-date growth rates are calculated by comparing average labor force from 
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The Hampton Roads, Northern Virginia and Richmond regions 
account for over 80 percent of metropolitan jobs and over 70 
percent of all jobs in the Commonwealth. Strong job growth in 
these metro areas typically translates into strong job growth for the 
Commonwealth as a whole. Hampton Roads has finally recovered all 
the jobs it lost due to the Great Recession and defense sequestration, 
but private-sector job creation remains anemic. The slowdown in job 
growth in Hampton Roads and Richmond could be interpreted as a 
warning sign of slowing growth in the Commonwealth. However, while 
job growth has slowed in these metros in 2018, it remains positive. 
Slow and steady progress, in this case, may win the day.
There are possible explanations for slowing job growth in the larger 
metropolitan areas. First, economic activity may be slowing. The growth 
in individual employment data, however, suggests otherwise. Second, job 
growth may be slowing because employers are unable to find qualified 
employees to fill vacant positions. Reports from employers suggest this 
may be the case. National-level data indicate that voluntary job quits were 
at a postrecession high in the fall of 2018. The number of open positions 
in the U.S. was not only at a postrecession high in 2018, but it was also 
greater than the number of unemployed. In other words, there were more 
open positions than people looking for work. With unemployment around 
3 percent at the state level and below 3 percent in some metro areas, we 
suspect that what is playing out at the national level has echoes at the 
metro level in the Commonwealth.
Another possible explanation is that the jobs data do not yet accurately 
reflect metropolitan area economic conditions. Individual payroll 
withholding is approximately 64 percent of state general fund revenues 
and may be a superior indicator of the health of the labor market in the 
Commonwealth. The Virginia Department of Taxation reported that 
payroll withholding from July 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018, rose 3.6 percent 
over the same period the previous year.4 
Three possibilities emerge from this discussion: existing employees are 
earning more, employment is growing, or a combination of the two. As 
we will discuss later in the chapter, the gains in taxable sales mirror the 
reported gains in payroll withholding and individual employment. It would 
4  https://www.finance.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/secretary-of-finance/pdf/master-revenue-reports/September-2018-Revenue-Letter-10-11-18_.pdf.
thus appear that the jobs data might be revised upward in the coming 
months and that the regional economies are performing better than the 
jobs data might suggest.
Metro Area Wages
Politicians of every stripe campaign on the promise of higher wages. While 
the U.S. economy is amid the second-longest economic expansion since 
the end of World War II, wage growth has been relatively tepid. Virginia’s 
metros seem to be following this pattern.
We again turn to the QCEW to obtain the most accurate estimates of 
wage growth. Table 3 presents growth in total nominal wages from 2015 
through the first quarter of 2018. 2015 saw rapid nominal wage growth 
across the Commonwealth’s metropolitan areas, except for Lynchburg. 
The years 2016 and 2017, however, paint a more muddled picture. Nominal 
wage growth slowed appreciably in 2016. While Winchester posted a 4 
percent gain in total wages in 2016, total wage growth was below 2 percent 
in Blacksburg, Lynchburg and Hampton Roads.
In 2017, however, there were upticks in total wage growth. Total wages 
grew by 6 percent in Charlottesville and over 5 percent in Winchester. 
Every other metropolitan area, except Roanoke, saw total wage growth 
near or exceeding 3 percent in 2017. Roanoke, on the other hand, saw total 
wages grow by only 0.9 percent last year. Total wages grew in 2017 but, 
as with previous years, the growth was not evenly distributed across the 
metro areas.
The picture that emerges for 2018, however, suggests that total wages 
are climbing across all the metropolitan areas. Blacksburg experienced 
a 9.1 percent increase in total wages in the first quarter of 2018, while 
Charlottesville, Harrisonburg, Staunton, Winchester and Northern 
Virginia all saw wages increase by about 4 percent or more in the first 
quarter of 2018. Even though total wages grew the slowest in Lynchburg 
and Roanoke, total wage growth was still greater than 2 percent in these 
metro areas.  
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The good news is that the gains in employment and jobs appear to be 
reflected in the wage data. We should expect, given the tightness of 
labor markets in many metropolitan areas, for wage gains to increase 
in the latter half of 2018.
TABLE 3
GROWTH IN TOTAL WAGES IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, 
2015, 2016, 2017 AND 2018 Q1
2015 2016 2017 2018 Q1
Blacksburg 3.6% 1.2% 2.9% 9.1%
Charlottesville 8.4% 2.0% 6.0% 4.2%
Harrisonburg 4.7% 3.3% 3.1% 5.9%
Lynchburg 1.2% 1.9% 3.8% 2.3%
Richmond 5.5% 2.5% 4.7% 3.0%
Roanoke 4.0% 2.4% 0.9% 2.7%
Staunton 3.9% 3.5% 3.1% 4.0%
Hampton 
Roads
5.0% 1.2% 3.8% 3.4%
Washington, 
D.C.
4.6% 2.9% 4.2% 4.2%
Winchester 4.6% 4.0% 5.1% 3.9%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2018. Data reflect year-
over-year percentage change, except for 2018 Q1, which represents the percentage change from 2017 Q1. 
Virginia metropolitan statistical areas. 
Is wage growth due to increased work effort or an actual rise in wages? 
For Virginia, average weekly work hours decreased slightly from 34.9 
hours in October 2017 to 34.4 hours in October 2018. Average hourly 
earnings also increased from $27.73 in October 2017 to $28.62 in October 
2018. For the Commonwealth, the increases in average weekly work effort 
and average hourly earnings resulted in an increase in average weekly 
earnings from about $968 in October 2017 to $985 in October 2018. In 
other words, people are earning more not only because they are working 
more, but also because average earnings have risen over the past year.
Graph 5 presents average weekly hours by metropolitan area. Increases 
in average weekly work effort will, if average earnings remain constant, 
lead to increases in average weekly earnings. The Charlottesville metro 
area observed the largest decline in average weekly work hours from 
October 2017 to October 2018. The Harrisonburg and Washington, D.C., 
metro areas also saw a decline in average work hours. If an individual, for 
example, moves to a higher-paying job, he or she may work less to earn the 
same (or more) pay. If we, on the other hand, see broad declines in hours 
worked across the metro areas, this could be a signal that employers are 
cutting back hours. So far, there is no evidence that this is occurring in 
the Commonwealth.
Graph 6 presents average hourly earnings for October 2017 and 
October 2018. Roanoke and Staunton saw the largest gains in average 
hourly earnings, followed by Charlottesville and the Washington, D.C., 
metro area. Average hourly earnings did decline in four of Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas, suggesting that tighter labor markets have yet to 
affect average hourly earnings in these metro areas.
Graph 7 illustrates the percentage change in average weekly earnings 
between October 2017 and 2018. The picture is somewhat muddled. In 
Blacksburg, hours and earnings declined, so average weekly earnings 
declined as a result. In Roanoke, while hours declined slightly, earnings 
rose substantially, so average weekly earnings rose from October 2017 
to October 2018. We surmise that economic conditions are not equal 
across the Commonwealth. Low unemployment rates have yet to result in 
significant increases in weekly wages, possibly leading some Virginians to 
conclude that the recovery has left them behind.
Does a clearer picture emerge from the labor market data? Some 
metropolitan areas are indeed growing. For these metros, individual 
employment is rising, job creation is surging and average weekly 
earnings are outpacing inflation. Richmond, Roanoke and Staunton 
are an example of these positive labor market dynamics. For other 
metros, the picture is less clear. In some cases, average hours worked 
have declined, suggesting employers may be cutting back hours in these 
metros in response to unfavorable economic conditions. It remains to 
be seen whether the jobs data are lagging other indicators or whether 
some metros are indeed slowing down.
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GRAPH 5
AVERAGE WEEKLY WORK HOURS IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, OCTOBER 2017 AND OCTOBER 2018


























































































AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS FOR VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, OCTOBER 2017 AND OCTOBER 2018
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GRAPH 7
PERCENT GROWTH IN AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS FOR VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, 
OCTOBER 2017 TO OCTOBER 2018


































































































Virginia’s relationship with the federal government has historically been 
mixed. More recently, however, this relationship has drawn scrutiny and 
questions as to whether it is still beneficial for the Commonwealth to be so 
tightly yoked to the fortunes of the federal government. 
Virginia has typically entered recessions later than the United States, 
experienced less of an economic impact from economic downturns, 
emerged earlier from previous recessions than the nation and grown 
more robustly over the succeeding business cycle. Yet, the recovery from 
the Great Recession has been relatively slow when compared to the U.S. 
Sequestration, which followed the recession, had a disproportionate impact 
on the Commonwealth due to its ties to the federal government.
A primary source of fuel for the Commonwealth’s economic engine has 
been the large federal presence in Virginia and, more specifically, in 
Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia. At the end of the first quarter of 
2018, the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area had approximately 361,000 
federal civilian employees, down about 5,300 (1.4 percent) from the end of 
the first quarter of 2017.5 Hampton Roads, on the other hand, had 57,000 
federal civilian employees at the end of the first quarter of 2018, a slight 
increase of 0.5 percent from the end of the first quarter of 2017. The 
Richmond region had almost 17,000 federal civilian employees, a slight 
decrease from the first quarter of 2017. It should be noted that active-duty 
military personnel are not included in the federal civilian employment 
statistics. 
Table 4 presents employment data for the federal government for each 
of the metropolitan areas in the Commonwealth from 2015 through the 
first quarter of 2018. Outside of the Washington, D.C., Hampton Roads 
and Richmond metro areas, the number of federal civilian employees is 
relatively small. A potential concern is the decline in federal employees in 
the Washington, D.C., metro area from 2017 Q1 to 2018 Q1. If this trend 
continues, it could potentially slow economic growth in this region. 
5   Following Bureau of Labor Statistics convention, we compare employment in the third month of the quarter with the third month of the same quarter in the previous year. We obtain the data from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages for all industries and all establishment sizes.
TABLE 4
FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, 2015-2018 Q1
2015 2016 2017 2018 Q1
Blacksburg 452 451 446 425
Charlottesville 1,397 1,406 1,423 1,443
Harrisonburg 346 350 345 355
Lynchburg 560 552 559 551
Richmond 16,729 17,095 17,054 16,907
Roanoke 3,841 3,798 3,822 3,798
Staunton 256 272 272 298
Hampton Roads 56,034 57,019 57,007 57,000
Washington, 
D.C.
363,953 367,229 366,893 361,425
Winchester 1,973 2,020 2,160 2,350
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2018. Virginia metropolitan 
statistical areas.
Table 5 presents federal civilian employment as a percentage of total 
nonfarm employment. The Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, not 
surprisingly, has the highest percentage of federal civilian employees in 
total nonfarm payrolls, followed by Hampton Roads and the Winchester 
metro area. While the absolute number of federal civilian employees 
is small in Winchester when compared to Hampton Roads, Northern 
Virginia, Richmond or Roanoke as a percentage of all jobs, federal civilian 
employees constitute a greater percentage of payrolls in Winchester than 
Richmond or Roanoke.
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TABLE 5
FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL 
NONFARM EMPLOYMENT, 2015-2018 Q1
2015 2016 2017 2018 Q1
Blacksburg 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Charlottesville 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
Harrisonburg 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%
Lynchburg 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Richmond 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
Roanoke 2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Staunton 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Hampton 
Roads
7.7% 7.8% 7.7% 7.7%
Washington, 
D.C.
12.0% 11.9% 11.8% 11.7%
Winchester 3.4% 3.4% 3.6% 3.9%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2018. Virginia metropolitan 
statistical areas.
Table 6 presents the average nominal wages of federal civilian employees 
between 2015 and 2017 and provides the average wages for all employees 
in 2017 as a basis of comparison. Federal civilian employees earn more, 
on average, in every metropolitan area in Virginia. In Winchester, for 
example, federal employees, on average, earn nearly twice the annual 
average wage. In fact, except for Lynchburg and Staunton, federal 
employees’ average pay was 50 percent higher than the average pay of 
all employees in 2017. The announced federal pay freeze for 2019 will 
undoubtedly erode the value of federal wages in real terms but these wages 
will still, on average, be higher than for the average job in the metro areas. 
Of course, if the federal civilian pay freeze is sustained over a prolonged 
period, the relative pay advantage of federal civilian jobs would shrink 
relative to other jobs in the private sector.
6  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures by State, Oct. 4, 2018.
TABLE 6





Blacksburg $65,524 $64,685 $65,719 $41,253
Charlottesville $84,089 $84,871 $86,925 $51,354
Harrisonburg $61,867 $60,236 $61,367 $39,453
Lynchburg $58,262 $55,754 $56,132 $41,565
Richmond $74,252 $75,045 $77,858 $52,194
Roanoke $71,494 $72,475 $73,055 $43,040
Staunton $54,722 $54,931 $56,858 $40,429
Hampton 
Roads
$73,302 $74,280 $76,821 $46,425
Washington, 
D.C.
$105,652 $108,135 $111,066 $74,613
Winchester $84,907 $87,851 $90,013 $44,798
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2018. Virginia metropolitan 
statistical areas.
Taxable Sales
Another viable measure of economic activity is taxable sales. More than 
two-thirds of total spending in the U.S. economy comes in the form of 
consumption. Taxable sales capture most of this activity, though it is 
important to note that not all conventional sales are taxable and numerous 
economic exchanges go unrecorded.
Consumption levels in Virginia have increased each year since 2009. 
Residents of the Commonwealth consumed approximately $369 billion of 
goods and services in 2017, or about $43,500 per person.6 This is about 
$2,600 higher than the average American, not surprising since household 
income is higher in Virginia than the United States.
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Unfortunately, we do not have recent data on consumption spending within 
Virginia’s metropolitan areas. We do have data on taxable sales within the 
metros. While not perfect, as taxable sales will understate some forms of 
consumption spending, it is a useful indicator of economic conditions at 
the metropolitan level.
Taxable sales growth predictably rises during business cycle expansions 
and falls during contractions. However, taxable sales growth usually leads 
the business cycle, and this makes it a valuable leading indicator of future 
economic conditions. This is a valuable attribute and an important reason 
why we present the data on taxable sales growth for the Commonwealth’s 
metro areas.
At the time of publication, data were only available for the metropolitan 
areas through July 2018. Taxable sales data are highly seasonal and so it 
is important when comparing across time to ensure that the time periods 
are consistent. Table 7 presents average taxable sales growth rates for 
January through July. We include 2006 to compare prerecession growth 
with growth in 2015 through 2018.
Two things stand out. First, taxable sales growth between 2017 and 
2018 was positive. The data lend support to the argument that Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas are growing, though at different rates. Second, some 
metros are eclipsing prerecession growth levels in 2018.  
Blacksburg’s taxable sales have jumped in 2018. Lynchburg and Roanoke 
taxable sales are also growing at a faster rate in 2018 compared to 2017, 
and taxable sales in Hampton Roads have increased at an average rate 
of 4.2 percent in 2018, following a similar performance in 2017. The data 
suggest that economic growth is indeed picking up in Hampton Roads and 
that the advance GDP estimates for 2017 are likely to be revised upwards. 
TABLE 7
AVERAGE GROWTH IN TAXABLE SALES (CAGR), JANUARY TO JULY OF EACH YEAR
2006 2015 2016 2017 2018
Blacksburg 2.6% 3.3% 2.3% 2.5% 4.4%
Charlottesville 5.4% 1.9% 2.6% 1.6% 1.7%
Harrisonburg 2.0% 2.8% 1.8% 1.3% 1.5%
Lynchburg 3.7% 3.0% 1.8% 1.7% 3.2%
Richmond 1.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.0% 1.5%
Roanoke 2.9% 3.2% 2.2% 2.4% 3.9%
Staunton 2.4% 2.8% 2.3% 2.4% 2.6%
Hampton Roads 4.0% 3.8% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2%
Winchester 1.9% 3.0% 2.7% 2.1% 2.6%
Northern Virginia 1.8% 2.6% 3.3% 2.4% 2.4%
Virginia 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 2.5% 2.8% 
Source: Center for Economic and Policy Studies, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, University of Virginia. CAGR, the Compound Average Growth Rate, is calculated for each year.
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Final Thoughts
The uneven growth among Virginia’s regional economies over the last 
decade is emblematic of the struggle to create economic opportunities 
across the state. The economic data suggest the Harrisonburg 
metropolitan area may be slowing down. Two of the larger metros, 
Richmond and Northern Virginia, are growing but at a slower pace than 
earlier in the decade. This is a change of pace, and given the amount of 
overall economic activity in these two metro areas, may pose a challenge 
for the Commonwealth. 
Federal employees, who play a large role in the Northern Virginia 
economy, face headwinds with a pay freeze in 2019 and continued attempts 
to reduce overall federal employment. Southwest Virginia continues to 
struggle with a decline in the reliance on coal and other natural resources. 
Underlying all of this is the continuing opioid crisis, which continues to 
challenge policymakers, citizens and employers alike.
Not all the news is bad. Increases in defense spending will drive economic 
growth in Hampton Roads and may alleviate some of the downward 
pressure in Northern Virginia. Charlottesville continues to grow, in large 
part due to the presence of the University of Virginia. Richmond, while 
growing at a slower pace this year, continues to benefit from the #RVA 
campaign. Virginia’s winning bid for part of Amazon’s HQ2 will spur 
economic growth in Northern Virginia. It may also increase the scarcity 
of housing and spur increased demands for transportation infrastructure. 
These demands present, however, opportunities for increased growth over 
time. Much of the United States internet traffic runs through Virginia 
and the construction of Amazon’s HQ2 will undoubtedly burnish the 
Commonwealth’s reputation as an innovation-friendly state. 
Employment and jobs are up in most of the metropolitan areas, although 
growth is uneven so far in 2018. Unemployment rates are below 3 percent 
in some metro areas and this is reflected in gains in average weekly wages. 
Taxable sales have continued to grow and, in some areas, have eclipsed 
growth rates observed prior to the Great Recession. Economic growth 
may be uneven, but it appears that, for the most part, the metro areas are 
pushing themselves off the mat and moving ahead.
Each year we ask what the future holds. Increases in federal spending 
through September 2019 are likely to boost the fortunes of those 
metropolitan areas closely tied to the federal government. Political 
uncertainty in Washington, D.C., has yet to harm economic prospects 
in the country and, just perhaps, uncertainty is the “new normal” for 
firms in Virginia. The prospects for 2018 remain positive and, barring an 
unexpected shock, should remain positive well into 2019.
Virginia can act to improve regional outcomes. We offer the following 
suggestions. Targeted investments in infrastructure are necessary 
to promote economic development and attract new businesses. 
Improving the quality of education, including investments in physical 
infrastructure, is necessary to produce a workforce that can compete 
in an increasingly globalized economy. Virginia’s antiquated tax 
structure must be reformed to compete with neighboring states. 
Regulatory relief, or at least regulatory clarity, is a necessary 
component of economic growth. Lastly, regional collaboration 
should not just be a slogan. Virginia should continue to promote 
regional collaborations through efforts like GO Virginia. These 




THE PROMISE AND 
PERIL OF MEDICAID 
EXPANSION FOR THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA
We are very excited about having the 
opportunity to provide them with a pathway 
to coverage, so they can get the coverage 
that they need and get healthier, so they can 
pursue opportunities that they deserve for 
themselves and their families.
–  Dr. Jennifer Lee, Director, Virginia 




n July 1, 2018, after years of heated 
debate, Virginia became the 33rd state 
(along with the District of Columbia) 
to sign an expansion of Medicaid coverage into 
law. Effective Jan. 1, 2019, the Commonwealth 
will expand Medicaid eligibility to childless 
adults and increase how much Medicaid 
recipients can earn without losing their health 
insurance. The question is no longer whether 
Virginia should expand Medicaid, but rather 
what will be the impact of Medicaid expansion 
on the Commonwealth.
Medicaid is a joint program between the 
federal government and the states to provide 
health coverage for low-income individuals 
in the United States. Medicaid operates 
in conjunction with another federal-state 
partnership, the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP), which aims to improve 
children’s health insurance coverage and 
outcomes. Almost 73 million Americans were 
enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP in May 2018, 
with about 1 million of those enrollees residing 
in Virginia.1 Medicaid is one of the largest 
payers for health services in the U.S.; total 
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State participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, although every 
state participates. Why, then, has expanding the Medicaid program 
generated such heated debate? In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the federal government could not coerce states to expand Medicaid.2 
The choice of whether and when to expand would be left to individual 
states. Some chose immediately to expand and others, including Virginia, 
opted to study the merits of expansion. To incentivize states to enroll 
new participants, the federal government initially covered 100 percent of 
the cost of new enrollees. In 2019, the federal government will reimburse 
expansion states for 93 percent of the cost of new enrollees, a share which 
will decline to, and remain at, 90 percent in 2020 and beyond. This is 
a much higher rate of reimbursement than the 50/50 split for existing 
Medicaid enrollees in Virginia.
More than 750,000 Virginia residents, or about 9 percent of the state’s 
population, lacked health insurance in 2016.3 Of those with health 
insurance in the Commonwealth, 12 percent received their insurance 
through Tricare, a health care program of the U.S. Department of Defense 
Military Health System, or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 
2016, more than twice the national average. Only Alaska and Hawaii, 
which are far less populous than Virginia, had a higher percentage of their 
population covered by Tricare or the VA. The large federal presence in 
Virginia may mute the impact of Medicaid expansion compared to other 
states.
We expect that between 120,000 and 170,000 newly eligible adults ages 19 
to 65 will enroll in Medicaid once expansion is fully implemented. Annual 
uncompensated care costs for charity care and bad-debt expenses will 
decline as a result, and the financial viability of hospitals will improve 
over time. The work effort of existing enrollees will likely increase, 
and Medicaid expansion will undoubtedly have a positive effect on the 
Commonwealth’s budget. As the effort to identify and enroll newly eligible 
Virginians increases, so will the economic impact of Medicaid expansion in 
Virginia.
2 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
3  The Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach-Norfolk metropolitan statistical area includes the counties of Gloucester, Isle of Wight, James City, Mathews and York and the cities of Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, 
Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, Virginia Beach and Williamsburg. 
4 https://www.delmarvanow.com/story/news/2018/05/14/how-virginia-medicaid-expansion-would-affect-accomack-county/541626002. 
Even with Medicaid expansion, however, around 500,000 Virginians 
will remain without health insurance, as they will exceed the income 
eligibility threshold for Medicaid expansion enrollment. Even among 
those who are income-eligible, not all will enroll. Along with the large 
number of people remaining without insurance, we caution that if the 
federal government were to lower its reimbursement share of new 
Medicaid expansion enrollees to that of existing Medicaid enrollees, the 
costs of expansion to the Commonwealth could increase substantially if 
new enrollees remained on the program.
In this chapter, we will look at how Medicaid expansion may affect health 
insurance coverage and health care in Virginia. We’ll consider opposing 
views, the history of health insurance, current eligibility, future eligibility 
under expansion and the financial impact. Medicaid expansion offers 
promise to low-income residents who currently may not have health 
insurance, but it may also increase the fiscal risk to the Commonwealth’s 
budget.
The impact of Medicaid expansion on Virginians is not merely an 
academic question. Recently, Ann Lewis of Accomack County lost feeling 
in her hands and feet. As the numbness continued to spread, she decided 
to go to the hospital. While there, Lewis could only think of one thing: the 
cost of her health care. “All I could do was cry,” she recalled. “I thought, 
‘What am I going to do? I can’t afford all this.’” She was then transported 
to Maryland, where the cost of her care was written off by the hospital 
as charity care. Although doctors recommended an extended stay in 
a rehabilitation facility upon discharge, Lewis went home because she 
couldn’t afford rehabilitation services. Unable to return to her nursing 
assistant job, due to her condition, she remains unemployed.4 
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Two Sides Of The Debate
Detractors of expansion contend that the Medicaid program is poorly 
run, inefficient and an unwise use of the public purse. They also argue 
that the costs of Medicaid expansion have swelled past predictions. This 
latter claim is true, both because Medicaid has attracted more users than 
forecasted, and the average cost per user has exceeded expectations. New 
enrollments have outpaced Congressional Budget Office estimates by 
more than 50 percent. Costs per new Medicaid participant have been up 
to 50 percent higher than the projections by the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services. Even if the federal government continues to reimburse 
states for 90 percent of the costs associated with new enrollees, critics fear 
that costs will balloon at the federal and state level.5
Supporters, however, note that state expenditures per newly eligible 
Medicaid recipient fell by 6.9 percent in 2016, and are expected to decline 
further as states gain experience, and services for individuals with less 
urgent health problems increase. Further, multiple states have found 
that their health-related and criminal justice expenditures have declined 
because of increased Medicaid coverage.6 Proponents also cite numerous 
empirical studies showing Medicaid expansion increases the scope of 
insurance coverage, produces demonstrably healthier individuals and has 
minimal or no adverse labor market participation effects.7 These effects 
appear to be more pronounced in poorer communities.
5  See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, March 28, 2018, and Mercatus Center, Charles Blahous, June 28, 2017, for more details. 
6  See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, March 28, 2018, and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Judith Solomon, Jan. 24, 2017, for study details. 
7   Laura Antonisse, Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz and Samantha Artiga, “The Effects of Medicaid Expansion under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review,” Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (March 28, 2018), 
www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-medicaid-expansion-under-the-aca-updated-findings-from-a-literature-review-march-2018.
8  Blumberg, Alex and Davidson, Adam, “Accidents of History Created U.S. Health System,” NPR special series “Planet Money,” Oct. 22, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114045132. 
Accidents Of History: 
Health Insurance In 
The United States
Constant change has been the trademark of health insurance in the 
United States over the past 150 years. Historian John Murray found that 
by the mid-1800s, employers, unions and fraternal organizations had 
established “sickness funds” as a form of insurance. Employees would 
typically contribute 1 percent of their weekly wages to the sickness funds, 
which would then pay sick or disabled employees up to 60 percent of their 
lost wages. By 1890, there were more than 1,300 such funds, and Murray 
estimates that 20 percent of industrial workers belonged to a sickness 
fund in the early 1900s. While not health insurance per se, these funds 
provided workers with a semblance of indemnity coverage.
In the late 1920s, to encourage patients to pay their bills, hospitals started 
offering plans where medical payments would be forgiven if one paid a 
monthly fee, eventually evolving into the modern Blue Cross system.8 Blue 
Shield, established in 1939, mirrored the expansion of the Blue Cross 
system, although the Blue Shield program paid consumers, who were then 
responsible for paying physicians. 
During World War II, the federal government instituted wage and 
price controls, along with rationing, in an attempt to control inflation 
and redirect resources to the war effort. Facing labor shortages as 
the conscription of men increased over the course of the war, firms 
increasingly turned to women, leading to a significant rise in female 
labor force participation. The rising strength of unions led to demands 
for additional forms of compensation, including the provision of health 
insurance. By 1944, the National War Labor Board exempted employer-
sponsored health insurance from wage controls, and the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) ruled that employees did not have to pay income taxes 
on premiums paid by employers. These factors combined so that firms, 
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constrained in their ability to offer workers higher wages, increased other 
forms of compensation, including employer-sponsored health insurance. 
One anonymous employer noted, “It was a case of paying the money to 
insurance for their employees or to Uncle Sam in taxes.”9
While precise historical data on private health insurance coverage are 
difficult to come by, Michael Morrisey notes in his 2008 book “Health 
Insurance” that coverage by any type of private provider rapidly increased 
during and after World War II. As we illustrate in Graph 1, 9.1 percent 
of Americans had some form of private health insurance in 1940, a 
percentage vaulting to 50.6 by 1950. 
Almost every president since World War II has called for reforms to 
the health insurance system in the United States. Most recently, the 
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), otherwise 
known as Obamacare, attempted to strike a balance between private 
health insurance and public intervention in the marketplace. Obamacare 
allowed states to expand Medicaid coverage with higher federal rates of 
reimbursement, created health insurance marketplaces where individuals 
could compare plan costs and benefits across standardized plans, offered 
a federal tax credit for those earning between 100 and 400 percent of the 
Federal Poverty Level (FPL), prevented denial of coverage based on pre-
existing conditions, and allowed young adults up to age 26 to remain on 
family policies. One of the most unpopular provisions of Obamacare was 
the mandate requiring individuals to purchase health insurance or face a 
financial penalty. The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, however, reduced the 
penalty to zero, effectively eliminating the individual mandate as of Jan. 1, 
2019. 
Having health insurance, however, does not mean that one is immune 
from health care costs. A 2016 survey conducted by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation and The New York Times found that 20 percent of 
respondents had problems paying medical bills in the past year and, 
for those without health insurance, over 50 percent reported difficulty 
paying medical bills. One study from 2011 claimed that up to 26 percent 
9 Gordon, Colin, 2003, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10  “The Burden of Medical Debt: January 2016 Results from the Kaiser Family Foundation/New York Times Medical Bills Survey,” released January 2016, and Gross, T. and Notowidigdo, M.J., (2011), “Health insurance and the consumer 
bankruptcy decision: Evidence from expansions of Medicaid,” Journal of Public Economics, 95(7), 767-778.
11 “Myth and Measurement – The Case of Medical Bankruptcies,” Carlos Dobkin, Amy Finkelstein, Raymond Kluender, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, (2018), New England Journal of Medicine 378: 1076-1078.
12  Susan Brink, “What Country Spends the Most (and Least On Health Care Per Person?” NPR (April 20, 2017), www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/04/20/524774195/what-country-spends-the-most-and-least-on-health-care-
per-person.
13 http://news.gallup.com/poll/226607/news-americans-satisfaction-healthcare.aspx.
of bankruptcies filed by low-income households could be related to 
out-of-pocket medical costs.10 A recent analysis, featured in a New 
England Journal of Medicine article, argued the belief that a significant 
percentage of bankruptcies resulting from medical costs is overstated, 
and hospitalizations were responsible for about 6 percent of bankruptcies 
among the uninsured population.11 The article’s authors also found, not 
surprisingly, that hospitalizations increased out-of-pocket spending on 
health care, which led to higher levels of medical debt and a decrease in 
employment and income.
Critics of the U.S. health care system often argue that the Canadian 
system operates with lower costs and better outcomes. While 100 percent 
of Canadians have health insurance, not all services are covered, so 
individuals do have out-of-pocket expenses, and health needs may not 
always guarantee prompt access to care. The 2017 edition of “Waiting 
Your Turn,” a report by the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank, found 
that wait times for medically necessary treatments reached the highest 
recorded levels in 2017. The median wait time from a general practitioner’s 
initial referral to a specialist to final receipt of treatment was over 21 
weeks. Canadians could also expect to wait about four weeks for an 
ultrasound or a computed tomography (CT) scan and almost 11 weeks for 
a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan. Every health care system has 
tradeoffs but the United States currently spends substantially more per 
capita on medical care than any other country in the world.12
Americans are generally unsatisfied with the state of the health care 
system but are happy with their doctors. More than 70 percent of 
Americans responded in a February 2018 Gallup poll that the U.S. 
health care system is in a “state of crisis” or “has major problems.”13 Yet, 
when asked about their personal health care experience, three-quarters 
of employed Americans said their health care was “excellent” or “good.” 
These responses are like Americans’ perceptions of Congress versus their 
individual representative or senator: unhappy with the institution but 
satisfied at the personal level. 
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 GRAPH 1
PERCENT OF POPULATION WITH SOME FORM OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: UNITED STATES, 1940-1980
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Who Has Health Insurance?
Today, the U.S. Census Bureau tracks not only how many Americans 
have health insurance, but also what types of organizations provide that 
insurance. Reflecting the fact that some people may have been covered 
by more than one type of health insurance during the year, Table 1 shows 
that in 2016, the majority of Americans had some form of health insurance 
through their employer. Another 14 percent directly purchased a plan 
through a private insurer or the Obamacare Marketplace exchanges. 
Nearly 40 percent of Americans received health insurance through 
Medicare (17.2 percent) or Medicaid (21.1 percent). About 5 percent of 
Americans received health insurance through either Tricare or the VA. 
Lastly, 8.9 percent of Americans were uninsured in 2016.
Insured rates vary within the United States. As illustrated in Table 2, 
Massachusetts reported the highest percentage of the population with any 
type of health insurance coverage in 2016, followed by Vermont, Hawaii, 
the District of Columbia and Iowa. Two of the top five, the District of 
Columbia and Massachusetts,14 have an individual mandate that requires 
residents to purchase a health insurance plan or face a financial penalty. 
New Jersey is scheduled to implement an individual mandate in 2019, 
followed by Vermont in 2020. Several other states, including California, 
Washington and Minnesota, are discussing whether to require an 
individual mandate for health insurance.
Virginia ranked 34th out of the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
with respect to the percentage of its population that had health 
insurance coverage. Among more populous states, California (ranked 
22nd) and New York (ranked 15th) had higher rates of coverage compared 
to Florida (ranked 47th) and Texas (ranked 51st), in part because of the 
decision of California and New York to expand Medicaid in 2014. 
14 The Massachusetts individual mandate has been in effect for a decade. 
TABLE 1
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 


















269,474 85.2% 294,466 91.1% +5.9%
Employer-
based
168,850 53.4% 174,550 54.0% +0.6%
Direct-
purchase
37,398 11.8% 45,194 14.0% +2.2%
Medicare 50,888 16.1% 55,602 17.2% +1.1%




16,149 5.1% 17,096 5.3% +0.2%
Uninsured 46,654 14.8% 28,661 8.9% -5.9%
Total 316,129 -- 323,127 -- -- 
Source: Estimates based on the 2016 American Community Survey and 2013 American Community Survey 
one-year microdata. Total population of the United is used for this table. Only 0.50 of respondents stated 
that they only had Indian Health Service insurance and are excluded from the table. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 percent as individuals may have more than one type of health insurance. Data are based on a 
sample and are subject to sampling variability. A margin of error is a measure of an estimate’s variability. 
The larger the margin of error is in relation to the size of the estimate, the less reliable the estimate. The 
margins of error for the estimates are available upon request.
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TABLE 2
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: TOP FIVE STATES, VIRGINIA AND BOTTOM FIVE STATES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION REPORTING 
ANY HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2016











1 Massachusetts 6,811,885 6,639,121 97.5% 172,764 2.5% 2014
2 Vermont 624,594 602,470 96.5% 22,124 3.5% 2014




681,170 653,488 95.9% 27,682 4.1% 2014
5 Iowa 3,134,693 3,004,519 95.8% 130,174 4.2% 2014
34 Virginia 8,411,808 7,659,348 91.1% 752,460 9.0% 2019
47 Florida 20,612,439 17,935,011 87.0% 2,677,428 13.0% No
48 Georgia 10,310,371 8,925,297 86.6% 1,385,074 13.4% No
49 Oklahoma 3,923,561 3,367,352 85.8% 556,209 14.2% No
50 Alaska 741,894 635,232 85.6% 106,662 14.4% No
51 Texas 27,862,596 23,083,054 82.8% 4,779,542 17.2%  No
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 American Community Survey – estimates based the 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata. Iowa obtained a Section 1115 waiver for 2014 but switched to the more common ACA 
expansion in 2015. Iowa transitioned its entire Medicaid program to managed care in 2016. Data are based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. The margins of error for the estimates are available upon request.
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Health insurance rates also vary by race in the United States and Virginia 
(Graph 2). A lower percentage of the African-American population in the 
Commonwealth reported not having health insurance in 2016 compared 
to the nation. The uninsured rate among Asian-Americans was one-
half a percentage point higher in Virginia than the U.S. in 2016, while 
whites were essentially uninsured at the same rate. The American Indian/
Alaskan Native population is numerically small in Virginia and enjoys 
higher rates of health insurance coverage than the United States as a 
whole.
Within Virginia, health insurance coverage rates vary by locality. 
Figure 1 illustrates that uninsured rates tend to be lower in urbanized 
areas, including much of Northern Virginia, Richmond and Hampton 
Roads. Rural areas tend to have higher rates of uninsured. Lower 
rates also prevail along the I-95 corridor in central Virginia. Table 3 
illustrates the disparities in coverage between the 10 highest and 10 
lowest localities for the percentage of uninsured in the Commonwealth. 
In Roanoke, the Carilion Clinic’s chief financial officer estimates the 
hospital will have to pay about $27.6 million a year in new taxes once 
Medicaid expansion takes place. Don Halliwill, however, cannot yet 
determine how much the clinic will earn from the expansion, but believes 
it will outweigh the new taxes. “It’s going to help our patients, our 
physicians and staff. And it’s going to help the economy,” he said. “Any 
money that comes in is going to be spent. And for us, 100 percent of 
money coming in is spent here. Whatever the number is, it stands to be 
significant for us and our communities.”
Halliwill added: “It is a victory for our communities and a victory for 
our patients, but boy, it’s complicated. We know the direction and what 
has been stated as the intentions. But how it will play out, we just don’t 
know.”15
15 https://www.roanoke.com/business/news/roanoke/carilion-views-medicaid-expansion-as-victory-for-community-and-patients/article_d63f9214-01c6-59a4-8d42-e4a0d8e7a023.html.
In 2016, the Commonwealth’s uninsured rate of 9.0 percent was slightly 
higher than the nation’s 8.9 percent uninsured rate. In Virginia, 12.1 
percent of the population was insured through Tricare or the VA, and 
a higher percentage of individuals received their health insurance 
through their employer or union in Virginia than the nation. The share 
of Virginians who directly purchased insurance (where one directly 
buys private insurance, including marketplace exchanges) or obtained it 
through Medicare was about the same as the nation. Another difference 
between the Commonwealth and the U.S. was that only 11.8 percent of 
Virginians received health insurance through Medicaid, compared to 21.1 
percent of the population of the United States (see Graph 3).
Why is a smaller percentage of Virginians covered by Medicaid than 
the U.S. population as a whole? The most straightforward explanation 
is simple: Virginia was consistently ranked among the strictest states 
with regard to Medicaid eligibility. Prior to the implementation of 
Medicaid expansion, Virginia’s income and other requirements presented 
a significant challenge for low-income individuals seeking to enroll in 
Medicaid. If it’s harder to enroll and maintain enrollment, then a smaller 
number and percentage of the population will receive health insurance 
through Medicaid. We expect, with Medicaid expansion, that a significant 
number of people who were previously denied enrollment will now find 
themselves eligible to enroll in Medicaid in Virginia.
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GRAPH 2
UNINSURED RATE BY RACE: UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA, 2016
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 American Community Survey – estimates based the 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata. Data on other races (not elsewhere classified) and other Pacific Islanders are not included. 
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FIGURE 1
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 
VIRGINIA COUNTIES AND CITIES – POPULATION REPORTING ANY HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2012-2016
Sources: 2012-2016 American Community Survey, U.S. Census, Table B27001, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University (civilian noninstitutional population instead of total population). Data are 
based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. The margins of error for the estimates are available upon request.
Oto 4 .99 Percent Uninsured 
■ 5 t o 9.99 Percent Uninsured 
□ 10 t o 14.99 Percent Uninsured 
□ 15 t o 19.99 Percent Uninsured 
20 Percent or Greater Un insured 
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TABLE 3
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: TOP 10 AND BOTTOM 10 VIRGINIA COUNTIES AND CITIES – POPULATION REPORTING ANY 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2012-2016
Total Population
Insured Uninsured
Estimate Percentage Estimate Percentage
Falls Church 13,520 13,066 96.6% 454 3.4%
Poquoson 11,864 11,401 96.1% 463 3.9%
Botetourt County 32,914 31,272 95.0% 1,642 5.0%
Williamsburg 14,825 14,050 94.8% 775 5.2%
Goochland County 20,746 19,587 94.4% 1,159 5.6%
Hanover County 101,502 95,746 94.3% 5,756 5.7%
York County 63,499 59,714 94.0% 3,785 6.0%
New Kent County 19,473 18,247 93.7% 1,226 6.3%
Roanoke County 92,050 86,014 93.4% 6,036 6.6%
Montgomery County 96,586 89,929 93.1% 6,657 6.9%
Charlotte County 12,100 10,155 83.9% 1,945 16.1%
Lunenburg County 11,496 9,639 83.9% 1,857 16.2%
Winchester 27,102 22,619 83.5% 4,483 16.5%
Northampton County 11,799 9,835 83.4% 1,964 16.7%
Martinsville 13,190 10,985 83.3% 2,205 16.7%
Accomack County 32,677 26,811 82.1% 5,866 18.0%
Buena Vista 6,532 5,319 81.4% 1,213 18.6%
Manassas 41,121 33,403 81.2% 7,718 18.8%
Emporia 5,349 4,172 78.0% 1,177 22.0%
Manassas Park 15,786 12,260 77.7% 3,526 22.3%
Sources: 2012-2016 American Community Survey, U.S. Census, Table B27001, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University (civilian noninstitutional population instead of total population). Data 
are based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. The margins of error for the estimates are available upon request.
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GRAPH 3
HEALTH CARE COVERAGE TYPES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS: 
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA, 2016
Source: Estimates based on the 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata. Only 0.50 and 0.06 percent of respondents for the U.S. and Virginia stated that they only had Indian Health Service insurance and are excluded 
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Who Is Currently Eligible 
For Medicaid In Virginia?
Until Jan. 1, 2019, the Virginia Medicaid program is limited to residents 
of the Commonwealth who are U.S. citizens, permanent residents or legal 
residents in need of health insurance. To qualify, individuals must be 
pregnant, a parent or relative caretaker of a dependent child or children 
under age 19, under age 21 and in foster care, in a nursing facility, blind, 
disabled or age 65 years or older.16 Nondisabled adults without children 
will not be eligible to enroll in Virginia’s Medicaid program until 2019. 
Although at this printing in December 2018, recruitment efforts are 
already underway and people are enrolling to take advantage of Medicaid 
expansion on Jan. 1, 2019.
Who can enroll in Medicaid in the Commonwealth is determined, in 
part, by household income. Virginia sets income eligibility guidelines 
relative to the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), which are determined 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.17 The income 
eligibility thresholds for each category of Medicaid eligibility are based on 
these poverty levels (Table 4).
Currently, Virginia’s income guidelines are the same across all localities 
for pregnant women and children under the age of 19, in that countable 
income cannot exceed 148 percent of FPL. For the aged, blind and 
disabled, countable income cannot exceed 80 percent of FPL.
Parents and caretakers of children under the age of 18 who qualify in 
the category of Low Income Families with Children (LIFC), however, 
face income guidelines that depend on where they live.18 The LIFC 
income guidelines can cause confusion and may deter work effort. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, the parents of a family of three with countable 
income of around $10,000 a year would likely be eligible for Medicaid 
in Montgomery County, but the parents would become ineligible if they 
moved to any nearby county. The child in the household would likely 
16 Individuals who receive Social Security Disability Income (https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability) may be eligible to enroll in Medicaid, https://www.healthcare.gov/people-with-disabilities/ssi-and-medicaid.
17 https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.
18 Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services, “Medical Assistance Eligibility Policy & Guidance,” Chapter 4 (May 2018).
remain covered through Virginia’s version of the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP).
TABLE 4



















-- 148% 80% 205%
1 $12,140 $17,968 $9,712 $24,887
2 $16,460 $24,361 $13,168 $33,743
3 $20,780 $30,755 $16,632 $42,599
4 $25,100 $37,148 $20,080 $51,455
5 $29,420 $43,542 $23,536 $60,311
6 $33,740 $49,936 $26,992 $69,167
Sources: Federal Poverty Guidelines, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Virginia DMAS. 
For households with more than six persons, add $4,320 per individual to the FPL. *For pregnant women 
who qualify for Medicaid only with more than six persons, add $6,394 per individual. FAMIS and FAMIS Plus 
are Virginia’s CHIP programs for households where income exceeds 148 percent of FPL, add $8,856 per 
additional household member. Table includes 5 percent income disregard for children, parents and pregnant 
women.
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FIGURE 2
MEDICAID INCOME ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: 
ESTIMATED MAXIMUM ANNUAL COUNTABLE INCOME FOR FAMILY OF THREE, EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2018
Source: Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services, “Medical Assistance Eligibility Policy & Guidance,” Chapter 4 (July 2018), Appendix 5. Annual countable income is determined by the geographical income category monthly 







Who Will Be Eligible To 
Enroll Once Expansion 
Occurs In Virginia?
On Jan. 1, 2019, nondisabled adults with countable incomes up to 138 
percent of the FPL will become eligible to enroll in the Virginia Medicaid 
program. The income thresholds for disabled adults and low-income 
families will also adjust upward. To say that this is a significant change 
in eligibility is an understatement.
A single, childless, nondisabled adult who is ineligible for Medicaid in 
2018 could earn up to $16,754 and be eligible for Medicaid in 2019. For a 
single, disabled adult, the income limit rises from $9,712 in 2018 to $16,754 
in 2019. Families will also see a rise in income limits. The parents of a 
family of three in Charlottesville, for example, who currently make 
$12,000 a year and are ineligible for Medicaid in 2018, may be able 
to earn up to $28,677 in 2019 and still possibly be eligible to enroll in 
Medicaid (see Table 5).19 
TABLE 5
2018 FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL AND EXPANSION INCOME LIMITS 
BY HOUSEHOLD
Number of Persons in 
Household
Federal Poverty Level
 Medicaid Enrollees as 







6 $33,740 $46,562 
Sources: Federal Poverty Guidelines, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Coverva.org/
expansion. For households with more than six persons, add $4,320 per individual to the FPL. 
19 The LIFC program will remain for those families that meet the eligibility guidelines. Children are typically covered through CHIP and subject to different income qualification guidelines.
20 https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/help-paying-costs/medicaid/medicaid.html.
Who Among The Nonelderly 
Has Insurance In Virginia?
People who are 65 or older are automatically eligible for Medicare, even 
if they continue to carry private health insurance. While some individuals 
65 or older may qualify for Medicaid (as it offers benefits such as nursing 
home care and personal care services), these “dual eligibles” already have 
health insurance through Medicare. This is important since Medicaid only 
pays after Medicare, private-employer group health plans and Medicare 
supplements have paid.20 A person who has Medicare and qualifies for 
Medicaid would not be considered as transitioning from uninsured status 
to insured status. 
About 744,000 residents of the Commonwealth of Virginia under the 
age of 65 lacked health insurance coverage in 2016 (see Table 6). Of 
this number, almost 641,000 were adults and approximately 103,000 
were under the age of 19. 
There were about 259,000 adults who lacked health insurance and earned 
less than 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level in 2016, making them 
the target group for Medicaid expansion. Surprisingly, 57,000 Virginians 
under the age of 19 lacked health insurance even though their 
households earned less than 200 percent of the poverty limit. In many 
cases, these children would likely be eligible for Medicaid or Virginia’s 
FAMIS or FAMIS Plus programs. It appears that some children may 
fall through the cracks in the system.
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TABLE 6




(19 to 64 Years) (0 to 18 Years)
Less than 100% 
of FPL
188,560 24,470 213,030
100% to 138% 
of FPL
70,627 11,895 82,522






Total 640,695 103,102 743,797
Source: Estimates based the 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata. Data are based on a 
sample and are subject to sampling variability. The margins of error for the estimates are available upon 
request.
Our estimates, of course, are subject to debate. We do not adjust the 
population estimates for potential underreporting of CHIP and SNAP 
(Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) populations.21 We also do 
not examine how many individuals may transition from the Obamacare 
Marketplace (where they receive subsidies from the federal government) 
to Medicaid. DMAS, for example, estimated that approximately 60,000 
people would transition from other health care (marketplace and own-
purchase) to Medicaid.22 As these individuals already have insurance, we 
do not include them in our estimates of the impact of Medicaid expansion. 
If anything, our estimates serve as a lower bound of the impact of 
Medicaid expansion on the uninsured in Virginia.
21 https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2011/demo/improving-the-validity-of-the-medicaid-chip-estimates-on-the-acs.pdf.
22 DMAS estimates of Medicaid expansion with October 2018 start date, received by email on May 21, 2018. 
23 https://vplc.org/virginians-cant-wait.
Martha Harding’s case was recently highlighted by the Virginia Poverty 
Law Center. She cares for four grandchildren, who are on Medicaid. She 
works in a minimum-wage administrative job. “I don’t have insurance, and 
I worry about what would happen to my grandchildren if I get sick or hurt 
and can’t work. Hardworking people like me, age 55 to 64, have a difficult 
time because we are not yet able to get Medicare due to age, and can’t go 
on Medicaid because we try to earn money to take care of our families.”23
Focusing On The Working-
Age Population In Virginia
As many lower-income people who are disabled, pregnant or children may 
already qualify for Medicaid, the impact of Medicaid expansion is likely to 
be highest among working-age adults. Expansion, however, does not mean 
that these individuals will be automatically enrolled in Medicaid. They will 
need to actively seek to enroll in the program. Based upon the behavior 
of the uninsured in other states where Medicaid previously expanded, we 
know not all eligible individuals will enroll. The additional requirement 
that nondisabled adults must work or volunteer may deter some from 
enrolling in Medicaid, though we note that the legal status of such a 
requirement remains questionable at the time of writing.
Table 7 illustrates that the uninsured rate for the working-age (19-64) 
population in Virginia was 12.3 percent in 2016. The uninsured rate 
of the working-age population is higher, as one might expect, than the 
entire population of Virginia, where only 9 percent of the population was 
uninsured. About 11 percent of Virginia’s working-age population 
receives health insurance through Tricare or the VA, two and one-half 
times that of the nation. A higher percentage was covered by employer-
based group health insurance plans, and a lower percentage was covered 
by Medicare relative to the entire population. Within the Commonwealth’s 
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nonelderly population, only 6.9 percent were covered by Medicaid, 
compared to 15.4 percent for the United States. Two factors may explain 
the lower share of Medicaid in Virginia: first, Virginia has yet to expand 
Medicaid, and second, Virginia currently has some of the most onerous 
eligibility requirements in the United States.
TABLE 7
VIRGINIA AND UNITED STATES HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDER 
DISTRIBUTION: INDIVIDUALS AGES 19-64, 2016




Direct Purchase 12.0% 13.2%
Veterans Affairs 1.7% 2.7%
Medicare 4.0% 3.5%
Indian Health Service 0.5% 0.1%
Uninsured 12.6% 12.3%
Source: Estimates based the 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata. Sample only includes 
individuals between the ages of 19 and 64. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent, as individuals may have 
more than one type of health insurance. Data are based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. 
The margins of error for the estimates are available upon request.
24   For Maryland, in 2013, 73.4 percent of those earning less than 100 percent of FPL and 69.6 percent of those between 100 and 138 percent of FPL reported having health insurance. For West Virginia, 64.1 percent of those earning 
less than 100 percent of FPL and 62.9 percent of those between 100 and 138 percent of FPL reported having health insurance.
Estimating The Take-Up 
Rate Of Medicaid
What percentage of the eligible population can we reasonably expect to 
take up, or enroll in, Medicaid on or after Jan. 1, 2019? To answer this 
question, we draw upon the experience of Maryland and West Virginia, 
states that expanded Medicaid in 2014.
In both states, the insured rate increased after Medicaid expansion. By 
comparing the insured rate in 2013 with the insured rate in 2016, we 
can estimate the take-up rate. The take-up rate is an estimate of the 
percentage of individuals who acquired health insurance from 2013 to 
2016. To make matters slightly more complicated, take-up rates vary by 
state and income category.
Maryland and West Virginia started out at different points. In 2013, a 
higher percentage of the population of Maryland reported having health 
insurance than West Virginia.24 Because where you start often determines 
where you finish, the estimated take-up rates for Maryland and West 
Virginia are quite different.
As shown in Table 8, Maryland’s take-up rate was almost 30 percent 
for those earning less than 100 percent of the poverty level. For those 
earning between 100 and 138 percent of the poverty level, the take-up rate 
was about 46 percent. What does this mean? If you earned less than 100 
percent of the poverty level in Maryland, you were 30 percent more likely 
to have health insurance in 2016 when compared to 2013.
A similar but more significant story emerges from West Virginia. For 
those earning less than 100 percent of the poverty level, the take-up 
rate was almost 63 percent. The take-up rate was even higher for those 
with incomes between 100 and 138 percent of the poverty level, about 68 
percent. Why the higher take-up rates? A contributing factor was the 
starting point, in which a lower percentage of West Virginia’s population 
was uninsured prior to Medicaid expansion.
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TABLE 8




100% of FPL 
100% to 







29.9% 45.5% 62.5% 67.6%
Source: 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata. Sample only includes adults between 
ages 19 and 65. The take-up rate is determined by the rise in the percentage of individuals reporting any 
health insurance coverage in each year relative to the percentage of individuals reporting health insurance 
coverage in 2013. Data are based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. The margins of error 
for the estimates are available upon request.
Drawing upon the experience of Maryland and West Virginia, we 
estimate the take-up rate for Medicaid expansion in the Commonwealth 
of Virginia will be 44 percent for people with incomes of less than 100 
percent of FPL and 55 percent for those with incomes between 100 and 
138 percent of FPL. 
Some might argue that these take-up rates are too low. In 2016, the Urban 
Institute estimated a take-up rate of 56.8 percent for a potential Medicaid 
expansion in Virginia.25 In 2017, the Virginia Department of Medical 
Assistance Services (DMAS) projected take-up rates and enrollment 
for Medicaid expansion in Virginia. DMAS estimated that 85 percent of 
eligible (and interested) adults with incomes between 0 and 138 percent 
of FPL would enroll due to Medicaid expansion.26 Of the 370,000 adults 
without insurance and sufficiently low incomes, 238,544 would enroll in 
Medicaid and 60,000 would transfer from other health insurance plans. 
From this, we obtain a take-up rate of 64.5 percent.27
Of course, these are only estimates. We don’t know exactly how many 
people will enroll in Virginia because the Commonwealth is different from 
other states. The variations in health insurance coverage at the local level 
suggest that the impact of expansion will be higher in Southwest Virginia, 
25  Buettgens, M. and Kenney, G.M., “What if More States Expanded Medicaid in 2017? Changes in Eligibility, Enrollment, and the Uninsured,” (2016) Urban Institute.
26   DMAS estimated that 370,000 adults with incomes between 0 and 138 percent of FPL did not have insurance and 22.8 percent would remain ineligible for Medicaid; 5,000 of the remaining individuals would never enroll. Given an 
85 percent take-up rate for these remaining individuals, 238,544 of 370,000 would enroll and 60,000 other individuals would transition from other insurance plans.
27   We recognize that the Urban Institute and DMAS’s absolute estimates are higher, as both used ACS data adjusted for underreporting of SNAP recipients and other factors. In the interests of transparency and replicability, we have 
chosen not to adjust the ACS data at this time.
for example, than Northern Virginia, Richmond or Hampton Roads. Every 
estimate is fraught with uncertainty, and the best course of action is to 
present a range of outcomes.
How Many Will Enroll After 
Medicaid Expansion In 
Virginia?
Table 9 presents low, medium and high estimates of Medicaid enrollment 
in Virginia after Medicaid expansion. 
Low estimates: If newly eligible individuals in Virginia sign up for 
Medicaid at the estimated low take-up rates, about 121,000 additional 
adults will enroll in Medicaid. Of these, we estimate that about 83,000 
will have incomes less than 100 percent of FPL and about 37,000 will have 
incomes between 100 and 138 percent of FPL. 
Medium estimates: If newly eligible individuals acquire Medicaid insurance 
at the estimated medium take-up rates, 147,000 additional adults will 
enroll in Medicaid. Of this number, about 107,000 will have incomes less 
than 100 percent of FPL and 40,000 will have incomes between 100 and 
138 percent of FPL. 
High estimates: Lastly, if newly eligible individuals join at the estimated 
high take-up rates, about 167,000 additional Virginians will enroll in 
Medicaid – around 122,000 with incomes less than 100 percent of FPL and 
45,000 with incomes between 100 and 138 percent of FPL.
Regardless of one’s assumptions about take-up rates, Medicaid expansion 
will not result in every eligible person enrolling in Medicaid. Between 
92,000 and 138,000 working-age adults in the Commonwealth 
who might be eligible for Medicaid may not enroll. Some of these 
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individuals may never enroll, others may lack information about 
Medicaid and some may be deterred by proposed work requirements. 
Contrary to some public perceptions, however, many adult Medicaid 
enrollees already work. In fact, the increased income eligibility limits 
may result in increased work effort by existing Medicaid recipients, 
who will be able to earn more without endangering their enrollment.28 
Lastly, Medicaid expansion does not address those who make more than 
138 percent of the poverty level. Including all income groups, the number 
28  “Kaiser Family Foundation: Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by Family Work Status,” https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/distribution-by-employment-status-4. For further discussion regarding Medicaid work 
requirements, who is affected, and impacts on enrollment, see “Medicaid and Work Requirements: New Guidance, State Waiver Details and Key Issues,” Musumeci, M.B., Garfield, R. and Rudowitz, R. (January 16, 2018). Retrieved 
online May 31, 2018, from https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-and-work-requirements-new-guidance-state-waiver-details-and-key-issues.
of uninsured in Virginia will range between 473,000 and 519,000. Many 
of these people earn between 139 and 400 percent of the federal poverty 
level and are eligible for the marketplace. We must also recognize that 
reductions in outreach funding from the federal government may dampen 
enrollment of Medicaid expansion and the Obamacare Marketplace 
exchanges over time.
TABLE 9














Less than 100% 
of FPL
188,560 82,742 105,818 107,102 81,458 121,567 66,993
100% to 138% of 
FPL
70,627 38,640 31,987 40,116 30,511 45,534 25,093
139% to 400% of 
FPL
287,280 0 287,280 0 287,280 0 287,280
Greater than 
400% of FPL
94,228 0 94,228 0 94,228 0 94,228
Totals 640,695 121,382 519,313 147,218 493,477 167,101 473,594
Source: 2016 American Community Survey one-year microdata files. Low estimate based on take-up in Maryland/West Virginia post-ACA expansion, medium estimate based on take-up in Buettgens and Kenney (2016) and high 
estimate based on DMAS 2017 estimate. Data are based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. The margins of error for the estimates are available upon request.
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There Is No Such Thing As 
A Free Lunch
As part of Obamacare, the federal government match rate for expansion 
population costs (otherwise known as the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage, or FMAP) was 100 percent for 2014 to 2016. In other words, 
the federal government reimbursed states for 100 percent of the direct 
costs of newly eligible enrollees during this period.
Since then, the federal government reimbursement rate has declined and 
will be 93 percent in 2019. The FMAP ratchets down to 90 percent for 
2020 and subsequent years.29 For $1,000 in newly eligible enrollee costs in 
2019, Virginia will bear $70 of the amount, and the federal government 
will bear $930. In 2020 and beyond, for the same amount of cost, Virginia 
will bear $100 and the federal government will bear $900. To many, this 
seems too good a deal to pass up, but there are worries about the future.
Part of the hesitance to adopt the Medicaid expansion has been the lower 
FMAP rates states receive on previously eligible Medicaid enrollees and 
fears that future law changes might result in the newly eligible Medicaid 
enrollees receiving the current FMAP rates. With the current historically 
high federal budget deficits and debt, it is quite likely (if not guaranteed) 
that future federal spending will have to change, and likely in ways that 
shift more fiduciary burdens to the states. Current enrollee FMAP rates 
are adjusted each year, based on state per capita income relative to the 
national rate, where states with comparatively higher per capita incomes 
receive lower FMAP percentages. For fiscal years 2010-2018, Virginia is 
subject to an FMAP rate of 50 percent for its current Medicaid-enrolled 
citizens.30 The federal government matches Virginia’s expenditure dollar-
for-dollar.
While Virginia has been criticized in the past for being one of the more 
restrictive states with respect to Medicaid eligibility, this policy choice has 
worked to the financial advantage of the Commonwealth’s budget. More 
29  Medicaid’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) Congressional Research Service report 7-5700 by Mitchell, A., Feb. 9, 2016.
30  State Health Facts: Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid and Multiplier, retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier.
31  Congressional Research Service, 2018, Medicaid’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).
32  “Medicaid at a Glance” by the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services, http//dmas.virginia.gov/Content_atchs/atchs/MAG%20FNAL_1_13_17_pdf.
generous states which had previously allowed low-income, nondisabled, 
nonelderly adults to enroll in Medicaid received reduced reimbursements 
compared to states which chose to expand Medicaid in 2014 and beyond. 
By 2020, however, the matching rate will be equal for enrollees in the 
expansion income category across states.31 Virginia, on the other hand, 
having previously been excluded from this group, will now be able to 
count all newly eligible enrollees with incomes 138 percent or less of 
FPL eligible for higher FMAP reimbursement. Obviously, receiving 90 
percent reimbursement for newly eligible enrollees versus 50 percent is to 
Virginia’s benefit.
Table 10 includes estimates for the possible cost per enrollee and cost 
overall for Virginia from 2019 to 2021 if the Medicaid expansion incurs 
costs comparable to those of current enrollees. We continue to use our 
previous take-up rate estimates of 44 percent for people with incomes less 
than 100 percent of FPL and 55 percent for those with incomes between 
100 and 138 percent of FPL. We also assume that costs per enrollee will 
continue at the 2 percent rate observed from 2007 to 2013.32 In the first 
scenario, we front-load the number of newly eligible individuals estimated 
to enroll in Medicaid into 2019. One can think of this scenario in terms of 
estimating the upper limit of costs and imposing the full costs of Medicaid 
expansion in Virginia in 2019. In the second scenario, we mirror the take-
up of Medicaid in Maryland and West Virginia, and the costs are fully 
realized by 2021.
For the newly eligible enrollees in Virginia, we estimate that costs to 
the Commonwealth will range from about $30 million to $90 million in 
2019, depending on one’s assumptions about the take-up rate. By 2021, 
the Commonwealth will incur costs between $96 million and $133 million 
for new Medicaid enrollees. We caution that if federal reimbursement 
rates for newly eligible enrollees dropped to the 50 percent rate for 
currently enrolled participants, the estimated costs in Table 10 could 




ESTIMATES OF STATE COSTS FOR MEDICAID ENROLLEES IN VIRGINIA
Virginia’s Cost per Enrollee All Medicaid Expansion Occurs in 2019 Gradual Expansion of Medicaid*
Year



















2019 $7,628 $3,814 $534 $64,813,802 $78,609,610 $89,226,546 $29,185,788 $35,398,068 $40,178,896
2020 $7,781 $3,890 $778 $94,442,969 $114,545,432 $130,015,824 $84,083,749 $101,981,222 $115,754,704
2021 $7,936 $3,968 $794 $96,331,828 $116,836,340 $132,616,140 $96,331,828 $116,836,340 $132,616,140 
Source: Kaiser Medicaid Spending Per Enrollee (full or partial benefit) for FY 2014. 2015 and after are per-enrollee cost estimates based on the 2007-2013 yearly average change of 2 percent from DMAS “Medicaid at a Glance.” 
FMAP rates are 50 percent per current enrollee and are 93 percent and 90 percent for new enrollees for 2019, 2020 and beyond, respectively. *Cost estimates assume take-up rates that mirror the three-year time profile of 
Maryland and West Virginia expansion enrollees; not all who eventually signed up for Medicaid in these states did so directly after initial eligibility in January 2014. ACS one-year microfile data. 
33  “Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA),” Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, retrieved online March 13, 2013, from https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/index.html.
34  Garthwaite, C., Gross, T. and Notowidigdo, M.J. (2018), “Hospitals as insurers of last resort,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10(1), 1-39.
35  Dranove, D., Garthwaite, C. and Ody, C. (2016), “Uncompensated care decreased at hospitals in Medicaid expansion states but not at hospitals in nonexpansion states,” Health Affairs, 35(8), 1471-1479.
36  “How Has the ACA Changed Finances for Different Types of Hospitals? Updated Insights from 2015 Cost Report Data,” Blauvin, F. (April 2017), Urban Institute.
37  http://www.vhi.org/hospital_region.asp.
38  http://www.vhha.com/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2018/01/VHHA-2018-Community-Benefit-Report-Final.pdf.
Uncompensated Care And 
The Financial Impact Of 
Medicaid Expansion
Prior to Obamacare, most states did not extend Medicaid insurance to 
low-income, nondisabled, childless adults under the age of 65. As the 1986 
Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act forbade hospitals to turn 
away patients from emergency departments based on the ability to pay, 
one intent of Obamacare was to reduce the amount of uncompensated care 
provided by hospitals.33 The numbers of uninsured are associated with 
lower hospital margins,34 so one can reasonably argue that uncompensated 
care costs are not fully passed on by hospitals to other parties. Two 
recent studies found that when comparing Medicaid expansion states to 
nonexpansion states, uncompensated care costs drop from between 1 and 
1.7 percent.35, 36
Examples abound of how uncompensated care and bad-debt costs reduce 
the bottom line for hospitals in the Commonwealth. The Virginia Health 
Information System is a source for valuable information on the financial 
performance of hospitals throughout Virginia.37 During the 2015-16 fiscal 
year, Virginia hospitals incurred significant costs for charity care and bad 
debts. Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital in Newport News reported 
$25.7 million in charity care costs and $10.2 million in bad debts. Bon 
Secours Richmond Community Hospital reported $17.5 million in charity 
care and $13.1 million in bad debts. Sentara Northern Virginia Medical 
Center incurred $51 million in charity care and $46.9 million in bad-
debt expenses. Smyth County Community Hospital likewise incurred $6.2 
million in charity care but only about $670,000 in bad-debt expenses. 
During the 2015-16 fiscal year, estimated financial assistance topped 
$600 million, while bad-debt expenses exceeded $540 million.38 Even 
though some may argue that the costs of charity care and bad debts are 
overstated, as these costs are based on the full price of hospital services, 
we should be able to agree that uncompensated care and bad-debt costs 
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negatively affected the bottom line of hospitals in Virginia. Twenty-three 
percent of Virginia’s acute care hospitals and 40 percent of rural acute 
care hospitals had negative operating margins during the 2015-16 fiscal 
year, according to the Virginia Health Information System.
It stands to reason that if these costs are being incurred for specific 
patients without payment, additional revenues must be generated from 
those who are able or willing to pay to cover these uncompensated 
costs. Whether these costs are paid eventually by other patients, 
insurance companies, hospitals or governments, it should be clear that 
uncompensated care is a burden on the health care system.
Reductions in uncompensated care costs can be substantial as people 
move from uninsured to insured status, with one estimate suggesting 
savings may reach $800 per newly insured individual.39 Using this 
estimate, Medicaid expansion in Virginia could reduce direct annual 
uncompensated care costs between $100 million and $135 million. 
Another estimate suggests that uncompensated care costs can drop by 
40 percent or more in expansion versus nonexpansion states.40 Such a 
drop would result in annual savings in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
to providers in the Commonwealth. Regardless of which estimate one uses, 
a reduction in uncompensated costs and, indirectly, bad debts will improve 
financial outcomes for health care providers.
39  Garthwaite, C., Gross, T. and Notowidigdo, M.J. (2018), “Hospitals as insurers of last resort,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10(1), 1-39.
40  http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Medicaid_hospitals-clinics-June-2016.pdf.
41 Item 303, No. 5, p. 309, https://budget.lis.virginia.gov/get/budget/3619.
Final Thoughts
Virginia’s decision to expand Medicaid will undoubtedly impact the overall 
picture of health care insurance and services. We estimate that of the 
approximately 640,000 adults ages 19 to 64 without health insurance in 
the Commonwealth, about 120,000 to 170,000 will become eligible and 
enroll in Medicaid expansion. Uncompensated care costs will decrease, 
but the demand for health care services will increase, creating a higher 
demand for emergency department services and primary care physicians.
Expanding Medicaid in Virginia will not increase insurance coverage 
rates to 100 percent. Our estimates suggest that uninsured rates will 
drop over time, and about 500,000 adults may remain without health 
insurance. Approximately 400,000 of these adults earn more than 138 
percent of the poverty level. Increasing health insurance subsidies for 
these individuals may be one policy option, but it would involve substantial 
costs. The political climate certainly does not appear to favor an expansion 
of Obamacare subsidies at this point in time. 
We should not blithely assume that the federal government will continue 
to reimburse Virginia in perpetuity for new enrollees at a higher rate than 
existing enrollees. A reduction in the FMAP, or an economic downturn 
that places significant pressure on the Commonwealth’s budget, could 
result in a retrenchment of Medicaid eligibility and an increase in the 
uninsured rate. Simply put, if the federal government were to reduce 
its reimbursement rate for new enrollees to 50 percent, the cost of 
Medicaid to the Virginia budget could increase by $500 million, 
depending on the number of new enrollees.
Although state legislators wisely included a rider in the Medicaid 
expansion law that would remove newly covered enrollees if federal 
reimbursements fell, it would likely be politically unpopular to remove 
enrollees from the program.41 The effort to enroll newly eligible individuals 
may not only boost initial enrollments but also strategically (some would 
argue) increase the political and social costs of removing enrollees from 
Medicaid. In effect, as enrollments increase, policymakers may become 
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increasingly constrained in their ability to adjust program requirements. 
In the event of an economic downturn that led to a decline in federal 
reimbursements and state revenues, legislators may be faced with a 
difficult choice: more significant cuts to other parts of the Commonwealth’s 
budget, raise taxes to sustain programs, or a combination of the two. 
In the end, if the intent of Medicaid expansion is to lower the number 
of uninsured among Virginia’s most vulnerable residents, it will likely 
succeed in that goal. Medicaid expansion will not only improve the health 
outcomes for new enrollees, but current and prospective enrollees may 
also be able to earn more income without it threatening their eligibility 
– a boon to the economy. The more successful the Commonwealth is 
in enrolling newly eligible residents, the larger the potential decline in 
uncompensated care costs. This, in part, explains why S&P Global Ratings 
recently stated that Medicaid expansion would be “credit positive” for 
Virginia’s hospitals.42 Finally, the federal government will bear most of the 
cost of new enrollees, which will be a net benefit to the state budget.
Medicaid expansion costs, however, will not be negligible, and there 
is a risk that costs could increase substantially in the future. The 
Commonwealth could mitigate some of the financial risks by setting aside 
some or all of the current tax windfall resulting from the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017. Avoiding the temptation to return all this windfall to 
taxpayers is important, as we are likely closer to the next recession than 
farther away from it. Investing in enrollment efforts and administrative 
capability at the state and local level will be necessary to cope with the 
influx of new enrollees. 
Medicaid expansion will neither be free nor easy, but likely will result in a 
net positive economic benefit for the Commonwealth of Virginia. Now that 
the debate is over, the work associated with expansion begins in earnest.
42  https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly/s-p-finds-medicaid-expansion-positive-for-va-hospitals-credit/article_27c9eb6d-d076-5759-8bd2-b546d3011194.html.
That no free government, nor the blessings 
of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but 
by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, 
temperance, frugality, and virtue; by frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles; and by 
the recognition by all citizens that they have 
duties as well as rights, and that such rights 
cannot be enjoyed save in a society where law 
is respected and due process is observed.
–  Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, Article I, Section 15
A COMMONWEALTH 




irginia, honoring a venerable 
English tradition, fashions itself a 
Commonwealth. Only Kentucky, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania lay similar 
claims. Historically, Commonwealth status has 
implied that government and public affairs are 
conducted democratically with an eye toward 
the common good – that the collective welfare 
of all citizens should provide the guiding 
behavioral principle for public policy.
Cynics might argue that the notion of a 
Commonwealth does not apply in the case of 
Virginia today. Economic opportunity appears 
to be concentrated in Northern Virginia, 
Richmond and Hampton Roads. Rural areas, 
especially in southwestern Virginia, are 
adversely impacted by the decline of coal, an 
opioid crisis and underinvestment in public 
education. Political party identification now 
seems to be synonymous with where you live, 
with urban areas tending to vote Democratic 
and rural areas tending to lean Republican. Do 
we live in a Commonwealth or are we growing 
apart? Over the coming years, will Virginia 
become, in effect, two states, sharing a name 
but not a destiny?
Before we address this question, however, it is 
appropriate to note that the Commonwealth 
ideal never meant to imply precise equality of 
socioeconomic circumstances and outcomes 
for all Virginians. Instead, the notion of a 
Commonwealth has focused on shared values, 
such as democratically elected governments 
79
2018 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
80 A COMMONWEALTH COMING TOGETHER OR GROWING APART?■
that exercise demonstrated concern for one’s fellow human beings. This 
philosophical approach recognizes that Virginia is a large and remarkably 
diverse state. Should we expect a resident of Jonesville in Lee County (a 
city located on a meridian of longitude slightly west of Detroit, Michigan) 
to have the same preferences and outcomes as someone living 500 miles 
east along the ocean in Virginia Beach?1 Should jobs and incomes in 
Fairfax County’s McLean be expected to match those in Danville, one of 
Virginia’s distinctive independent cities?
They don’t, and they won’t. We should not expect uniformity among 
the citizens of Virginia. The challenge is to craft efficient and effective 
policies that adapt to local conditions while promoting the welfare of 
the Commonwealth at large. Not an easy task.
In this chapter, we shed light on the extent to which diversities of 
circumstances and outcomes exist in today’s Virginia. We can neither 
critique nor promote effective policies without having accurate information 
about those policies at arm’s reach. The distributions of income and wealth 
in Virginia provide important information about the extent to which there 
is a shared economic destiny. Over the course of this and coming reports, 
we will delve into what makes Virginia unique and how it can prosper in 
the coming years.
Our approach is to divide Virginia into regions to highlight geographic 
differences and then drill down within each region to see how a variety 
of people are faring with respect to key social and economic indicators. 
At the very least, we will find that the impressive diversity of topography 
that exists in Virginia carries over to economic, demographic and social 
characteristics.
Out Of Many Regions, 
One Commonwealth
There are many ways to divide Virginia to highlight its regions. In fact, 
some confusion arises because of the proliferation of administrative, 
statistical and other subdivisions of the Commonwealth. Virginia 
1 Measured by miles, Jonesville is closer to nine other state capitals than it is to Richmond.  
2 A description of these various divisions and others can be found in Issue Insight, Regional Analysis and Refinement: Government Service Delivery Regions, Council on Virginia’s Future, No. 8, March 2015.
comprises 95 counties and 38 independent cities that are distinct 
from each other. There are also numerous other divisions, including 
administrative districts, planning districts, public health districts, judicial 
circuits and districts, and multiple others reflecting service districts 
of state government.2 The federal government also classifies many of 
Virginia’s cities and counties by metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) or 
micropolitan statistical areas (MiSA), as well as census districts, among 
others.
For purposes of our analysis, we focus on the nine descriptive regions 
designated by GO Virginia. They hold the advantage of being easy to 
identify in terms of the areas they represent, even though they mix urban 
and rural regions. Figure 1 identifies the nine regions.
GO Virginia is a bipartisan, business-led economic development initiative 
designed to improve the ways in which Virginia’s diverse regions 
collaborate on economic and workforce development activities. GO 
Virginia, with funding from the General Assembly, provides incentives to 
business, education and government to encourage their participation in 
programs that will generate more high-paying, private-sector jobs.    
The organization’s Growth & Opportunity Board, made up of senior 
business leaders, oversees regional councils that are responsible 
for recommending the allocation of funds to the most promising and 
productive projects.  
GO Virginia effectively has been in operation since April 2016 when the 
General Assembly approved the concept and provided initial funding. The 
organization’s first round of project grants were awarded in December 
2017. GO Virginia’s promise is immense. Whether it actually will be able to 
alter the Commonwealth’s growth path remains to be seen.
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FIGURE 1
THE NINE GO VIRGINIA REGIONS
1.  Southwest
2.  West Central
3.  Southside
4.  South Central
5.   Hampton Roads 
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Demographic Change
Virginia is currently the 12th most populous state in the nation with a 
2017 estimated population of 8,470,020. Virginia’s population ranking 
in the U.S. has waxed and waned, in large part due to economic circum-
stance. In the 1870 census, Virginia ranked as the 10th most populous 
state; however, by 1930, the Commonwealth had declined to the 20th most 
populous state in the nation. The advent of World War II and rapid ex-
pansion of the federal government led to an influx of people to Virginia, 
increasing the population at a much faster rate than many other states.
More recently, Virginia has continued to grow, albeit slowly. From 2010 
to 2017, the population increased by 475,218 or about 5.9 percent. While 
this represents an absolute increase in the population, the annual rate of 
population growth has tapered off in the current decade to its slowest rate 
of increase since the 1920s (see Graph 1). The Weldon Cooper Center’s 
Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia estimates that 
Virginia will continue to grow steadily in the coming years and by 2030 
become the 11th-largest state. By 2040, our state is predicted to be home 
to more than 10 million people – which would make it the 10th-largest 
state.
While Virginia’s population has grown in recent decades, all areas of the 
Commonwealth have not been growing equally fast and, indeed, some 
(mostly in the south and southwest areas of Virginia) have lost population. 
In the 2000s, 103 cities and counties increased in population while 30 
localities declined in size.3 Forty-nine localities in Virginia grew by 10 
percent or more in the 2000s. This decade, however, 72 cities and 
counties have grown while 61 have become smaller. Only 13 localities 
in the Commonwealth have grown by 10 percent or more this decade, a 
sign of slowing population growth.
Figure 2 reveals that the geographic center of Virginia’s population also 
moved eastward from the 1940s to the 1970s, but then began a dramatic 
shift northward. By 2040, that center will be near Fredericksburg. At that 
time, half the state’s population will live in Northern Virginia, which we 
define as the area bordered on the south by Fredericksburg, on the north 
3 One locality, Newport News, remained essentially unchanged in population from the 2000 to 2010 Census.
by the Potomac River and on the west by the Shenandoah Valley. Some 
observers refer to the northernmost sector of the state with the most 
population as NOVA, Northern Virginia, and the remainder of the state as 
ROVA, the rest of Virginia.
FIGURE 2
CENTER OF POPULATION FOR VIRGINIA, 1940-2040







Source: University of Virginia Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, StatCh@t, June 26, 2017. 
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Nearly 80 percent of Virginia’s estimated 2017 population lives in 
five regions: Eastern, Hampton Roads-Eastern Shore, Northern, 
South Central and West Central. As illustrated in Table 1, two regions, 
Southside and Southwest, lost population this decade, while three 
others (Valley, Hampton Roads and West Central) grew slower than the 
Commonwealth as a whole. The double-digit growth in the Northern 
region continued to pull the population center of Virginia toward 
Fredericksburg. 
Figure 3 provides a visual picture of population growth rates. Red and 
orange represent those counties and cities that lost population from 
2010 to 2017. Yellow represents those localities with moderate increases 
in population, while green and blue represent those localities with more 
robust population growth. Buchanan County, for example, represented 
in red, lost about 8.7 percent of its population from 2010 to 2017. On the 
other hand, Loudoun County, represented in blue, experienced population 
growth of approximately 26.8 percent over the same period.
More than 60 cities and counties experienced population declines 
this decade, including an almost solid swath of cities and counties 
stretching from Virginia’s southern border meeting Ohio through to 
the midsection of the Commonwealth. If there is a lesson here, it is 
that population growth across Virginia has been very uneven in this 
decade. This, in turn, reflects the perceived presence or absence of 
economic opportunity.  
Ten cities and counties accounted for 48 percent of Virginia’s 
population in 2017 (Graph 2). Given current trends, it is reasonable 
to expect that a majority of the Commonwealth’s residents will live 
in these 10 cities and counties by the 2020s. As the population of 
Virginia becomes increasingly concentrated in urban areas, the 
divide between urban and rural areas will increase, leading to less 
of a Commonwealth and more like two states sharing the same 
geographical designation.
TABLE 1
RECENT POPULATION GROWTH BY REGION: VIRGINIA, 2010-2017
Region
April 1, 2010, 
Census






Southwest 401,745 381,647 -20,098 -5.00%
West Central 707,990 730,759 22,769 +3.22%
Southside 384,034 368,302 -15,732 -4.10%
South 
Central 





1,715,524 1,759,886 44,362 +2.59%
Eastern 663,988 724,204 60,216 +9.07%
Northern 2,230,623 2,501,308 270,685 +12.13%
Valley 508,933 534,485 25,552 +5.02%
Central 400,766 430,006 29,240 +7.30%
Virginia 
Totals
7,994,802 8,470,020 475,218 +5.94%
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census and 2017 Population Estimates, and the Dragas Center 
for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 1
ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH IN VIRGINIA, 1920-2017






































RECENT POPULATION CHANGE BY COUNTY: VIRGINIA, 2010-2017
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census and 2017 Population Estimates, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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□ Decl i11e up t o 5% 
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GRAPH 2
POPULATION OF THE 10 LARGEST CITIES AND COUNTIES: VIRGINIA, 2017













































































Seeking Fortunes Elsewhere: 
Domestic Migration
While the population of Virginia grew 5.5 percent between 2010 and 2017, 
this overall increase masks a troubling development: Many Virginians 
are leaving and seeking their fortunes elsewhere. Since 2013, Virginia 
has experienced a net outflow of individuals to other states. In 2016-2017, 
the net outflow of residents to other domestic locations was 12,395. This 
is a significant change in circumstance for Virginia, which traditionally 
attracted more people from other states than it lost to them (Graph 3). 
Why would more Virginians choose to leave than residents of other states 
decide to move here? While Virginia now has more jobs than prior to 
the Great Recession, other states have higher rates of job growth. 
One recent impediment to the growth of the Virginia economy is no 
mystery – stagnant federal spending, especially defense spending. Virginia 
ranks second among the states in terms of federal spending per person. 
Approximately 40 percent of this spending emanates from the Department 
of Defense.4 Plausibly, the recent upsurge of federal spending has the 
potential to reverse this flow.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publishes annual data on domestic 
migration that we use to explore where new Virginians are coming from 
and where Virginians are going.5 Between 2015 and 2016, the largest 
inflows to Virginia from other states were from California, Florida, 
Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Texas. Outflows from Virginia 
were largely to the same set of states. More than 60,000 Virginians moved 
4 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (June 2014), “Size and Impact of Federal Spending in Virginia,” http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt455.pdf.
5  A potential complication is the inflow and outflow of military personnel. To determine migration, the IRS compares two consecutive years of individual tax filings. If a person changes geographic location from one year to the next, 
they are considered a mover. A military service member stationed in Hampton Roads who did not change their filing address even though they physically moved would not show up as a migrant. A service member who did change 
their filing address upon moving to Hampton Roads would be considered a migrant if they moved from another county, state or country.
to California, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina and Texas 
between 2015 and 2016.
Putting this together paints a picture of net domestic migration (inflows 
minus outflows) for the Commonwealth. Figure 4 shows that net domestic 
migration is highest from New York (4,727), New Jersey (2,543), Maryland 
(2,534) and Pennsylvania (1,409). Net domestic migration is lowest to 
Florida (-8,762), North Carolina (-5,992), Texas (-4,480), Georgia (-2,233) 
and Tennessee (-2,151). 
Between 2015 and 2016, 221,869 people moved to Virginia from 
other states and 241,099 Virginians moved to other states. All told, 
Virginia’s net loss was 19,230. The Commonwealth is no longer as 
attractive a destination for residents of other states as it was in the 
past. The challenge will be to create jobs and opportunities to reverse 
this trend.
For localities in Virginia, the most recent data come from the U.S. 
Census through 2017. It should be no surprise that domestic outflows are 
the primary reason that many cities and counties have lost population 
this decade (Figure 5). While most of Northern Virginia and the Valley 
regions, for example, experienced positive net domestic migration, many 
other cities and counties have experienced outflows. Fairfax County, for 
example, lost over 79,000 residents to other domestic destinations between 
2010 and 2017. The city of Alexandria also lost about 10,500 residents this 
decade. Another perspective is that domestic outflows from Fairfax 
County, Hampton, Newport News and Virginia Beach this decade were 
greater in sum than the gains from all the other cities and counties 
combined.
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GRAPH 3
VIRGINIA NET DOMESTIC MIGRATION OF INDIVIDUALS, 1991-2017
Sources: University of Virginia Weldon Cooper Center (2017) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. *All years based on Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Migration data, except 














































































2015-2016 NET DOMESTIC MIGRATION FOR VIRGINIA
Sources: Internal Revenue Service, 2015-2016 Statistics of Income Migration Data, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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FIGURE 5
DOMESTIC MIGRATION, APRIL 1, 2010, TO JULY 1, 2017





Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decen ial Census and 2017 Population Estimates, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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International Migration: 
Coming To The 
Commonwealth
With Virginia experiencing net negative domestic migration in recent 
years, how has it managed to grow in population? One reason is the 
natural increase in the population, while the other is net positive 
international migration. The Commonwealth, simply put, is a desirable 
destination for people starting a new life in the United States.
Graph 4 illustrates how domestic and international migration have fared 
this decade. The inflows from international migration have offset the 
recent outflows of Virginians to other states. In 2017, for example, while 
12,395 Virginians left for other states, 33,365 new residents arrived 
from foreign locations. Overall net migration was positive, with 20,970 
additional residents in the Commonwealth.
Yet, as with many other things, some regions of Virginia are faring 
better than others. Table 2 shows that Southwest and Southside lost 
population from 2016 to 2017 because deaths outnumbered births 
and net domestic out-migration was higher than net international 
migration. Hampton Roads-Eastern Shore lost almost 10,000 
residents to other states, although international migration offset some 
of this outflow. Without international migration, Virginia would have 
grown much more slowly the last four years. Figure 6 illustrates net 
international migration by city and county from 2010 to 2017.
International migration varies across the Commonwealth. Areas that 
are economically attractive tend to pull people from other countries. 
Immigrant communities may attract foreign migrants as new arrivals seek 
out others with similar backgrounds and experiences. One only needs to 
sample the diversity of food in Northern Virginia, Richmond or Hampton 
Roads to grasp the impact that international migration has on our 
communities. A Commonwealth should serve as a place that people want 
to live and many people are leaving their countries to live in Virginia.
6 https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/.
Given that international immigration has helped fuel the Commonwealth’s 
economic engine, we are concerned about recent shifts in immigration 
policy. One consequence of the change in rhetoric and policy is a decline in 
international students. The National Science Foundation recently reported 
that the number of international students in the U.S. fell by 2.2 percent 
at the undergraduate level and 5.5 percent at the graduate level from fall 
2016 to fall 2017.6 International students not only typically pay full tuition, 
but many desire to remain in the United States after completion of their 
education. Immigrants, for example, have founded around half of startups 
in the U.S. that are valued at more than $1 billion. Whether through 
policy or rhetoric, curtailing these students not only places financial 
pressures on colleges and universities, but also undermines one of the 
foundations of economic growth for the United States.
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GRAPH 4
DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL AND NET MIGRATION IN VIRGINIA, 2011-2017
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Southwest -1,528 -2,492 89 -3,931
West Central 293 -297 1,932 1,928
Southside -1,255 -978 150 -2,083
South 
Central
3,073 3,642 2,870 9,585
Hampton 
Roads
7,462 -9,704 3,562 1,320
Eastern 2,737 3,883 1,293 7,913
Northern 22,077 -13,683 21,234 29,628
Valley 830 3,827 1,091 5,748
Central 1,040 3,407 1,144 5,591
Virginia 
Totals
34,729 -12,395 33,365 55,699
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Estimates of the Components of Resident Population Change, Various Years, 
and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Note that “Total Change in 
the Population” does not include the residual change that cannot be attributed to any specific demographic 
component.
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FIGURE 6
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, APRIL 1, 2010, TO JULY 1, 2017





Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Estimates of the Components of Resident Population Change, Various Years, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University  
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Racial And Ethnic 
Characteristics
The Commonwealth and its regions are racially and ethnically diverse, 
more so than the United States and most states, where racial and ethnic 
groups often are confined to certain cities or regions. Racial and ethnic 
diversity does vary throughout Virginia, with Northern Virginia, Hampton 
Roads and the Eastern Shore being among the most diverse regions in the 
Commonwealth.
The U.S. Census Bureau produces annual estimates of the population 
and demographic characteristics through the American Community 
Survey (ACS). Graph 5 reveals that 73.3 percent of Americans identified 
themselves as white and 12.6 percent as African-American in 2016. About 
5 percent classified themselves as Asian, while approximately 1 percent 
identified as American Indian, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander. About 3 percent identified themselves as being of two or 
more races. Of note, the percentage of individuals who identify as being of 
two or more races has increased over the last two decades.
According to the U.S. Census, an individual’s response to racial questions 
is based upon self-identification. The Census Bureau does not instruct 
individuals which boxes to mark or heritage to claim on the Census 
products. People who identify with more than one race may choose to 
provide multiple races in response to the questions about race.   
Hispanic origin is defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as the heritage, 
nationality, lineage or country of birth of the individual or of the birth 
or person’s parents or ancestors before arriving in the U.S. People who 
self-identify as Hispanic, Latino or Spanish may be of any race. The U.S. 
Census asks individuals to self-identify their race and whether they are of 
Hispanic-Latino origin.
In Graph 6, we show that 68.8 percent of Virginians classified themselves 
as white and 19.2 percent as African-American in 2016. About 6 percent 
classified themselves as Asian, while about 0.4 percent identified as 
American Indian, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander. Also, 3.4 percent of Virginians identified as being of two or more 
races. The number of Virginians identifying themselves as being of two or 
more races has also increased over time.
Table 3 provides regional details of Virginia’s ethnic and racial diversity. 
The white population reaches a high of 95 percent in the Southwest and a 
low of 60 percent in Hampton Roads-Eastern Shore. Southside, Hampton 
Roads-Eastern Shore, Eastern and South Central claim the largest 
regional proportions of African-Americans. Figure 7 displays African-
Americans as a percentage of the population by locality, illustrating how 
as one travels east in Virginia, the percentage of African-Americans in the 
population rises.
On a percentage basis, Northern Virginia claims more than three times 
as many Asian Virginians than the next closest region (South Central). 
Fairfax County has the largest proportion of Asian Virginians, followed by 
Loudoun County (Graph 7). The Southwest and Southside regions, on the 
other hand, are relatively less diverse.
Graph 8 illustrates the percentage of individuals classifying themselves 
as Hispanic-Latino by locality. As one tracks to the north and east, the 
percentage of the population that identifies as having Hispanic-Latino 
origin increases.
While an estimated 17.3 percent of Americans identified themselves as 
Hispanic-Latino, a much smaller percentage, 8.7 percent, of Virginians 
classified themselves in similar fashion in 2016. Among Virginia’s regions, 
the proportion of the Hispanic population varies significantly, from a 
low of 1.7 percent in the Southwest to a high of 17.1 percent in Northern 
Virginia. 
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GRAPH 5
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, 2016
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey. Hispanic-Latino individuals self-identify themselves within these categories. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent, as American Indian-Alaska Native and/or 
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GRAPH 6
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF VIRGINIA, 2016
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey. Hispanic-Latino individuals self-identify themselves within these categories. Percentages may not sum to 100 percent, as American Indian-Alaska Native and/or 
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TABLE 3




White Alone African-American Alone Asian Alone Other Races Alone
Two or More Races 
Alone
Southwest 392,112 373,080 95.2% 10,771 2.8% 1,455 0.4% 517 0.1% 4,625 1.2%
West 
Central 
725,993 590,975 81.4% 95,866 13.2% 16,358 2.3% 1,642 0.2% 16,333 2.3%
Southside 374,771 240,486 64.2% 119,683 31.9% 2,328 0.6% 791 0.2% 6,272 1.7%
South 
Central 
1,015,658 655,024 64.5% 271,976 26.8% 40,627 4.0% 3,517 0.4% 27,804 2.7%
Hampton 
Roads
1,751,779 1,048,055 59.8% 541,869 30.9% 63,614 3.6% 6,931 0.4% 65,860 3.8%
Eastern 700,133 444,749 63.5% 196,327 28.0% 14,157 2.0% 3,305 0.5% 24,308 3.5%
Northern 2,410,710 1,549,816 64.3% 287,245 11.9% 346,492 14.4% 8,157 0.3% 109,716 4.6%
Valley 522,620 472,021 90.3% 24,465 4.7% 7,123 1.4% 1,341 0.3% 12,149 2.3%
Central 416,525 338,752 81.3% 48,150 11.6% 10,724 2.6% 1,241 0.3% 12,632 3.0%
Virginia 
Totals
8,310,301 5,712,958 68.8% 1,596,352 19.2% 502,878 6.1% 27,442 0.3% 279,699 3.4% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. The Hampton Roads GO Virginia district includes the Eastern Shore.
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FIGURE 7
PERCENTAGE OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN POPULATION IN VIRGINIA COUNTIES AND CITIES, 2016
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GRAPH 7
PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AMERICAN POPULATION, VIRGINIA: 
LARGEST 10 COUNTIES AND CITIES, 2016












































































































PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO IDENTIFY AS OF HISPANIC-LATINO ORIGIN: VIRGINIA, 2016
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Thus, the Commonwealth is a diverse place, more diverse than the United 
States in terms of its representation of African-Americans and Asian-
Americans, but less diverse in terms of its representation of Hispanics-
Latinos. Whatever the difficulties Americans and Virginians of differing 
backgrounds have getting along with each other, these conditions have 
not deterred sundry individuals from deciding to reside in Virginia. It 
could be said that Virginia has turned out to be an amenable location for 
people of many different ethnic and racial backgrounds. In this sense, 
Virginia appears to have fulfilled at least some of the expectations of a 
Commonwealth.    
The Economic Commonwealth
PER CAPITA INCOME
Per capita income is an approximate measure of the standard of living of 
a city, county or state. In 2017, Virginia ranked 12th among the states with 
a per capita income of $54,244, which was 108 percent of the national 
average. Graph 9 displays income per capita for the U.S. and selected states.
The cost of living in each state, however, makes a difference. An individual 
living in Danville, for example, has a lower cost of living than a resident 
of New York, Los Angeles or Seattle. Virginia’s relatively modest cost of 
living compared to California, New Jersey, New York and other high cost-
of-living states enables it to pass by these states when we compute real 
per capita income adjusted for the cost of living. In Graph 10, we adjust 
state per capita income by regional price parities to obtain a cost-of-living 
adjusted state per capita income. The cost-of-living adjustment increases 
per capita income in relatively low cost-of-living states and decreases it in 
relatively high cost-of-living states. We obtain estimates of state per capita 
income that are on an equal cost-of-living basis.  
What about income in the various regions of Virginia? The U.S. Census 
tracks median household income, which we present by region in Graph 
7   Note that the regional cost of living in the Washington, D.C., region is estimated to be 18.6 percent higher than the national average. The differential between cities such as Alexandria and Arlington, and the state, however, exceeds 
30 percent.  
8  In the 2015 State of the Commonwealth Report, we reported that the Gini Coefficient for the distribution of income in Virginia was .4606, while it was .5994 in New York City and .4690 in the United States. (Higher values signify 
less equal distributions.)   
11 and by locality in Figure 8. Median household income in Northern 
Virginia is almost three times that of the Southwest region and twice 
that of the Valley. In general, as one tracks to the east and north, 
median household income increases. Undoubtedly, household income is 
not equally distributed in the Commonwealth. It should be no surprise 
that economic opportunities, as represented by median household 
income, are closely correlated with domestic migration. People, as 
economists are wont to say, follow jobs.
Once again, cost-of-living differentials can make a difference, but cost-
of-living indexes are not produced by Virginia region. We estimate real 
per capita income for Virginia’s regions by utilizing a cost-of-living index 
for a prominent jurisdiction within each region. In Northern Virginia, 
for example, we use the Washington, D.C., metropolitan region cost-
of-living index as our proxy. The net effect of considering cost-of-living 
differences is to reduce income disparities, although none of the rankings 
of the regions change because of the cost-of-living adjustments. After 
taking the cost of living into account, Northern Virginia’s real per capita 
income is only 17.3 percent higher than that of the Commonwealth, and 
60.5 percent higher than that of Southwest Virginia. These still are very 
large disparities but are substantially smaller when regional cost-of-living 
differences are incorporated.7
As it is often said, everything is relative. Incomes are more equally 
distributed in Virginia than they are nationwide.8 Median household 
income in Virginia is higher than either New York or California, 
where incomes are burdened by some of the highest living costs in 
the country. One only needs to compare real estate prices in many 
urban areas of California, for example, to see that Virginia has a 
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GRAPH 10
 REAL PER CAPITA STATE INCOMES, 2017





















































































ESTIMATED MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY GO VIRGINIA REGION, 2016
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
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FIGURE 8
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY CITY AND COUNTY: VIRGINIA, 2016
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PROPERTY VALUES
Most people know intuitively that the ownership of property is less equally 
distributed across individuals than their incomes. This phenomenon has 
important economic consequences in Virginia. Property constitutes one 
form of wealth and the “true value” of property as determined by the 
Virginia Department of Taxation is one criterion that often is used by the 
General Assembly to allocate funds to local and regional jurisdictions. The 
“true value” of property and estimates of adjusted gross income are the 
two variables used to determine the sizes of a variety of payments to local 
and regional governments, including aid to public schools.
In 2016, property values in Virginia were estimated to be $1.16 
trillion, with the Northern Virginia region accounting for almost 45 
percent of all the real estate property valuation in the Commonwealth 
(Table 4). Values in the Northern Virginia region were estimated to 
be more than $516 billion; this was 18 times the estimated property 
values in Southwest Virginia, 3.7 times those in the South Central 
region (dominated by Richmond) and 2.8 times those in the Hampton 
Roads-Eastern Shore region. As with income, property values are not 
equally distributed throughout Virginia.
TABLE 4
PROPERTY VALUES BY VIRGINIA REGION, 2016
Region True Value of Real Estate
True Value of Public Service 
Corporations
Total Estimated True Value
Southwest $28,608,102,311 $3,554,748,045 $32,162,850,356
West Central $70,367,011,877 $3,558,134,944 $73,925,146,821
Southside $28,335,400,125 $4,392,140,998 $32,727,541,123
South Central $138,744,340,613 $7,874,629,808 $146,618,970,421
Hampton Roads $183,203,108,949 $6,016,811,823 $189,219,920,772
Eastern $66,213,229,920 $2,375,318,142 $68,588,548,062
Northern $516,576,910,380 $9,885,636,242 $526,462,546,622
Valley $59,784,205,249 $4,840,702,990 $64,624,908,239
Central $67,693,639,330 $4,996,929,285 $72,690,568,615
Virginia Totals $1,159,525,948,754 $47,495,052,277 $1,207,021,001,031
Sources: Virginia Department of Taxation, the 2016 Virginia Assessment/Sales Study, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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ABILITY TO PAY FOR EDUCATION
The General Assembly has directed that the “true value” of property 
be used along with adjusted gross income and taxable retail sales to 
produce a “median composite index” that determines how the Virginia 
Department of Education distributes financial aid to local school districts.9 
The index varies between 0 and .8. The lower the index, the greater the 
school district’s assessed need for financial support to enable it to meet 
the Standards of Quality (SOQ) that define minimum learning outcomes 
expected, if not required, in Virginia public schools.
Eight school districts recorded the highest .8 index, indicating lesser 
financial need: the cities of Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax and Falls 
Church plus Bath, Goochland, Highland and Surry counties.  The lowest 
index was recorded by Lee County (.1779), followed by Buena Vista (.1849), 
Scott (.1917) and Hopewell (.2032). Graph 12 provides a selection of 
median composite index values for school districts throughout Virginia.10 
Graph 13 presents the average composite index by region, while Figure 9 
illustrates the composite index by locality in Virginia.
9  The Average Daily Composite Index, for example, is equal to 0.5*((Local TV/Division ADM)/(Statewide Total TV/Statewide ADM)) + 0.4*((Local AGI/Division ADM)/(State AGI/State ADM)) + 0.1 ((Local Taxable Sales/Division ADM)/
(State Taxable Sales/State ADM), where ADM = Average Daily Membership, AGI = Adjusted Gross Income, and TV = True Value of Property. 
10 All of these composite index values include nonresident adjusted gross income. The Department of Education also computes indexes that exclude nonresident adjusted gross income.
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GRAPH 12
COMPOSITE INDEX VALUES FOR SELECTED VIRGINIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2018-2020 VALUES
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GRAPH 13
MEAN COMPOSITE INDEXES OF LOCAL ABILITY TO PAY BY REGION: 
 VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 2016-2018






















COMPOSITE INDEXES OF LOCAL ABILITY TO PAY BY COUNTY: 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 2016-2018





Composite Indexes of Local Ability to Pay by County: 




Sources: Virginia Department of Education, “Composite Index of Local Ability to Pay, 2016-2028” and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. In most cases, 
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NUTRITION
Some regard the absence of hunger as the mark of a civilized society. 
Feeding America, a nonprofit hunger relief organization, reports that 1 
in 9 Virginians do not have enough to eat and that it would take more 
than $468 million on an annual basis to feed them properly (www.
feedingamerica.com). Whether or not one agrees with this assessment, 
data are available that record the number of students within the 
Commonwealth who are eligible for free and reduced-price school lunches 
and other nutritional programs available through the Virginia Deparment 
of Education’s (VDOE) School Nutrition Programs.
The VDOE typically utilizes federal guidelines that establish eligibility 
for free and reduced-price meals in schools. In the 2018-19 school year, 
this means that children from families with annual incomes less than 185 
percent of the federal poverty level are eligible. For a family of four, for 
example, this means a family income must be under $32,630 (Federal Food 
and Nutrition Services, Document 2018-09679, May 8, 2018).
On a typical day, 49.8 million breakfasts, 1.5 million lunches and 
1.4 million after-school snacks are served in Virginia public schools 
(Virginia Department of Education, 2018). Meals also are served in 
the summer. Approximately 44 percent of students were eligible for free 
and reduced-price lunch in Virginia’s public schools during the 2017-18 
school year. Graph 14 displays the five districts with the highest percentage 
of recipients of free and reduced-price lunch and the five districts with the 
lowest percentage of recipients, ranging from a low of about 8.5 percent in 
Falls Church to a high of 100 percent in Danville, Franklin, Martinsville, 
Petersburg and Richmond.
Graph 15 illustrates that profound differences exist among Virginia’s 
regions in terms of the percentage of public school students who qualify 
under federal guidelines for free or reduced-price food at their public 
school. The percentage of students who qualify for free or reduced-price 
food in the Southside and Southwest regions is more than twice that in the 
Northern Virginia region. Somewhat astonishing, however, is that more 
than 50 percent of students are eligible in five of the nine Virginia 
regions, including predominantly urban Hampton Roads, where more 
than 132,000 public school students are eligible.  
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GRAPH 14
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS ELIGIBLE FOR FREE AND REDUCED-PRICE LUNCH: 
SELECTED VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOL DIVISIONS, 2017-18 SCHOOL YEAR
Source: Virginia Department of Education, School Year 2017-18, Free and Reduced Eligibility Report. We recognize that some schools with 100 percent free or reduced-price lunch participate in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
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GRAPH 15
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS WHO QUALIFY FOR FREE OR REDUCED-PRICE MEALS UNDER FEDERAL GUIDELINES: 
VIRGINIA REGIONS, 2017
Sources: Virginia Department of Education, School Year 2017-18, Free and Reduced Eligibility Report, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are for Department of Education regions that 






















Virginia is geographically and economically diverse. One’s distance 
from Washington, D.C., the decline of industries such as coal, textiles 
and tobacco, and the stimulus of defense spending are among the most 
important reasons why we observe large variations in incomes and wealth 
throughout Virginia. Average real per capita income in Northern Virginia, 
for example, is almost 61 percent higher than the comparable figure in 
Southwest Virginia and about 11 percent higher than the next highest 
region, Central Virginia.
Population growth is both a cause and effect of income and wealth 
disparities. At least 40 Virginia towns, cities and counties lost population 
between 2010 and 2017. The geographic center of Virginia’s population is 
marching northward almost coincident with I-95 at the rate of about 20 
miles annually. Virginia’s population continues to become more diverse, 
especially in its urban areas. While net domestic migration has been 
negative recently, international migration has helped offset the outflow of 
Virginians to other states. 
To the extent that the concept of a Commonwealth is interpreted to mean 
that public policy metaphorically should ensure that no one in Virginia 
is left behind, selected state policies, especially those involving school 
funding, help reduce the impact of economic disparities. On the other 
hand, the Virginia income tax ranks in the lower middle among all states 
in terms of its income progressivity, and the Commonwealth’s average level 
of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefit payments again places 
it roughly in the middle of the pack.
In coming years, this report will dive into economic life in Virginia. 
How have urban and rural areas fared in terms of jobs and income since 
the Great Recession? How are public schools faring in rural and urban 
communities? How can Virginia tap into its diverse population, geography 
and economic circumstances to strengthen the Commonwealth? Finding 
answers to these and other questions will help us examine ways to improve 
the common destiny of all Virginians.




Labor Day is a glorious holiday because your 
child will be going back to school the next 
day.  It would have been called Independence 
Day, but that name was already taken.
– Bill Dodds, children’s poet and novelist 
In some states, the question of school 
calendars is being considered through an 
economic lens – not just with an eye toward 
their students’ potential as future members 
of the workforce, but on the impact a shorter 
summer break might have on local tourism.
–  Emily Richmond, The Atlantic 
(Aug. 24, 2017) 
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I
f you are the parent of a child who 
attends public school in the eastern third 
of Virginia, then you may agree secretly 
with Bill Dodds (quoted on the previous 
page). Perhaps your patience is tested by your 
children at summer’s end and you are more 
than ready to send them off to school. But alas, 
your child’s school doesn’t open until after 
Labor Day. 
Why? Virginia’s “Kings Dominion law.”
In 1986, the Virginia General Assembly 
passed VA § 22.1-79.1, which requires that 
Virginia schools not open until after Labor 
Day, unless they meet specific conditions for 
a waiver.1 The law is now commonly referred 
to in conversation and the media as the Kings 
Dominion law,2 a reference to the amusement 
and theme park north of Richmond. The law is 
based neither on research concerning student 
performance nor on the need for agricultural 
labor. Instead, it reflects strong and persistent 
advocacy by the Commonwealth’s travel and 
tourism industry, which believes the legislation 
is important to its financial welfare.
The theory was (and is) that amusement 
parks, hoteliers and restaurants in tourist 
destinations, and other tourist attractions 
1  To read the full text and all waivers, please reference: Code of 
Virginia § 22.1-79.1, “Opening of the school year; approvals for 
certain alternative schedules,” retrieved May 27, 2018, from 
https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter7/
section22.1-79.1.
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benefit significantly when Virginia’s public schools do not open until after 
Labor Day. There are three parts to this hypothesis. First, the supposition 
is that tourist destinations in Virginia will attract incremental Labor Day 
business that otherwise they would lose if public schools opened earlier. 
Second, supporters believe that later public school openings enable tourist-
oriented businesses to employ high school teenagers who otherwise might 
be forced to quit their jobs earlier because of their school responsibilities. 
Third, it is believed that schools can reduce air conditioning costs if they 
open after Labor Day.
The Kings Dominion law remains controversial and has faced recurring 
challenges since its enactment, with bills introduced in the General 
Assembly in each of the past eight years that would allow local control 
of start dates.3 During the 2018 legislative session, advocates for repeal 
introduced two bills in the House of Delegates that would have allowed 
public schools to decide on their own whether classes would start before 
or after Labor Day. One of the measures included a sweetener that would 
have required schools to give students a four-day Labor Day weekend.4 
While both bills passed the House of Delegates, each failed in the Senate’s 
Health and Education Committee. Thus, the post-Labor Day school 
opening requirement remains in force. However, as we will see, practically 
speaking, the law’s requirement has been waived for almost 56 percent of 
all Virginia public school students. It is a virtual certainty that the law will 
remain a legislative issue in forthcoming sessions.
Virginia’s Kings Dominion law contains important exceptions and the 
reality is that many public schools in the Commonwealth open prior 
to Labor Day. Figure 1, based on data from the Virginia Department 
of Education (VDOE) for the 2017-18 school year, illustrates that the 
divisions not receiving a waiver from the VDOE are heavily concentrated 
in eastern Virginia. 
Who can receive a waiver? Waivers giving school divisions the option 
of an earlier start date are available to schools if they have been 
closed an average of eight days per year during any five of the last 10 
3  Jessica Samuels (Feb. 15, 2017) “Schools still can’t start before Labor Day,” The Virginia Gazette, www.vagazette.com/news/va-vg-cns-school-calendar-0215-20170215-story.html.
4   Chelsea Jackson and Katie Bashista (Feb. 1, 2018), “All Virginia schools may get authority to open before Labor Day,” Capital News Service, 
www.fredericksburg.com/news/all-virginia-schools-may-get-authority-to-open-before-labor/article_7d531a22-a311-59e2-845e-350f96925c3d.html.
5  Virginia Department of Education School Calendars for 2017-18, retrieved from the Virginia Department of Education website on May 26, 2018, from www.doe.virginia.gov/directories/sch__locales_schedules/_calendars.pdf.
years because of severe weather conditions, energy shortages, power 
failures or other emergency situations, or if they have innovative or 
experimental education programs. Still other possibilities exist, including 
a school division being granted a specific waiver by legislative action, or 
because it is surrounded by or located next to school divisions that do 
qualify for waivers.  
Basing waiver eligibility on days when schools are closed, however, 
introduces a circumstance that economists often label “moral hazard” 
because it introduces adverse incentives. Virginia’s waiver policy supplies 
an inducement for school divisions to cancel school days to ensure they 
qualify for a waiver. Even so, such cancellations do not diminish the total 
number of days that schools must be open (which is 180 days annually, or 
990 hours), but redistribute them to earlier (or later) dates.
The Kings Dominion law and waiver system have led to very different 
school start (and thus, finish) dates, depending on where one lives in 
Virginia. For example, Buckingham County schools in central Virginia 
started classes on Aug. 3 for the 2017-18 school year, while Lancaster 
County on the Northern Neck started the day after Labor Day, Sept. 5.5 
Graph 1 reveals that the percentage of schools in Virginia with a start 
date prior to Labor Day trended upward between 2001-02 and 2017-18. 
More than 716,000 Virginia students, or 55.5 percent of all students, 
attended a school that started prior to Labor Day during the 2017-
18 school year. In practice, the law requiring schools to start after 




SCHOOL OPENING DATES IN VIRGINIA, 2017-18 SCHOOL YEAR
















































































































































Virginia Department of Education
School Division Openings
2017-18
 No waiver - schools open after Labor Day
 Weather related waiver - schools open before Labor Day
 
 Dependency on other divisions - schools open before Labor Day
 
 Innovative or experimental program - one or more schools open 
 before Labor Day
 Division surrounded by a qualifying division - schools open 
 before Labor Day
 Division received waiver in 2011-12 (as provided by the 
 Appropriation Act) - schools open before Labor Day
Richmond
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GRAPH 1 
PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS IN VIRGINIA WITH A PRE-LABOR DAY START DATE, 2001-02 TO 2017-18


















































































































School Start Dates In 
The United States
When public schools should begin their academic year isn’t a matter 
of debate only in Virginia. Figure 2 shows school start date mandates 
for each of the 50 states. Approximately two-thirds of U.S. states allow 
their school divisions to determine their own start dates. In contrast, a 
handful of states provide some division control, but require schools to start 
within specified ranges, such as Aug. 15-31. South Carolina, for example, 
requires schools to start no earlier than the third Monday in August. 
Finally, several states – including, of course, Virginia, but also Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota and South Dakota – require some or all of 
their schools to start after Labor Day. 
Maryland became the most recent state to join the “late start” club when 
Gov. Larry Hogan issued an executive order in 2016 delaying public school 
start dates to after Labor Day.6 The governor cited a 2013 Maryland 
Board of Revenue Estimates conclusion that an extra week of summer 
would add $74.3 million in economic activity to the state, generating 
$7.7 million in additional tax revenue.7 This followed a 2000 Texas study 
showing that early school start dates would result in the loss of $332 
million in economic activity,8 a 2002 South Carolina study that estimated a 
$180 million loss in economic activity9 and a 2008 Tennessee study whose 
comparable estimated loss was $189 million.10 Since then, a 2016 Michigan 
study has appeared with a rather modest $20 million loss estimate.11 
In this chapter, we review and analyze some of the common arguments 
both for and against the Kings Dominion law as well as distinctive 
conditions within Virginia that must be considered. The most commonly 
6 https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EO.01.01.2016.13.pdf.
7 Bureau of Revenue Estimates, State of Maryland, “Economic Impact of a Post-Labor Day Start Date for Maryland Public Schools” (Aug. 14, 2013).
8 Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, “An Economic Analysis of the Changing School Start Date in Texas” (December 2000).
9 Stephan C. Morse, “South Carolina Early School Start Dates and the South Carolina Travel and Tourism Industries: An Analysis of Economic & Tax Revenue Impacts” (August 2002).
10 Stephan C. Morse, “Post Labor Day School Starts in Tennessee: An Analysis of the Economic and Tax Revenue Impacts on Tennessee Travel and Tourism Industry” (January 2008).
11 Anderson Economic Group, “The School Year Calendar and Tourism in Michigan” (Sept. 8, 2016).
12  Virginia Tourism Corporation, “Economic Impact of Travel: 2016 Economic Impact of Domestic Travel on Virginia,” retrieved May 27, 2018, from www.vatc.org/research/economicimpact. Most economists believe the corporation’s 
estimates are on the high side.
13 Jennifer Radcliffe, “Texas Schools’ Later Start Means Big Savings on Utilities,” Houston Chronicle (Aug. 21, 2008), www.chron.com/neighborhood/pearland-news/article/Texas-schools-later-start-means-big-savings-on-1780115.php.
14 As an example, the “2017-2018 Virginia SOL Assessments: Test Administration Dates,” www.doe.virginia.gov/administrators/superintendents_memos/2017/065-17a.pdf.
15  It remains an open question whether SOL scores in themselves should be the goal of schooling, as they may not necessarily coincide with college/workforce preparedness or preparation for students to live normal, well-adjusted 
lives. See www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/08/01/what-do-standardized-tests-actually-test for one assessment.
cited benefit of requiring a post-Labor Day public school start date 
is straightforward: It is helpful to the Commonwealth’s travel and 
tourism industry, which accounts for approximately $24 billion in annual 
Virginia spending and in the process generates 230,000 jobs in the 
Commonwealth.12 
The industry argues that when families have the opportunity to do so, 
many opt to take vacations around Labor Day, patronage that would be 
lost if school divisions were to open prior to Labor Day. Second, some 
argue that travel and tourism companies are dependent on high school-
age workers for the summer season. Thus, if school were to start prior to 
Labor Day, these teenagers most likely would not be available for extended 
holiday weekend work assignments. A third rationale is that there may be 
utility savings when schools open later because air conditioning is needed 
less after Labor Day.13 
Few things of consequence ever occur without accompanying costs. Here 
too, this applies. Three potential negative impacts to student outcomes are 
important to consider when public schools do not open until after Labor 
Day. First, it is possible that high school graduation rates fall at schools 
that open after Labor Day. This is because Virginia law does not require 
students who have not yet graduated to attend school after they have 
reached age 18. Later school start dates mean a slightly larger proportion 
of students will reach age 18 during the school year and therefore be 
eligible to drop out, if they so choose.  
Second, Standards of Learning (SOL) test scores are administered during 
fixed windows of time in each school year.14 If the school year does not 
begin until after Labor Day, then students will have fewer days in class 
prior to the SOL examinations and plausibly might not achieve as well as a 
consequence.15
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Third, students who take national examinations, such as the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT), likewise 
have fewer days in class prior to taking these exams and there may be a 
negative achievement effect attached to this.
In this chapter, we provide empirical evidence from Virginia relating to 
each of these propositions. We also shed light upon the economic impact 
that pre-Labor Day school openings might have on the Commonwealth’s 
travel and tourism industry. Our analysis reveals that the Kings 
Dominion law has not significantly impacted school graduation rates, 
student retention or test scores. Further, repealing the law would not 
have a very large negative impact on Virginia’s travel and tourism 
industry. We estimate that if the Kings Dominion law were repealed, 
the Commonwealth would lose only about $37.5 million in tourism 
spending, even after accounting for the economic ripple effects of 
tourism expenditures inside Virginia. In 2016, this constituted only 
one-sixth of 1 percent of reported total tourism expenditures and an 
almost invisible .000076 percent of the value of the Commonwealth’s 
gross domestic product.  
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FIGURE 2 
MANDATED PUBLIC SCHOOL START DATES: THE 50 STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2017
Source: Education Commission of the States
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A Look At The Evidence 
Concerning Student 
Performance
Let’s begin our analysis by clarifying the nature of our data set. The 
work we present below is based on the performance of students in 130 
of Virginia’s 132 public school divisions.16 During the 2016-17 school 
year, there were approximately 1.29 million full-time students in these 
school divisions, with approximately 49.7 percent identifying as white, 
15.1 percent as Hispanic, 6.8 percent as Asian and 22.6 percent as black. 
We examine school division performance data for each school division 
for every year in the 10-year time interval 2007-08 through 2016-17. 
Therefore, we have 130 * 10  = 1,300 potential observations. Non-reporting 
of data, or the minimal presence of a particular ethnic group in a school 
division, eliminated some school divisions from being included in our 
analysis in specific years.17
Our focus on these school divisions is designed to estimate the impact of 
early or late school opening dates on five academic performance variables: 
(1) on-time graduation rates, (2) dropout rates, (3) standardized test 
scores, (4) SOL pass rates and (5) end of course (EOC) examinations.
16  Because we focus on 130 of Virginia’s 132 school divisions, our sample is almost identical to the population of school divisions. In such an instance, conventional error statistics function primarily as measures of variability rather 
than as measures of statistical significance.
17  Thus, we have 1,253 school division observations that apply to all students; 1,248 that focus on economically disadvantaged students; 321 that focus on Asian students; 1,025 that focus on black students; 596 that focus on Hispanic 
students; 1,251 that focus on female students; and 1,249 that focus on male students.
18  Code of Virginia § 22.1-254: “Compulsory attendance required; excuses and waivers; alternative education program attendance; exemptions from article” states that “every parent, guardian, or other person in the Commonwealth 
having control or charge of any child who will have reached the fifth birthday on or before September 30 of any school year and who has not passed the eighteenth birthday shall, during the period of each year the public schools 
are in session and for the same number of days and hours per day as the public schools, cause such child to attend a public school or a private, denominational, or parochial school or have such child taught by a tutor or teacher of 
qualifications prescribed by the Board of Education and approved by the division superintendent, or provide for home instruction of such child,” retrieved online May 28, 2018, from https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/22.1-254.
19  Students who were born on Sept. 30 and enter school on their fifth birthday would turn 18 on Sept. 30 of their senior year, assuming normal progress through the school grades. At that point, they could not be legally compelled to 
remain in school.
20  In Virginia, the on-time graduation rate is defined as the number of students who have graduated within four years after entering high school, divided by a quantity that consists of the number of students who entered four years 
earlier plus the number who transferred into the school division minus the number who transferred out of the school division, www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/graduation_completion/cohort_reports/calculating.pdf.
21  Per the Virginia Department of Education website, a student is considered economically disadvantaged if he/she meets any one of the following: 1) is eligible for free/reduced-price meals, 2) receives Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families, 3) is eligible for Medicaid or 4) is identified as either migrant or experiencing homelessness, www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/research_data/data_elements.shtml#disadvantage.
RELATIONSHIP OF PRE-LABOR DAY STARTS 
TO ON-TIME GRADUATION RATES
One of the more important arguments against starting after Labor Day is 
that later starts might negatively impact student retention and graduation 
rates. According to the Code of Virginia, compulsory attendance is 
required up to the student’s 18th birthday.18 Given the enrollment 
provisions, it is possible that some students will turn 18 as early as Sept. 
30 of their senior year.19 One can imagine the thought process of some of 
the students who fall into this category. If they perceive that they have 
little chance of graduating, or they already are earning what they consider 
to be significant income, then they will be more likely to drop out.  
We rely upon a common statistical technique known as multiple linear 
regression to focus on the determinants of school division graduation 
rates. Our aim is to assess the impact of the start date of a student’s 
school division (pre-Labor Day or not) on the on-time graduation rate20 of 
the school division. However, it is clear that factors in addition to school 
start dates influence graduation rates, and so we also explore the influence 
of several other variables on the on-time graduation rate: (1) annual 
per student spending in the student’s school division, (2) the presence 
of economically disadvantaged students in the school division,21 (3) the 
gender of students in the school division and (4) the ethnic background of 
the school division’s students.  
Graph 2 presents the results. The 0.54 coefficient for the “all students” 
variable tells us that a pre-Labor Day start date would increase the 
graduation rate of all students in a school division by .54 percent. The 
horizontal line bracketing the 0.54 number provides information that helps 
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us understand how confident we can be in the precision of this estimate. 
Suppose we were able to find data for 2017-18, 2018-19 and other years, 
and then performed the same analysis. How confident can we be that we 
would once again end up with the value 0.54? We utilize a conventional 
5 percent level of statistical significance in this regard. The horizontal 
bracket tells us that if we found a new sample of years and performed the 
same analysis, 95 percent of the results would lie inside this interval and 
only 5 percent would lie outside it.
However, note this: A zero value resides within this interval, as do quite 
a few negative values. This means that if we found the new sample and 
conducted the same analysis, we might end up with values such as -0.25 
or .00. The horizontal bracket, which is termed a confidence interval, tells 
us that we cannot be supremely confident that our 0.54 estimate would 
emerge if we found a new sample of school division years.  
This seriously reduces our confidence in the 0.54 estimate. Indeed, if we 
were testing a formal hypothesis that the actual value of early school 
start dates upon on-time graduation rates is zero, then we could not 
reject this hypothesis.
A perusal of the estimates reported in Graph 2 reveals that every one of 
them features a horizontal bracket that contains a zero. This means that 
we cannot be confident at least 95 percent of the time that a new analysis 
with a new sample of years and school divisions wouldn’t generate a zero 
result.22 This would mean that start dates have no influence on graduation 
rates. 
The practical significance is that we can’t show that any of the explanatory 
factors in Graph 2 has a statistically significant influence upon on-
time school division graduation rates. For example, the 1.61 estimate 
for Hispanics suggests that early school start dates increase Hispanic 
graduation rates by 1.61 percent. Unfortunately, we aren’t sufficiently 
confident in this result that we can rely on it. If we took a new sample and 
performed the same analysis, then we might obtain a very different result, 
perhaps even a negative percentage.     
22   Is there anything magical about the 95 percent criterion (which corresponds to a .05 level of statistical significance) rather than, say, a 90 percent criterion? No. However, a .05 level of statistical significance is used widely and is 
the standard in trials in federal courts.
GRAPH 2
EFFECT OF A PRE-LABOR DAY START UPON ON-TIME 
GRADUATION RATES
Source: Analysis based on data compiled from the Virginia Department of Education, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts Local Government Comparative Reports. Note: Each 
coefficient estimate is generated using a linear regression model, including per pupil educational spending, 
local unemployment rate, school fixed effects, a school-level linear time trend and a school-level quadratic time 
trend to account for time variant trends at the local level. Errors are clustered at the division level. Excludes 
specific special schools for which information is not available. Sample only includes divisions listing between 
272 and 299 calendar days for the school year (1st and 99th percentiles, respectively). Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals are shown.
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Effects Of Pre-Labor Day 
Starts On High School 
Dropout Rates
An argument against a mandatory law that requires K-12 schools to open 
after Labor Day is that later starts will lead to more high school students 
dropping out of school before the end of their senior year. Older high 
school students may turn 18 during their senior year and thus decide to 
leave high school. While this may have been more common decades ago 
when a high school diploma was not necessary for some forms of labor, 
it is common knowledge today that failing to finish high school leads to 
significantly lower lifetime earnings. While students still drop out of high 
school, these decisions are multifaceted and may be due more to lack of 
parental guidance, poor learning environments and a perceived lack of 
economic opportunities.
These arguments notwithstanding, we examine the empirical evidence of 
whether school start dates have an effect on high school dropout rates. 
While the negative coefficients in Graph 3 suggest that pre-Labor Day 
start dates might diminish dropout rates, a quick scan of the values and 
the intervals confirms that each contains a zero and therefore there are no 
statistically significant effects of starting before Labor Day on high school 
dropout rates. That is, if our standard of evidence is a 5 percent level of 
statistical significance, then we cannot conclude that early school start 
dates have an influence on high school dropout rates. 
GRAPH 3
EFFECT OF PRE-LABOR DAY SCHOOL DIVISION START 
DATES UPON HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT RATES
Source: Analysis based on data compiled from the Virginia Department of Education, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts Local Government Comparative Reports. Note: Each 
coefficient estimate is generated using a linear regression model, including per pupil educational spending, 
local unemployment rate, school fixed effects, a school-level linear time trend and a school-level quadratic time 
trend to account for time variant trends at the local level. Errors are clustered at the division level. Excludes 
specific special schools for which information is not available. Sample only includes divisions listing between 
272 and 299 calendar days for the school year (1st and 99th percentiles, respectively). Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals are shown.
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Effects Of Pre-Labor Day 
Start Dates On Standardized 
Test Scores
In Virginia, Standards of Learning (SOL) represent the “minimum 
expectations for what students should know and be able to do at the 
end of each grade or course in English, mathematics, science, history/
social science and other subjects.”23 Performance with respect to these 
standards is measured by SOL exams administered within a specified 
time window that applies to all public schools in Virginia. For instance, in 
2017-18, for the graduating senior end of course (EOC) exams, there was 
a window of March 5-16 for a student’s first attempt at his or her writing 
tests. EOC exams are high-stakes exams that can determine the type of 
diploma high school graduates receive24 and are a factor in school funding 
and performance evaluations. It is possible that later start dates would 
penalize student performances on the EOC exams because students so 
affected would have less time to prepare for them.   
The Virginia Department of Education provided us with mathematics SOL 
score pass rates for grades 3-8 for school years 2007-08 to 2017-18 as well 
as EOC exam pass rates for English: reading, English: writing, history 
and social science, mathematics and science for the time period 2007-08 
through 2017-18.  
Graph 4 contains estimates of the impact that a pre-Labor Day school 
division start date has on EOC pass rates across all five major exams. 
The same statistical criteria apply as in Graphs 2 and 3. Because zero 
values reside inside each of the horizontal confidence interval brackets, 
we cannot find any statistically significant impact of pre-Labor Day school 
start dates on EOC pass rates.   
23 Virginia Department of Education Standards of Learning (SOL) and Testing, retrieved June 7, 2018, from www.doe.virginia.gov/testing/index.shtml.
24 Virginia Department of Education, “Frequently asked questions about earning a Virginia high school diploma,” retrieved June 19, 2018, from www.doe.virginia.gov/instruction/graduation/faq.shtml.
GRAPH 4
END OF COURSE PASS RATE EFFECTS BY PRE-LABOR DAY 
SCHOOL DIVISION START DATES
Source: Analysis based on data compiled from the Virginia Department of Education, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts Local Government Comparative Reports. Note: Each 
coefficient estimate is generated using a linear regression model, including per pupil educational spending, 
local unemployment rate, school fixed effects, a school-level linear time trend and a school-level quadratic time 
trend to account for time variant trends at the local level. Errors are clustered at the division level. Excludes 
specific special schools for which information is not available. Sample only includes divisions listing between 
272 and 299 calendar days for the school year (1st and 99th percentiles, respectively). Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals are shown.
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Effects Of Pre-Labor Day 
School Division Start Dates 
On SOL Scores
Next, we turn to the influence of early school start dates on SOL scores 
in grades 3 to 8. We focus initially on mathematics and these results are 
reported in Graph 5. We emerge with the same conclusion – in this case, 
early school start dates have no statistically significant influence on SOL 
mathematics scores.
Next, we look at SOL reading pass rates in grades 3 to 8. While no 
statistically significant differences are evident in Graph 6 for grades 3 to 
6, the results for grades 7 and 8 do meet our .05 standard of statistical 
significance. An early school start date is associated with a 2.3 percent 
lower likelihood of passing the reading SOL for seventh-graders and a 
3.3 percent decline for eighth-graders. This is interesting, as these are 
the only instances where we find any statistically significant evidence that 
early school start dates have an impact on academic performance. It is not 
clear why these results emerged in these two cases.
Notwithstanding the two anomalous results reported in Graph 6, 
our overall conclusion is that there is little or no evidence that early 
school division start dates harm academic performance. If anything, 
the evidence leans in the opposite direction. It does not appear that 
academic considerations should play a major role in the discussion 
about whether the school year should begin before or after Labor Day. 
GRAPH 5
THE IMPACT OF PRE-LABOR DAY START DATES ON 
MATHEMATICS SOL PASS RATES IN GRADES 3-8
Source: Analysis based on data compiled from the Virginia Department of Education, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts Local Government Comparative Reports. Note: Each 
coefficient estimate is generated using a linear regression model, including per pupil educational spending, 
local unemployment rate, school fixed effects, a school-level linear time trend and a school-level quadratic time 
trend to account for time variant trends at the local level. Errors are clustered at the division level. Excludes 
specific special schools for which information is not available. Sample only includes divisions listing between 
272 and 299 calendar days for the school year (1st and 99th percentiles, respectively). Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals are shown.
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GRAPH 6
READING SOL PASS RATES IN GRADES 3-8 BY 
PRE-LABOR DAY START
Source: Analysis based on data compiled from the Virginia Department of Education, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts Local Government Comparative Reports. Note: Each 
coefficient estimate is generated using a linear regression model, including per pupil educational spending, 
local unemployment rate, school fixed effects, a school-level linear time trend and a school-level quadratic time 
trend to account for time variant trends at the local level. Errors are clustered at the division level. Excludes 
specific special schools for which information is not available. Sample only includes divisions listing between 
272 and 299 calendar days for the school year (1st and 99th percentiles, respectively). Ninety-five percent 




28 Elton Mykerezi and Genti Kostandini (2016), “The impact of post Labor Day School Start Mandates on Summer Travel: Evidence from a Quasi-experiment,” Tourism Economics, 22(3), 637-644.
A Look At The Economic 
Evidence Concerning Public 
School Division Start Dates 
On Economic Activity
As of mid-2018, Gov. Ralph Northam had yet to take a position on the 
merits of the Kings Dominion law. In contrast, Northam’s predecessor, 
Gov. Terry McAuliffe, supported the law, specifically citing concern for 
how changing it might adversely affect the Commonwealth’s travel and 
tourism industry.25 The “tourism issue,” as McAuliffe called it, was the 
original impetus for changing school start dates back in 1986. The thrust 
of the economic argument comes from the Virginia Restaurant, Lodging 
and Travel Association (VRLTA), a tourism industry trade group. Among 
other priorities, the VRLTA has focused its legislative effort on protecting 
Virginia’s post-Labor Day school start date.26 The VRLTA contends that 
starting classes in August would be detrimental to Virginia’s travel and 
tourism industry and subsequently reduce overall state tax revenues.27 
Most of the empirical studies that have focused on the economic effects 
of pre-Labor Day school start dates have been produced or paid for by 
parties that have had a proverbial horse in the race. These parties crave 
a certain result and this is what they usually receive. This is not to say 
that one should discard these studies (many of which were cited earlier in 
this chapter), but rather that their conclusions should be interpreted with 
discerning eyes.  
Only one rigorous study of the school start date issue has gone through 
peer review and criticism. It is the subject of a 2016 article in the journal 
Tourism Economics, authored by Elton Mykerezi and Genti Kostandini.28 
We will have much more to say about it later in the chapter.  
One practical reason for the paucity of rigorous studies of the school 
start date issue is that Labor Day falls in the middle of the third quarter 
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of the year. Therefore, it is not so easy for analysts to determine the 
precise impact that school start dates have on travel and tourism industry 
receipts.
Importance Of 
Tourism Spending To 
The Virginia Economy
Without a doubt, the travel and tourism industry plays an important role 
in the Virginia economy. Table 1 provides Virginia Tourism Corporation 
(VTC) estimates of tourism expenditures in Virginia in 2016. Note, 
however, that the VTC contracts with the U.S. Travel Association (USTA) 
to provide these estimates. The USTA utilizes a proprietary model to 
generate its estimates and hence it is not possible to audit or check the 
numbers it provides. Most economists familiar with the situation believe 
that the USTA’s estimates are generous, at least partially because of the 
expansive definitions it utilizes in deciding what is a tourism expenditure.
Nevertheless, tourism expenditures and employment are significant in 
the Commonwealth. In 2016, $24 billion (4.8 percent of Virginia’s gross 
domestic product in that year) could be attributed to tourism if one 
accepts the USTA’s estimates. These expenditures were associated with 
more than 229,000 jobs (or about 5.9 percent of Virginia’s total nonfarm 
employment in 2016). Hence, it takes about $103,000 in annual travel 
spending inside the state to support one tourism-related Virginia job.29  
The economic argument in favor of tourism doesn’t stop with the 
expenditures we have noted in Table 1 and Graph 7. Tourism spending, 
like all other spending, reverberates through the economy in areas where 
it takes place. Figure 3 illustrates a simple visual version of the “economic 
wave” of tourism and visitor spending. First, tourism spending creates jobs 
in the hospitality sector and related industries from the direct spending 
noted above. Cities and the Commonwealth capitalize on this spending by 
collecting revenues from meal and restaurant taxes, transient occupancy 
29 www.vatc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2016_Economic_Impact_of_Domestic_Travel_on_Virginia_and_Localities.pdf.
(hotel and motel) taxes and admission taxes. For most tourism-reliant 
areas, these taxes are important revenue streams. The economic ripples 
continue with indirect and induced effects. The indirect effect relates to 
the spending done by businesses that supply the tourism industry, while 
the induced effect focuses on the spending undertaken by tourism industry 
workers with the income they earn. To the extent that pre-Labor Day 
public school openings reduce tourism expenditures, these indirect and 
induced effects shrink due to resulting smaller direct effects.
TABLE 1







Lodging $4.7 billion 40,800




General Retail Trade $2.3 billion 15,500
Public Transportation $3.1 billion 24,000
Auto Transportation $4.6 billion 8,700
Totals
$24.0 billion 
(4.8 percent of 
Virginia GDP)
229,000 (5.9 percent 
of Virginia nonfarm 
employment)
Sources: Virginia Travel Corporation for estimates, FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) for Virginia 
gross domestic product, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VANGSP and Virginia employment, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/VANA. Travel planning accounts for 3,348 employees and approximately 
$183 million in payroll and is included in the totals. Estimates rounded to the nearest 10th for expenditures 
or 1,000th for employment.
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As noted previously, the scholarly journal Tourism Economics has 
published research that addresses the issue of how much tourism spending 
might occur (or not occur) during a Labor Day holiday due to earlier 
public school opening dates. Using appropriate statistical techniques, 
Mykerezi and Kostandini found that families with children traveled 3.56 
fewer days in August and September when they lived in states with pre-
Labor Day public school openings. However, the families made up some of 
this decline by traveling more between May and July. The net reduction in 
leisure travel, May through September, was 1.59 days per family. Hence, 
there is a negative tourism effect attached to earlier public school opening 
dates for these families with children. However, for families without 
children, the net effect, May through September, was effectively zero. 
Thus, on average, it is only families with children that are affected by 
legislation such as Virginia’s Kings Dominion law.   
Virginia Tourism Commission data also suggest that the Labor Day 
weekend tourist effect is not quite as large as some might perceive. 
Graph 8 discloses that single-day tourism travel (with no overnight stay) 
increases in September and peaks in October. Leisure travel (defined here 
as consisting of travel more than 50 miles away from home and involving 
at least one overnight stay) declines a bit in September, but rebounds 
smartly in October. Perhaps some households make up for any reductions 
in their Labor Day tourist trips with additional travel later in the fall. 
Senior citizens may also travel after Labor Day to take advantage of lower 
hotel rates.
FIGURE 3
THE ECONOMIC RIPPLE EFFECTS OF TOURISM 
EXPENDITURES
Source: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 7 
VIRGINIA DOMESTIC TRAVEL EXPENDITURES, 2007-2016
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GRAPH 8
LEISURE AND DAY TRIPS BY MONTH IN VIRGINIA, 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 
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Who Engages In Tourism 
In Virginia?
Table 2 reveals the origins as well as the destinations of Virginia tourists, 
according to VTC data. Tourists entering the Commonwealth come 
primarily from East Coast states and travel broadly across Virginia. 
Notably, Table 2 informs us that only 26 percent of leisure travelers in 
Virginia come from Virginia. This is welcome news because these travelers 
from other states represent “new” or “outside” money that does not simply 
redistribute dollars already here. However, this flow of guests from other 
states also carries with it implications for school start dates. Any tourist 
industry sting associated with revoking the Kings Dominion law is reduced 
significantly because almost three-quarters of overnight leisure travel 
inside the Commonwealth comes from other states. 
Those who do engage in leisure travel in Virginia are relatively wealthy 
and over one-third earn more than $100,000 a year (see Table 3). Sixty-
six percent of leisure travelers are married, yet only 30 percent of 
those traveling for leisure bring their children with them. This is 
important because the Kings Dominion law only has a direct impact on 
families that have school-age children. 
Finally, the VTC travel profile data provide several useful measures of 
overnight leisure travel activities. The average leisure travel trip lasts 2.5 
nights and involves 2.8 individuals. Spending per travel party trip averages 
$550, or approximately $220 per day. Unfortunately, these data are not 
categorized by families with and without children.
TABLE 2

























Virginia 26% 64% 45% 45% 28% 38% 31% 37% 41% 36% 33%
North 
Carolina
8% 13% 6% 9% 9% 11% 6% 6% 18% 12% 11%
Pennsylvania 8% 5% 6% 6% 11% 7% 9% 10% 5% 6% 8%
New York 7% <1% 6% 7% 8% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% <1%
Maryland 7% 6% 7% 4% 7% 7% 7% 6% 3% 4% 6%
Florida 5% 5% 3% 3% 4% 4% 6% 4% 4% 4% 4%
All Other 
States
39% 7% 27% 26% 33% 27% 35% 31% 24% 34% 38%
Source: Virginia Tourism Corporation’s “Profiles of Travel in Virginia FY 2017”
135
TABLE 3











































$548 $166 $473 $588 $729 $626 $471 $515 $552 $387 $475 
Average 
Nights
2.5  3.3 3.6 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.6
Source: Virginia Tourism Corporation’s “Profiles of Travel in Virginia FY 2017”
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How Many Families In 
Virginia Are Affected By 
The Kings Dominion Law?
You will remember that Graph 1 disclosed the rather large percentage 
(62.6 percent) of schools that obtained a waiver for the 2017-18 school 
year. In Table 4, we break down the number of Virginia families with 
pre- versus post-Labor Day school division start dates. The U.S. Census 
definition of a family is that it consists of a household with two or more 
individuals who are related by birth, marriage or adoption. 
Table 4 shows that approximately 60 percent of households live in areas 
with pre-Labor Day school starts. This means that more than 826,000 
households currently are in school divisions in which the public schools 
begin prior to Labor Day and only about 425,000 households reside in 
school divisions that begin after Labor Day. Interestingly, Table 4 also 
reveals that the presence of children in a household or the household’s 
income makes little difference in terms of whether that household is in a 
division that opens its schools either early or late.
The fact that almost 60 percent of school divisions in Virginia have 
received waivers from the Kings Dominion law means that its effects have 
been muted over time. Nonetheless, we would like to know what those 
effects are. We can mine the information presented thus far to develop 
a simple, transparent measure of the economic impact of pre-Labor Day 
public school division openings. 
Table 4 illustrates that for all the households in Virginia, about 60 percent 
reside in areas where school starts prior to Labor Day. Not all households, 
however, have children. Of the approximately 1.2 million households in 
areas where schools open prior to Labor Day, approximately 587,000 have 
children. The remaining households did not report having children and 
would thus be largely unaffected by school start dates. On the other hand, 
of the approximately 826,000 Virginia households that reside in post-
Labor Day school start areas, about 401,000 have children. The remaining 
425,000 households without children would, again, be largely unaffected by 
when schools start their academic year.
TABLE 4 
CURRENT FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS WITH PRE- AND POST-LABOR DAY START IN VIRGINIA
 Pre-Labor Day Start Post-Labor Day Start % Pre-Labor Day Start % Post-Labor Day Start
Family Households 1,221,761 826,079 59.7% 40.3%
Family Households Without 
Children
 634,549 425,141 59.9% 40.1%
Family Households With 
Children
587,212 400,938 59.4% 40.6%
Family Households Over 
$30,000 Income Without 
Children
599,687 424,270 58.6% 41.4%
Family Households Over 
$30,000 Income With 
Children
443,525  292,799 60.2% 39.8%
Source: American Community Survey 5-year estimates
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Simply put, this means that of the 2.05 million households in Virginia 
in 2016, only about 20 percent were impacted by the Kings Dominion 
law. Table 4 also reveals that neither family income nor the presence 
of a child made a difference as to whether a household was in a pre-
Labor Day or post-Labor Day school division. Most households in 
Virginia are unaffected by when a school division opens, except, 
perhaps, for traffic increases due to parents taking children to and 
from school and the ubiquitous presence of yellow school buses on the 
road.
If we allow for economic ripple effects, then this number could rise to $50 
million. However, to the extent these families choose to vacation outside 
of Virginia, the size of this estimate declines. Suppose these families spend 
one-quarter of their vacation days outside the Commonwealth. Then, our 
net loss number declines to $37.5 million. 
Recall that the VTC reported that travel-related spending in Virginia was 
almost $24 billion in 2016, while our simple calculation relating to the 
repeal of the Kings Dominion law results in an estimated $37.5 million 
annual loss. This estimated loss is less than one-sixth of 1 percent of total 
tourism expenditures – nothing to be sneezed at, but hardly resembling 
the financial hammer blow that supporters of the law have contended.   
Final Thoughts
For a fairly innocuous law about school start dates, the Kings Dominion 
law has led to strong opinions regarding its impact on school performance, 
tourism and economic impact. Both sides of the debate have brought 
reasonable arguments to a question of policy: Should local control or 
central control prevail with regard to when public primary and secondary 
schools start instruction? What should prevail: economic arguments or 
arguments about how children learn and are tested?
Supporters of the Kings Dominion law argue that pre-Labor Day school 
year openings would lead to damaging economic losses. We do find 
damages, but they are remarkably small: less than one-sixth of 1 percent 
of the VTC’s estimated annual tourism expenditures in Virginia and an 
almost infinitesimal .000076 percent of Virginia’s gross domestic product 
in 2016. Perhaps one way to alleviate these concerns is to allow districts to 
open the school year based on local preferences but to mandate a four-day 
Labor Day holiday. 
Opponents of the Kings Dominion law argue that delayed school openings 
harm school performance. Students who attend schools that open later, as 
this argument goes, have less instruction time to prepare for standardized 
tests. We find no empirical evidence to support this argument. Our 
analysis suggests that, after controlling for district characteristics, there 
are no discernable empirical differences in test scores between early- and 
late-opening districts.
We acknowledge that our conclusions are unlikely to satisfy those on 
either side of the argument. The discussion is important but the squabbles 
over the repeal of the Kings Dominion law ultimately involve arguments 
over very small stakes. We find almost no evidence that revoking this law 
would harm the Commonwealth. It seems sensible to allow school divisions 
to pursue their own pleasure concerning public school start dates.
Our new Constitution is now established, 
and has an appearance that promises 
permanency; but in this world nothing can be 
said to be certain, except death and taxes.









tate and local governments often seek 
ways to obtain more revenue, especially 
to fund ever-increasing expenditure 
demands. Excise taxes represent one possibility 
in this regard. An excise tax is one levied by the 
federal, state or local government on a specific 
good, such as gasoline, cigarettes or alcoholic 
beverages. Responsibility for paying this tax 
falls on merchants, who generally seek to pass 
on the tax to the price of the good(s) they sell. 
Unlike income taxes, an excise tax is a tax on 
consumption – if someone doesn’t buy the good, 
they don’t pay the tax.
Increasing existing excise tax rates or levying 
new excise taxes on certain goods offers a 
potentially attractive revenue source for state 
governments, including Virginia. The state 
can collect the necessary tax revenue, while 
avoiding increasing – or possibly being able to 
decrease – their income tax or property taxes. 
No issues in tax deductibility arise, since excise 
taxes are generally not deductible from federal 
or state income taxes.
Excise taxes for alcoholic beverages provide 
an additional potential benefit to state 
governments. Along with taxes on cigarettes, 
they represent an example of a so-called “sin 
tax.” Excise taxes on beer, wine and distilled 
spirits have the ancillary effect of reducing 
alcohol consumption and thus the adverse 
effects associated with overuse of alcoholic 
beverages. Efforts can take the form of 
discouraging negative externalities, such as 
alcohol abuse or driving while intoxicated.
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This chapter examines excise taxes on alcoholic beverages in Virginia. It 
includes a look at the historical record of excise tax revenue over time 
for the United States and Virginia; how Virginia’s excise tax rates on 
beer, wine and distilled spirits compare to those of other states across 
the country; the role of Virginia’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority; 
and alcohol consumption over time, including the incidence of negative 
alcohol-related behavior, in the Commonwealth. We conclude by examining 
whether increasing excise tax rates on beer, wine or distilled spirits 
constitutes a potentially effective policy for Virginia.
Revenue From Excise Taxes 
On Alcoholic Beverages: 
Historical Trends
Excise taxes on alcoholic beverages have long been a source of income 
for state and local governments. The Urban Institute, a nonprofit think 
tank, collects data on state and local governments. For the U.S. overall 
(Graph 1), revenue from excise taxes declined in real (inflation-adjusted) 
terms from 1977 to 1999 but has increased since the turn of the century. 
Total excise tax revenue on alcoholic beverages for all state and local 
governments fell from $8.8 billion in 1977 to $6 billion in 1999, but then 
recovered to over $7 billion in 2015.
We observe a similar pattern in the Commonwealth in Graph 2, where 
excise tax revenues on alcoholic beverages fell from $250 million in 
1977 to around $161 million in 1997. Since then, excise revenues on 
alcoholic beverages have recovered smartly, reaching $257 million in 
2015. From 1998 to 2015, excise tax revenues on alcoholic beverages 
increased almost 60 percent, even after accounting for the effects of 
inflation, and excise tax rates on beer and wine have not changed in 
recent memory.
Excise taxes from the sale of alcoholic beverages have been markedly 
resilient this century, weathering economic downturns in stride. Even 
during the Great Recession, real (inflation-adjusted) revenue from 
excise taxes on alcoholic beverages for state and local governments 
in the U.S. only fell from $6.4 billion in 2007 to $6.3 billion in 2008 
before increasing to $6.5 billion in 2009. Over the same period, 
Virginia’s real excise tax revenues on alcoholic beverages increased 
from $192 million in 2007 to $198 million in 2009. While revenue 
dipped slightly in 2011, it has steadily increased since then, reaching 
$257 million in 2015.
Consistency in revenue from excise taxes on alcoholic beverages contrasts 
with income tax revenue, which tends to be much more sensitive to 
fluctuations in economic activity. The Great Recession resulted in 
significant declines in income tax revenue for state and local governments. 
These same governments were also constrained by balanced budget 
requirements and from borrowing to fund day-to-day expenditures. States 
and local governments faced an unenviable decision of having to increase 
taxes from other sources, cut expenditures, or both.
From 2008 to 2010, state and local government income and sales tax 
revenues in the U.S. fell by 15.3 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. 
For Virginia, income and sales tax revenues fell by 15.5 percent and 3.7 
percent, respectively, over the same period. For comparison, national 
excise tax revenues on alcoholic beverages increased by 3.4 percent and 
Virginia’s increased by 2.3 percent from 2008 to 2010. Excise taxes on 
alcohol, wine and distilled spirits offered more consistency and actually 
grew during the depths of the recession.
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GRAPH 1
ALCOHOL TAX REVENUE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1977-2015
Sources: State & Local Government Finance Data Query System, the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, Government 
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GRAPH 2
ALCOHOL TAX REVENUE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN VIRGINIA, 
1997-2015
Sources: State & Local Government Finance Data Query System, the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, Government 





















Tax Rates On 
Alcoholic Beverages 
Each state sets its own excise tax rates for beer, wine and distilled spirits 
(the federal government and possibly local governments set additional 
excise tax rates on each of these beverages as well). Excise tax rates on 
the various types of alcoholic beverages differ considerably across states, 
with Virginia having relatively high rates. As of Jan. 1, 2018, the excise 
tax rates on beer, wine and distilled spirits for Virginia are each above the 
corresponding median rates, based upon the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia.
Virginia’s state excise tax rate for beer equals $0.2565 per gallon (Figure 
1), ranking it 21st nationally. The highest excise tax rates on beer are in 
Tennessee ($1.28), Alaska ($1.07) and Hawaii ($0.93), while the lowest 
rates are found in Wyoming ($0.018), Missouri ($0.06) and Wisconsin 
($0.06). Virginia’s excise tax rate for beer is slightly above the median 
state tax rate on beer of $0.20 per gallon.
Virginia’s state excise tax rate for wine equals $1.51 per gallon (Figure 
2).1 It ties for sixth highest (with Georgia) among the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. The highest excise tax rates on wine come from 
Alaska ($2.50), Florida ($2.25) and Iowa ($1.75), with the lowest rates 
found in Missouri ($0.06), Wisconsin ($0.064) and California ($0.20). The 
excise tax rate for wine in Virginia is more than twice the median rate of 
$0.72 per gallon.2  
In Virginia, the government directly controls the sale of distilled spirits, 
one of 17 states to do so. According to the Distilled Spirits Council of the 
United States, the estimated excise tax rate for spirits in Virginia equals 
$19.90 per gallon (Figure 3).3 This rate ranks third highest nationally. 
The highest excise tax rates for distilled spirits occur in Washington state 
($31.48) and Oregon ($22.78), with Missouri ($2.00), Colorado ($2.28) and 
1 Pennsylvania, Utah and Wyoming are omitted from this sample since all wine sales in these states take place through state stores. Revenue in these states comes from various taxes, fees, price markups and net profits.
2 Tax Policy Center (2018b).
3 Alcoholic beverage control states, of which Virginia is one, earn revenue through ad valorem markups as well as excise taxes. Excise tax rates on distilled spirits are estimated for these states.
4 http://www.virginiaspirits.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Understanding-the-Economics-of-Distilling-and-Selling-Spirits-in-the-Commonwealth-1.pdf.
Texas ($2.48) having among the lowest rates. Virginia’s excise tax rate for 
distilled spirits is well above the median of $5.56 per gallon.
As the Commonwealth controls the sale of distilled spirits, it can alter 
the markup on spirits to generate more revenue. Whether this markup 
is economically efficient is a matter of debate. The Virginia Distillers 
Association (VDA), for example, argues that distillers contribute more in 
excise taxes on a per gallon basis than wine or beer producers. In 2016, the 
VDA estimated that Virginia’s excise tax on a per gallon basis for distilled 
spirits was almost $31, higher than the $1.51 for wine and $0.26 for beer.4 
Their argument was that one should not only consider the direct excise 
tax but also the markup, handling fee and other charges that create a 
higher burden for distillers. Regardless of whether one only examines the 
excise tax on spirits or a more inclusive measure of the burden on spirits, 
a reasonable conclusion is that Virginia has a relatively high tax rate on 
distilled spirits. Given the emergence of craft distilleries (much like craft 
breweries), these relatively high tax rates may discourage investment in 
the distillery industry in the Commonwealth.
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FIGURE 1
STATE EXCISE TAX RATES ON BEER: 
DOLLARS PER GALLON, 2018





















STATE EXCISE TAX RATES ON WINE: 
DOLLARS PER GALLON, 2018
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators (2018)
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FIGURE 3
DISTILLED SPIRITS EXCISE TAX RATES: 
DOLLARS PER GALLON, 2018
Sources: Tax Foundation (2018) and the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States
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Excise taxes serve as one means for state and local governments to collect 
tax revenue. Sales taxes are another source. In contrast to its excise tax 
rates on beer, wine and distilled spirits, Virginia has one of the lower 
combined average sales tax rates in the nation (Table 1). With a state 
sales tax rate of 5.3 percent, Virginia ranks 31st among the states and the 
District of Columbia. California ranks the highest (7.25 percent), followed 
by four states – Indiana, Mississippi, Rhode Island and Tennessee – at 
7 percent. Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon do not levy a 
sales tax at all.
As localities can piggyback on state sales taxes, combined sales tax rates 
paint a slightly different picture. Virginia’s combined average sales tax 
rate of 5.63 percent (5.3 percent state and 0.33 percent local) places 
it 41st among the states that have a sales tax (Table 1). The sales tax 
rate in Virginia falls below the median of 6.80 percent. Virginia’s 
relatively high excise tax rates on alcoholic beverages may help keep 
its sales tax rate low.
States also collect revenue from several other different types of taxes and 
fees, such as property taxes and income taxes. Individual states place very 
different emphases on the various types of taxes as ways to obtain income 
(Table 2). Relative to its neighboring states, Virginia relies more heavily 
on income taxes, placing less importance on property taxes. Collections 
from sales and gross receipts also have relatively lower weight in Virginia. 
Maryland and West Virginia have less dependence on income taxes, 
placing a greater emphasis on sales and gross receipts. Maryland also 
collects a greater percentage of its income from property taxes, relative to 
the other states in the sample. Sales taxes from alcoholic beverages make 
up a small but nontrivial percentage of tax collections among the states. 
For Virginia, taxes from this source comprise 1.3 percent of total revenue. 
TABLE 1
SELECTED STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX RATES 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2018






Louisiana 1 10.02% 5.00% 5.02%
Tennessee 2 9.46% 7.00% 2.46%
Arkansas 3 9.41% 6.50% 2.91%
Washington 4 9.18% 6.50% 2.68%
Alabama 5 9.10% 4.00% 5.10%
Oklahoma 6 8.91% 4.50% 4.41%
Virginia 41 5.63% 5.30% 0.33%
Maine 42 5.50% 5.50% 0.00%
Wyoming 43 5.46% 4.00% 1.46%
Wisconsin 44 5.42% 5.00% 0.42%
Hawaii 45 4.35% 4.00% 0.35%
Alaska 46 1.76% 0.00% 1.76%
Source: Tax Foundation (2018). Four states do not levy a sales tax at the state or local level.
TABLE 2
STATE TAX COLLECTIONS BY SOURCE:  











Virginia 0.1% 32.4% 61.2% 1.3%
Maryland 3.6% 42.8% 46.2% 0.2%
North 
Carolina
NA 42.5% 50.0% 1.4%
West Virginia 0.1% 50.1% 38.8% 0.3%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2016) 
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Alcoholic Beverage Control 
(ABC) In Virginia
Virginia is one of 17 states nationwide to have a state-owned and -operated 
alcohol control board (Figure 4). As in these other “control” states, 
the ABC in Virginia has a monopoly on the sale of distilled spirits (e.g., 
bottled hard liquors such as rum or whiskey). The Virginia ABC does 
allow the sale of “liquor by the drink” in food establishments; however, 
the sale of distilled spirits by the bottle is only legal in ABC stores. In 
contrast to distilled spirits, the ABC permits the sale of beer and wine in 
establishments outside of the state-controlled ABC stores, such as grocery 
stores and convenience stores. 
The ABC in Virginia has a long history dating back to the 1930s, when it 
was created shortly after the end of Prohibition. Today the ABC employs 
close to 4,000 people and operates 366 stores statewide. Sales and profits 
have increased steadily over the past few years. In 2017, ABC stores 
recorded sales totaling $940.1 million, an increase of over 17 percent 
from $800.5 million in 2014 (Graph 3). Correspondingly, profits in 2017 
totaled $171.7 million, up from $140 million in 2014, an increase of over 
22 percent. Along with helping to increase Virginia’s general tax revenue 
fund, monies from the ABC help finance several state alcohol-related 
programs, including youth and adult education prevention programs, 
training programs for alcohol servers and managers, and alcohol 
awareness groups.5
Virginia’s ABC regulates the sale and movement of alcoholic beverage 
products into and within Virginia, including the approval of product labels 
and franchise agreements. The agency also collects excise taxes on these 
products and submits reports to the appropriate public entities.6 
In 2017, the Virginia ABC authorized more than 19,000 retail licenses 
for businesses in various localities to sell alcohol on their premises. 
Every county in the Commonwealth allows the legal sale of beer and 
wine, conditional on the local retail establishment obtaining the proper 
5 Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2017, Annual Report.
6 Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2017, Industry Resources Report.
7 https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/senate-liquor-panel-will-study-whether-to-make-virginia-s/article_8b17b4f8-056f-5823-9756-fcdae75d1311.html.
license. The counties of Bland, Buchanan, Charlotte, Craig, Franklin, 
Grayson, Highland, Lee and Patrick remain “dry,” meaning that the 
sale of distilled spirits is currently prohibited. A Virginia Senate 
panel, however, is considering a reform of Virginia’s liquor laws to 
make every county “wet” by default. Under this proposal, a county 
would have to hold a referendum to remain or become “dry.”7
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FIGURE 4
ALCOHOL BOARD CONTROL STATES
Source: National Alcohol Beverage Control Association, 2018. For Maryland, only Montgomery County has a control board. Some jurisdictions in Alaska, Maryland, Minnesota and South Dakota have adopted forms of the “control” 
model.
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GRAPH 3
VIRGINIA ABC SALES AND PROFIT
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Alcohol Consumption And 
The Costs To Society
Alcohol consumption has been a daily part of social and private life in 
the United States dating back to our country’s founding. While there are 
laws in place that restrict alcohol consumption (Sunday sale bans, age 
restrictions, etc.) across several states, the consumption of alcohol has 
generally been legal throughout U.S. history, with the notable exception 
of the Prohibition period (1920-1933). In 2015, the average Virginian 
drank about 2.1 gallons of alcoholic beverages per year, lower than the 
national average of 2.32 gallons (Graph 4).  
Beer consumption constitutes roughly half of all alcoholic beverage 
consumption. In 2015, according to the National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), Virginians, on average, drank exactly one 
gallon of beer per capita per year, 0.48 gallons of wine and 0.64 gallons of 
distilled spirits. At the national level, Americans on average drank 1.09 
gallons of beer per capita per year, 0.42 gallons of wine and 0.81 gallons of 
distilled spirits.
Overall, alcoholic beverage consumption in Virginia has remained 
relatively steady over the past decade (Graph 5). That said, current 
consumption levels (2.12 gallons per year) in Virginia are roughly 22 
percent lower than their peak in the early 1980s (2.59 gallons per year). 
Declines in beer and distilled spirits consumption have been particularly 
dramatic from their previous peaks. Beer consumption per capita per year 
among Virginians has declined by 52 percent from its peak of 1.52 gallons 
per capita per year in 1986.  
Per capita consumption of distilled spirits in Virginia peaked in 1980 
at 0.90 gallons per year, implying that current spirits consumption has 
decreased by roughly 41 percent since then. In contrast, wine consumption 
has increased since the late 1970s (the earliest years available in the 
NIAAA data). Virginians drank 0.21 gallons per capita per year of wine in 
1977, in contrast to today’s number of 0.48 gallons, more than double the 
previous rate.
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GRAPH 4
APPARENT ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2016




































Virginia United States■ ■ 
153
GRAPH 5
VIRGINIA ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN GALLONS PER CAPITA: 
TYPE OF BEVERAGE, 1977-2016
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Virginians’ consumption of alcoholic beverages has trended roughly in 
line with the national average over time. In the United States, alcoholic 
beverage consumption rates peaked in 1981 with an average consumption 
rate of 2.76 gallons per capita per year (Graph 6). The latest numbers 
available at the national level are 2.32 gallons per year, roughly 16 
percent lower than their previous high. Similar to Virginia, the national 
trends show a decrease in beer and distilled spirits consumption and an 
increase in wine consumption. U.S. per capita alcohol consumption in 
2015 was roughly 28 percent less than its previous high of 1.39 gallons 
per year in 1981. Consumption of distilled spirits is now 23 percent lower 
in comparison to the high of 1.05 gallons per year in 1978. As for wine, 
consumption rates at the national level of 0.42 gallons per capita per year 
are 50 percent higher than their previous low of 0.28 gallons per year in 
1994.
Alcohol is a textbook example of a good (product) that can have negative 
externalities associated with its consumption. In this context, the term 
“negative externality” simply means that the consuming individual does 
not bear all of the costs associated with purchasing and consuming the 
good. Examples of these added costs include those associated with health 
care, drunk driving and crime related to over-consumption of alcohol. 
Drunk drivers impose a cost on society through higher death and injury 
rates. They not only impact themselves, but could also affect others when 
crashes occur. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention noted 
in 2012 that 1.4 percent of Virginians reported they had driven after 
drinking too much in the past 30 days (Graph 7). This rate for Virginia 
does, though, compare favorably with the national median of 1.9 percent. 
Montana (3.4 percent), Nebraska (3.4 percent) and North Dakota (3.3 
percent) have the highest percentages.8 
Binge drinking, particularly among youth, also represents a major alcohol-
related concern for health officials. Underage binge drinking can lead to 
negative long-term health consequences as well as destructive behavior 
on a number of fronts. Of note, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration defines binge drinking as having five or more 
drinks on the same occasion (i.e., at the same time or within a couple of 
8 As a cautionary note, data from self-reporting surveys can be subject to measurement error, since people may under-report their incidence of negative behavior.
hours of each other) on at least one day in the past 30 days. Underage 
binge drinking nationwide and in Virginia occurs with much greater 
frequency than driving after drinking too much (Graph 8). Virginians in 
the 12-20 age range report binge drinking in the past month at a rate of 
13.9 percent. This percentage is slightly lower than the national median of 
15 percent, with the highest rates found in North Dakota (21.4 percent), 
New Hampshire (21.0 percent) and Vermont (20.9 percent). 
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GRAPH 6
UNITED STATES ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN GALLONS PER CAPITA: 
TYPE OF BEVERAGE, 1977-2016


























Beer Wine Spirits All Beverages
- - - -
2018 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
156 SIN TAXES AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN VIRGINIA■
GRAPH 7
PERCENTAGE OF ADULTS WHO REPORT DRIVING AFTER DRINKING TOO MUCH  
(IN THE PAST 30 DAYS) 
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An Aside On Sin Taxes
Goods with negative externalities associated with them are common 
in society. Some goods, such as alcohol and cigarettes, are legal, while 
others, like heroin and cocaine, remain banned and prosecuted by law 
enforcement. The standard way to deal with legal goods such as alcohol is 
through something known as “Pigovian” taxes (named after the economist 
Arthur Pigou, 1877-1959). A common name for these taxes is “sin taxes.” 
The idea behind sin taxes is that the consumer of the good should not 
only bear the private cost of consumption, but also the social costs 
associated with the product. Society should not have to pay for the extra 
health care costs that an individual imposes upon himself by excessive 
alcohol consumption. This is typically corrected by way of a per-unit, 
or ad valorem, tax on the good. In this example, society doesn’t ban the 
commodity outright, but rather makes the consumer pay more at the price 
register (through a higher tax rate) to account for the costs imposed on 
the populace at large. In general, the tax rates on such goods should be 
roughly equal to the costs imposed on society.
While it is difficult to monetize all of the negative externalities associated 
with alcohol consumption, it has been attempted by a number of 
researchers.9 This line of literature has generally found that alcohol 
taxation across the United States and within Virginia itself is lower than 
optimal – that is, the tax revenue collected on alcohol does not appear 
to fully pay for the negative externalities imposed on society by way of 
its consumption. Raising the current tax rates on alcohol might help 
offset the costs imposed on society through higher tax revenues. If the 
Commonwealth desires to further shift the societal costs associated with 
alcohol consumption to consumers, raising alcohol excise tax rates might 
be a prudent (though potentially unpopular) course of action. 
9 A summary of this research is available at Congressional Research Service (2014).
10 A summary of these rate changes is available at Tax Policy Center (2018b).
11 See Kenkel, Donald S., “Are Alcohol Tax Hikes Fully Passed Through to Prices? Evidence from Alaska,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 95 (2), 273-277.
Final Observations
Is it time for Virginia either to increase the markups on the alcohol it sells 
in its state liquor stores, or to levy an increase in the excise tax? Certainly, 
in examining whether the state should enact such a move, several issues 
need to be considered, including the potential impact on the emerging 
craft brewing and distillery industries. There is also the philosophical 
question of whether it is sound public policy to use the tax system to 
discourage (or encourage) individual behavior.
First, how does the Commonwealth fare in its alcohol excise tax compared 
to other states? Virginia has relatively high excise tax rates on wine and 
distilled spirits. Its excise tax rate for beer is closer to the average but still 
above the median for U.S. states. However, Virginia also has not changed 
these tax rates in over 15 years. Other states have periodically levied 
excise tax increases in recent years, at least in part to generate more 
revenue.10 In particular, Alaska has taken such actions despite having 
among the highest excise tax rates for alcoholic beverages.11  
Second, would a hike in excise tax rates on beer, wine or distilled spirits 
actually result in greater tax revenue for Virginia? Excise taxes are the 
responsibility of the merchant who sells the beverage. Merchants will pass 
on the increased cost to the consumer with a higher overall price (retail 
price plus tax), based upon what markets will bear. 
Third, we must recognize that Virginia can also raise the markup on the 
alcohol it sells. In terms of revenue, there is no real difference between 
an increase in excise taxes and increases in the markup. However, excise 
taxes are typically more visible to the consumer than, for example, an 
increased markup in an ABC store. Care must be taken to recognize 
the impact of excise taxes and markups on producers and consumers of 
alcohol.
Furthermore, the experience of excise tax increases on alcoholic beverages 
(as well as cigarettes and gasoline) in the U.S. points to “over-shifting” 
behavior. In over-shifting, the change in overall price (retail price plus 
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tax) resulting from an increase in the excise tax is greater than the change 
in the tax itself. If excise taxes increase by $1 a unit, for example, sellers 
will not only fully shift the tax but also increase the underlying price, 
resulting in a greater than $1 retail price hike to consumers. The farther 
the distance from a bordering state, the greater the likelihood that over-
shifting will occur, due to the lack of competition.
A hike in the excise tax for beer, wine or distilled spirits in Virginia could 
very well bring about over-shifting in pricing. While the state would 
receive an increase in tax revenue, consumers would likely face higher 
net-of-tax prices. Some research into this question indicates that, even 
in markets for alcoholic beverages that exhibit over-shifting, hikes in 
excise tax increases generally tend to be quite favorable for increasing tax 
revenue.12 Indeed, the actual experience of excise tax hikes in states across 
the U.S. reveals that such increases, including for alcoholic beverages, have 
been consistently successful in generating tax revenue.13  
Moreover, per capita consumption of beer, wine and distilled spirits in 
Virginia has been remarkably constant over the past 20 years, with a small 
increasing trend for wine and spirits. Thus, consumers in Virginia have 
largely absorbed the continual market-based price increases in alcoholic 
beverages that have occurred over this period without undergoing major 
changes in their consumption. In fact, per capita consumption of wine and 
distilled spirits in Virginia has exhibited small but steady increases over 
the past decade. And while the record indicates a decreasing trend over 
time in Virginia’s per capita consumption of beer, the emergence of the 
rapidly growing craft beer industry may lead to a reversal of this pattern.
Might an increase in excise taxes on alcoholic beverages have benefits 
beyond raising additional tax revenue for Virginia? As a “sin tax,” any 
decrease in alcohol use stemming from increased excise taxes on beer, 
wine and distilled spirits might lead to declines in some negative behavior 
associated with over-consumption of alcohol. This may take the form of 
negative externalities, such as underage binge drinking, driving under the 
influence or other signs of alcohol abuse. While our preliminary evidence 
does indicate that Virginia has less incidence of alcohol abuse relative 
12 Dutkowsky, Donald H. and Sullivan, Ryan S. (2017). 
13 See a summary of these changes at Tax Policy Center (2018a, 2018b).
14 See a summary of this literature at Congressional Research Service (2014).
to most other states, any reduction in this behavior would be welcome. 
Further, the Virginia government could allocate a portion of the increased 
tax revenues to statewide programs that address such alcohol-related 
problems.  
It’s not clear how much these negative behaviors would decrease in 
Virginia as a result of such a tax hike, especially since our per capita 
alcoholic beverage consumption seems to be fairly unresponsive to price 
increases. Arguably, though, any reduction in this direction stands as 
favorable. Moreover, considerable research indicates that excise tax rates 
in the U.S. on “sin tax” goods, such as alcoholic beverages, are well below 
optimal rates for achieving significant and acceptable reductions in these 
negative behaviors.14
As another potential benefit, Virginia could use the increased revenue 
from hikes in excise taxes on alcoholic beverages (and perhaps other 
goods) to effect some relief for its taxpayers in their state income tax. 
With the significant reductions in deductibility for state and local income 
taxes and property taxes, the federal tax reform legislation of 2017 
produced shockwaves for residents of states impacted in this way. Many 
Virginia residents will be significantly affected by these changes in the 
federal tax structure in their 2018 tax returns and beyond. 
Although Virginia seems to have kept property tax and sales tax rates 
down relative to other states, it relies much more heavily on income taxes. 
Excise taxes from alcoholic beverages make up a small percentage of total 
tax revenue for the Commonwealth. However, with increased revenue from 
this source, along with possibly raising excise taxes on some other goods, 
including cigarettes and gasoline, Virginia may be able to lessen the state 
income tax burden on its residents. This move could benefit Virginians in 
their federal taxes as well. Increased excise taxes could also counteract 
any decreased state income tax revenue during future downturns in the 
economy.
We should not, however, discount that Virginia is now home to a unique 
craft brewing industry and an emerging craft distillery industry, along 
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with established beer, wine and spirits producers. While consumers have 
shown that they are not highly responsive to changes in price, care must 
be taken not to throw these nascent and established firms out with the 
bathwater. There must be a balance between increasing revenue and 
job creation, especially given that some locations in the Commonwealth 
(Richmond and Hampton Roads, in particular) are now tourist 
destinations for beer, wine and, most likely in the future, spirits.
There is also the question of whether governments should try to 
incentivize specific types of behavior through the tax system. The 
administrative complex and inefficient federal tax code is a prime 
example of how good intentions have gone awry. As the complexity of 
the tax code increases, the transparency of the tax system declines and 
voters’ awareness of what taxes they are paying diminishes. While the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages does generate social costs that may not 
be adequately captured by the current tax system, should we use taxes to 
further decrease consumption? An unintended consequence might be that 
consumers seek alternative forms of consumption, to include illegal drugs, 
which have more serious costs and consequences for society. We only have 
to look at the history of the Prohibition era to observe how good intentions 
had unintended results.
The best course of action may be to stay the course. While it may be 
tempting to increase excise tax rates or markups on alcoholic beverages, 
the emergence of Virginia as a beverage destination has been a boon for 
local economies. Ensuring that some portion of excise tax revenues on 
alcohol continues to fund education, outreach and recovery efforts is a 
wise course of action. While some may view staying the course as inaction, 
it is preferable to slowing job growth and development in industries 
associated with alcohol production and consumption. 
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